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A B S T R A . O T
This thesis examines the 1981 hunger strike by 
republican prisoners in Northern Ireland against the 
removal of special category status from newly convicted 
paramilitary prisoners on 1 March 1976, the fast was part 
of a protest that began in 1975.
The thesis opens with an examination of the origins 
of the Provisional Irish Republican Army in 1969 and the 
emergence of a younger leadership in the late 1970's, and 
evaluates the significance of the prisons in Irish 
history. The development of the prisoners protests 
ranging from the refusal to put on a uniform and perform 
prison work to the rejection of sanitary or washing 
facilities, is analysed. The prisoners demands are 
examined in the context of British and international law. 
The campaign in support of the republican prisoners 
conducted outside the Maze Prison, including the 
formation of the Relatives Action Committee and the 
National H-Block/Armagh Committee is surveyed, and the 
female "dirty" protest at Armagh Prison is examined. The 
medical, ethical, and moral dilemmas presented by hunger 
striking are identified and the thesis examines the 
debate whether the men who died were suicides or martyrs. 
The 1980 and 1981 hunger strikes are examined with 
particular attention to the efforts to bring about a 
compromise with the British government and the factors 
leading to a new hunger strike in 1981 and to the 
intervention of the Catholic Church with the prisoners 
relatives which ended the fast. The hunger strike is
analysed regarding its effect internationally in building 
up republican support, and in the Province where it acted 
as the base for the future success of Provisional Sinn 
Fein later in the decade.
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la. INTRODUCTION.
The origin of the Prison dispute of 1976 to 1981 can 
arguably lie at any time in the last 800 years from when 
the Normans first invaded Ireland to the present 
conflict. Normally, the choice reveals the political bias 
of the writer.
In Chapter II, the historical background to the 
dispute will be examined in more detail. It will include 
a consideration of the background to the emergence of the 
Provisionals in the late 1960’s after a split had 
occurred in the old Irish Republican Army (IRA). The 
power struggle that provided the leadership that was to 
rise to public profile during the hunger strike is also 
examined.! It will also look at the long history of Irish 
republicans’ refusal to accept the status of a criminal. 
Practically every move made during the prison crisis was 
based on precedents set by the Republicans in gaols in 
Britain and Ireland over the last two centuries. 
Traditionally prisoners have refused to do prison work, 
wear any form of convict uniform, take prison cooked 
food, or have anything to do with ordinary criminals 
(ODC’s in prison argot meaning Ordinary Decent 
Criminals). They have also demanded the right to their
1 Liam Clarke, BROADENING THE BATTLEFIELD, THE H-BLOCKS 
AND THE RISE OF SINN FEIN. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 
1987, 45-47.
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own structures of command with the authorities working 
through the structure.%
The immediate cause for the crises, as examined in 
Chapter III, lies in an announcement made by Merlyn Rees 
in February 1976 to Westminster. In this speech he argued 
that as internment had been ended, he intended to follow 
the guide-lines of the report which was compiled by the 
judge Lord Gardiner and published in 1975.3 This report 
argued that the authorities had lost control of the 
prison compounds and that the prisons were not fulfilling 
their role as a reforming institution. In fact it was the 
opposite situation within the compounds. The people 
inside the cages sited in Long Kesh seemed to think that 
an amnesty would soon be announced and that the sentences 
of the courts for serious offences were losing their 
deterrent effect. The newly built cell based prison built 
on the Long Kesh site, but named the Maze Prison (after 
the local village famed as the sight of Northern 
Ireland's horse racing track), was due to be opened, and 
presented an ideal situation for the end of special 
category status.'*
Though the reforms were to also include dramatically 
improved remission of sentences, the government should 
have expected some form of resistance. The new prison 
regime which was dubbed by republicans as
2 Tim Pat Coogan, DISILLUSIONED DECADES^ IRELAND 1965-87. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1987, 222-228.3 HANSARD, 20 February 1976, coll 1077.4 Lord Gardiner (chair), REPORT OF A COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER, IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, MEASURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND. London: Her Majesties Stationary Office, 1975, 33-34.
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"criminalisation" came into effect in regard to crimes 
committed after the 1 March 1976. This was fought by the 
Provisional Irish Republican Array (PIRA), and its legal 
political wing Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) for several 
reasons. Partly this was seen as a direct attack on their 
status as political prisoners, but they also viewed the 
prison policy as part of a greater policy which they 
dubbed "normalisation".. The British authorities called it 
"Ulsterisation". This included reducing the role of the 
Army in directly fighting the Provisionals, by 
introducing the policy of police primacy and increasing 
the role of the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), This led 
to a reduction in the number of British troops on the 
streets of Ulster^, and reduced the number of British 
casualties. "Ulsterisation" also signalled a localisation 
of the conflict and so illustrated that the British were 
preparing for a long term presence in the Province, thus 
unintentionally mirroring the increased role of the 
northerners in the Provisionals. The war on both sides 
now was largely an internal Ulster affair. This was not 
something that the Provisionals would have wanted as it 
would have conflicted with their own perception of the 
troubles. As "criminalistation" was something they could 
easily fight it became the obvious target with which to 
fight the whole "Ulsterisation" strategy.
The protest developed from the original refusal to 
wear convict's uniform. This was first the "blanket" 
protest, then the "no-work" protest followed by the
5 Chris Ryder, THE RÜC, A FORCE UNDER FIRE, London: Mandarin, 1990, 140.
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"dirty” protest when the prisoners smashed all the 
furniture in their cells and refused to use the toilet 
facilities, choosing instead to foul the walls. This, 
together with a refusal to cooperate with the prison 
warders, meant that the protesting prisoners were living 
in appalling (though self inflicted conditions). One also 
can see the formulation of the prisoners aims in what 
became known as the five demands which amounted to a 
réintroduction of special category status. These were:
1. The right to wear their own clothes.
2. The right to abstain from penal labour.
3. The right to free association.
4. The right to educational and recreational
activities.
5. The restoration of all remission lost because of
the prison protest.®
Outside the prison there were two parallel campaigns 
in support of the protesters. This is examined in Chapter 
IV. Firstly the PIRA were conducting an assassination 
campaign against people working within the prison system. 
The aims of this campaign were twofold, to try and 
frighten people off from working as prison officers, and 
an attempt to get prison officers to attack the prisoners 
physically to aid the outside prison campaign. It was 
also an attempt by the Southern leadership to show the 
prisoners that their protest was not being ignored and 
thus maintain morale within the prison. At this stage the 
power-struggle within the Provisionals was heightening, 
and the prisons were known to be sympathetic to the more
6 Coogan, (1987), 229-230.
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politicised northerners who preferred to use the 
political card. These people included; Gerry Adams,- Danny 
Morrison,- and Martin McGuinness outside the gaols;
Brendan Hughes, Bobby Sands, and Mairead Farrell inside 
the prisons.? The external campaign was not a purely 
Provisional operation, though PSF dominated proceedings. 
Several diverse groups were to form a series of Anti- 
Unionist coalitions over the prisons issue. These groups 
included; the Relatives Action Committee (RAC), the Irish 
Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) which was the political 
wing of the INLA (Irish National Liberation Army), the 
remains of the Nationalist Party, Peoples Democracy (PD) 
and PSF.8 This was the first workable coalition that the 
Provisionals had set up, but the most important party 
among Catholics, the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP), was not in attendance, as PSF was only prepared 
to co-operate with organisations that allowed it to be in 
full control. Indeed past attempts at coalition had 
fallen through when PSF complained of SDLP infiltration. 
These groups eventually formed what became known as the 
National H-Block/Armagh Committee at a conference at the 
Green Briar Hotel in Belfast. The Committee co-ordinated 
a national and international campaign in support of the 
"blanketmen", During the 1980 hunger strike the committee 
released leaflets publicising the strikers aims and 
publishing the five demands. The issue of the prisoners
7 Edgar 0'Ballance, IRA LEADERSHIP PROBLEMSr Paul Wilkinson (ed), BRITISH PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM,London; George Allen & Unwin, 1981, 79, & Tim Pat Coogan, ON THE BLANKET, THE H-BLOCK STORY, Dublin; Ward River Press, 1980, 115 & Coogan, (1987), 230-232.8 David Reed, IRELAND; THE KEY TO THE BRITISH REVOLUTION, London; Larkin Publications, 1984, 319.
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was essentially portrayed as one of human rights.9 The 
argument was that the prisoners were political offenders 
because their offence was politically motivated- with 
PIRA members being people who would not in a normal 
society be violent criminals- and so should be regarded 
as political offenders. The other argument was that the 
prisoners were POW’s and should be treated as such under 
the terms of the Geneva Convention. This campaign was 
only partly successful and by 1980 a hunger strike looked 
a near certainty.
However, the escalation to hunger strike meant that 
some serious medical, ethical and moral issues had to be 
addressed by all the actors in the prison dispute. In 
Chapter V these issues are discussed. The medical aspects 
of fasting dictated that fasts would last between on 
average forty-five and seventy days depending on the 
physical condition of the individual hunger striker. The 
human body tries to minimise the damage cased by the 
deprivation of food by reducing the size of most glands 
and muscles, slowing the metabolism and curtailing 
voluntary movements. However after a while the brain is 
permanently damaged as are the respetory muscles, at this 
stage unless the person on the fast was fully fit at the 
start of the strike then they face an increased mortality 
rate.10 It is at this stage that if they are to live they 
have to be force fed and even if they survive the body 
and mind of the striker may be permanently damaged.
9 Ibid, 339-341.
10 John Macleoud (ed), DAVIDSON’S PRINCIPALS AND PRACTICE 
OF MEDICINE, A TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND DOCTORS.
Edinburgh & New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1981, 86-87.
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The authorities faced the problem of whether or not 
to force feed the prisoners but the British had decided 
that they would not medically intervene without the 
individuals or their relatives consent after the death of 
Michael Gaughan in 1974. This meant that the strikers 
would die unless they changed their minds. Did this mean 
that the hunger strikers were suicides or martyrs? This 
was to cause some disagreement within the Catholic 
Church. Cardinal Tomas O ’Fiaich felt that one did not go 
on hunger strike with the intention of dying, while 
Bishop Daly of Derry opposed the fast as a drawn out form 
of suicide. After a number of deaths once it became clear 
that no matter how many prisoners died the Church became 
increasingly opposed to the fast and set out to end the 
strike.  ^^
By 1980, as is shown in Chapter VI, it seemed that 
the campaign, though successful in winning support from 
the nationalist community, was not going to win an 
improvement in prison conditions and had not moved the 
British government to give any concessions. The principal 
hope of gaining a change in government policy was the 
attempt by five "blanketmen" to challenge the prison 
conditions in the European Commission on Human Rights. In 
June 1980, the Commission’s judgement was largely in 
Britain’s favour. However, it did leave one small opening 
for compromise between the authorities and prisoners.
This was that it was the duty of the government to 
provide acceptable conditions for the prisoners and as
11 IRISH TIMES, 2 March 1981 & TIMES, 19 June 1981.
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this was not the case in Ulster then prison conditions 
should be reconsidered.1%
Another hope was a series of discussions between the 
NIC minister responsible for the prisons, Michael Alison, 
and Cardinal O ’Fiaich. However these talks also failed to 
find a mutually acceptable solution. The prisoners would 
not sacrifice on three issues, namely, remission, prison 
work, and uniform. In fact to many republicans the five 
points were the maximum concession to the British. The 
British were unwilling to negotiate and were not prepared 
to sacrifice control. They preferred to offer liberal 
interpretations of prison rules rather than change the 
regime. This would have turned many of the conditions the 
prisoners wanted as a right into privileges. The other 
issue the government were not prepared to move on was a 
differentiation in the conditions for paramilitary 
prisoners and the ODC's.
By the early autumn of 1980 the two sides were 
irreconcilable and a hunger strike was inevitable. The 
seven hunger strikers embarked on the fast towards the 
end of October in the hope that the pressure to stop 
deaths at Christmas time would be increased because of 
the date. On the 1 December they were joined by three 
female hunger strikers in Armagh with the intention that 
this might fuel the moral indignation of the socially 
conservative Irish population. This was also a useful 
method of moral support for the men and an indication 
that the northern leadership were far more socially 
liberal than their predecessors. The pressure was
12 GUARDIAN, 20 June 1980.
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increased to a further extent when a total of thirty 
prisoners joined the fast on the 15 and 16 December, One 
of the seven original hunger strikers, Sean McKenna, was 
badly ill by this time and by the 17 December was 
incapable of keeping water down and would soon die. The 
Northern Ireland Office (NIG) released a statement the 
same day which was passed on to the hunger strikers with 
what they felt was an assurance that if they abandoned 
the strike and saved McKenna's life the proposals could 
be negotiated on. Thus, just before Christmas on the 18 
December, the fast was called off.
There is some confusion as to what happened 
afterwards and this is examined in section (d) of Chapter 
IV, It seems that the prison leaders,- including Brendan 
Hughes the hunger strike DC (Officer Commanding), were 
unprepared to see any deaths. The prisoners thought that 
the deal offered by the government was negotiable while 
the authorities did not. This misunderstanding led both 
sides to feel that the other had broken the agreement, so 
they were determined in 1981 not to compromise.
In an attempt to introduce the agreed reforms the 
authorities placed ninety-six "blanketmen" into clean 
furnished cells. On the 28 January the prisoners 
destroyed the furniture and started to foul the cell 
walls,13 The republican leadership was worried about an 
alarming drop in the number of prisoners on the blanket 
and decided that if the protest was to do anything it had 
to do so fast. On the 9 February 1981, the PSF office in 
Belfast announced that as of 1 March Robert "Bobby" Sands
13 IRISH TIMES, 10 February 1981
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would go on strike to be followed by other prisoners at 
two week intervals. It was hoped that the use of a series 
of single hunger strikes would increase the pressure on 
the government. Thus,- every few weeks there would be a 
new death approaching which meant the external campaign 
could use this to galvanize public support. It was also 
hoped that the single fasts would prevent a repeat of 
the panic that was caused at the end of the 1980 strike 
by the possibility of all seven men dying simultaneously. 
The principal problem of the 1981 strike was the 
total communication failure between the prisoners and the 
authorities. As Humphrey Atkins was to state ten years 
later,- the republicans were not prepared to accept that 
the government could not be seen to negotiate while the 
hunger strike was still on.i* As it turned out it was not 
the republican leadership which in the end recognised 
this but the relatives and the Catholic Church, As will 
be seen the government, from as early as 2 March, when 
Atkins informed Westminster of his intention not to give 
in to prisoners (with three party support), the British 
were ready to allow the men to die.
The next important issue to occur during the crisis 
was the by-election in the seat of Fermanagh and South 
Tyrone on the 9 April 1981. In this seat Sands (the only 
Catholic candidate) was to win an important victory in 
the prisoner's quest for legitimacy. This result was not 
only an irritation to the government, but also the vital 
ingredient in the republican movement's attempts to
14 PACK UP THE TROUBLES, CRITICAL EYE, London: Exco T,V for Channel Four, 24 October 1991.
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expand the external campaign outside of the Province, as 
well as launch PSF's new strategy of using democratic 
politics as a weapon in conjunction with the armed 
struggle.
After this victory there were two new attempts to 
provide intermediaries in an attempt to solve the dispute 
in April before any hunger strikers died. These were by 
Fr John Magee, a personal emissary of the Pope, and the 
European Commission for Human Rights who returned to the 
dispute after a request from Sands’ sister (at the 
suggestion of the Dublin g o v e r n m e n t ) , i s  However, Sands 
died on the 5 May 1981, This resulted in a large amount 
of rioting in nationalist areas leading to the death of 
three people and a resultant increase in sectarian 
t e n s i o n , 16 Throughout the summer both sides became 
further entrenched as the number of deaths mounted up.
By September arguments by British Catholics that the 
hunger strikers were suicides were beginning to gain 
ground even among republican minded clerics in the North. 
This led a prison chaplain, Fr Dennis Faul, to decide 
that he should end the strike. The best way to do this 
was through the relatives who were by now increasingly 
disillusioned with the Provisional's leadership of the 
fast. In a meeting the relatives decided to announce that 
it was their intention to intervene when the strikers 
went into coma. This broke the fast which ended after ten 
strikers deaths on the 3 October 1981,i?
15 GUARDIAN, 5 October 1981,16 IRISH TIMES,- 14 May 1981,17 GUARDIAN, 5 October 1981,
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Originally the Provisionals had hoped that the 
hunger strike might have been the push that they needed 
for their electoral strategy but they did not succeed in 
winning new support. Their supporters simply voted for 
the first time, having previously not bothered. The SDLP 
vote did not go down despite the rise in PSF votes. 
Further, the republican vote has since declined and has 
never been able to reach the support that the H-Block 
candidates had in 1981 in the by-elections. Those votes 
were single issue votes, not declarations of support for 
the Provisionals or the armed struggle. Internationally 
the effect of the hunger strike was useful in advancing 
propaganda and the resultant monies this brought in. The 
dispute and the strike allowed the Provisionals and their 
allies world wide to take their message and compromise 
the British. They were able to portray the British as 
inflexible and intolerant with the prisoners’ rights 
being claimed as human rights. By extension they were 
able to then question the continuation of Northern 
Ireland in the United Kingdom (UK). This was done 
throughout the European Economic Community (EEC), North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Commonwealth, 
much to the consternation of the Foreign Office.
Within the UK and Ireland the dispute sparked off a 
determination to try and find some form of political 
initiative to solve the North’s problems. In the Republic 
the new regime under Garret FitzGerald’s Fine Gael/hahour 
coalition decided to form the New Irish Forum where the 
constitutionalist parties in the Republic and the SDLP 
put forward a series of possibilities for the North.
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These were rejected by the British who in 1982 tried to 
re-introduce the Stormont Parliament but failed because 
the SDLP and PSF boycotted their seats. The SDLP did not 
take their seats up, as they wanted some form of Irish 
dimension which was not present. Then finally came the 
Anglo/Irish Agreement of 1986 which gave the Republic a 
consultative role in the North’s affairs. The UK also for 
the first time mentioned that if the majority of the 
population ever voted for a reunion with the Republic 
then this would occur.
This was successful in halting the rise of PSF and 
allowed the SDLP to become secure in its position. This 
has lead to the retaking of Gerry Adams West Belfast 
parliamentary seat by the SDLP. Ultimately this has meant 
that the legacy (of significant political support) left 
by the hunger strikers to the Provisionals has 
effectively been halted. But so long as the present 
conflict continues in Ireland, the prisons will continue 
to remain an emotive subject which republicans could 
exploit in the future, 
lb. TERMINOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY.
In Northern Ireland even the terminology used is 
politically loaded. This thesis has used a variety of 
terms for the part of Ireland remaining within the UK. 
These are Northern Ireland (the official name), the Six 
Counties (a term preferred by republicans), Ulster (often 
used by unionists meaning the Six Counties not counting 
the three counties now in the Republic) and simply the 
terms the North or the Province. Similarly the Republic 
of Ireland (Official name Poblacht na hEireann) is also
14CHAPTER I
referred to as the Twenty-six Counties, Southern Ireland, 
the South or the Republic. When the term Ireland is used 
without any qualification the whole thirty-two counties 
are being referred to. In reference to the city and 
county of (London)derry the official name is used. So the 
city and county are referred to as Londonderry except 
when the term Derry indicates a correct usage, for 
example the Catholic and Church of Ireland Bishoprics use 
the older term of Derry as do the city council and other 
organisations. Similarly, when referring to the Long 
Kesh/Maze Prison the official name at the period referred 
to is used.
When references are made to other terms such as 
"Criminalisation” or the "Armed Struggle", they are used 
to reflect the perception of the actors involved in the 
Irish Conflict. No political meaning is intended with 
these and other terms, and they are used interchangeably 
when it is appropriate in the text. When reference is 
made to the republican movement the large group of 
organisations who support the forceful unification of 
Ireland ranging from PIKA to the National H-Block/Armagh 
Committee is being talked of. The term Provisional is 
used to indicate PIRA and PSF together. The term 
nationalist is used to indicate the largely Catholic 
people and organisations who support the unification of 
Ireland whether by force or by consent.
No political theory is used in the text for two 
principal reasons. Firstly, the constraints on the word 
limit of the M.Phil thesis has meant that there is not 
the space required to give this approach justice.
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However, the use of theory in a Phd would be a useful 
addition to the study of this period should anyone ever 
approach it. Secondly, the primary intention of this 
thesis was to give an academic overview of the large 
amount of material that has appeared about the prison 
protest in the ten years since it ended. This has meant 
that a principally historical narrative approach to the 
thesis was taken leaving the theoretical work for future 
studies.
The principal sources for this work came from the 
Press Archive in the Department of International 
Relations at St.Andrews University which contained a wide 
range of cuttings from British and international papers. 
The republican press also provided another important 
source explaining the perceptions of the principal actors 
in the hunger strike. A further vital source of material 
was the Linen Hall Library in Belfast which has a large 
collection of ephemera from the dispute including press 
releases and leaflets from all sides in the conflict. The 
secondary works referred to in the literature review were 
important because of the authors’ access to figures not 
available to this researcher.
Ic. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.
The literature on the prison protest of 1976 to 
1981 has two distinctive characteristics. Firstly, it has 
been written from a largely pro-nationalist perspective 
which is to varying degrees sympathetic to the prisoners. 
Secondly, the vast majority of the work was written in a 
journalistic manner rather than from an academic 
perspective. These two factors have meant that much of
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the published literature highlighted human involvement 
and had tendency towards generalisation.
The most important work in this topic was Liam 
Clarkes, Broadening The Battlefield, The H-Blocks And The 
Rise Of Sinn Fein. This work, though sympathetic to the 
nationalist perspective of the conflict, was well 
researched and w r i t t e n . H e  approached the study of the 
dispute as part of the evolving political strategy of the 
Provisionals especially the development of Armalite 
politics by PSF and the northern leadership. His work on 
the hunger strike is largely based on the role of the 
fast in the development of the outside campaign. Much of 
the material that is verifiable proved correct and he 
demonstrated a sound understanding of the principal 
Catholic actors in the crisis whether churchmen or 
gunmen. His area of weakness was in his lack of 
satisfactory contacts amongst Protestants and the 
government. He also over emphasised the role of the 
dispute outside of the Province and its effect on British 
and Irish policy. It could also be argued that he placed 
too much importance on the strike in its long term effect 
on the province as well perhaps reflecting the 
perceptions and bias of his largely republican contacts.
The book by the former editor of the Irish Press,
Tim Pat Coogan, on the prison dispute before the hunger 
strikes of 1980 and 1981 is an excellent source of 
material. On The Blanket, The H-Block Story is 
unashamedly sympathetic to the aims of the prisoners in 
that Coogan felt that they had a good case for special
18 Clarke, (1987).
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treatment, given the situation in the North .{though 
Coogan has always maintained that the physical force 
tradition of republicanism is wrong).is However, unlike 
Clarke, he had good contacts both amongst the Protestant 
community (whether politicians, paramilitaries or Prison 
and Police Officers) and the government. .Sadly he is at 
times over optimistic about Protestant opinion, 
especially that of the paramilitaries in regard to their 
attitude to the dispute and the solution to the greater 
conflict. He puts a more rounded case together than 
Clarke, but it is incomplete as he published the book in 
mid-1980 and has never seen fit to update it with an 
account of the hunger strikes and an assessment of the 
effect of the fast. As his principal intention in 
producing the work at the time was to explain the reasons 
behind the protest to the wider public, so at times it 
tends to sound more like a pamphlet than a study.
This is unfortunate as his accounts of the strike 
in his history of contemporary Ireland Disillusioned 
Decades, Ireland 1966-87 and the updated history of 
physical force republicanism. The IRA,20 are both brief 
and lack the detail of On The Blanket.
The other important work on the hunger strike itself 
was the account published by the Guardian journalist 
David Beresford who covered the dispute for the 
newspaper. The Book Ten Men Dead is unashamedly 
sympathetic to the PIRA and their aims but this does not 
prevent him giving an accurate account of the strike
19 Coogan, (1980),20 Coogan, (1987) and Tim Pat Coogan, THE IRA, Glasgow; Fontana/Collins, 1988,
18CHAPTER I
itself.21 His aim was to give as near to an inside story 
of the dispute as was possible. He was given access to 
the "comffls” (smuggled communications) between prisoners 
and the republican leadership outside the Maze and it is 
upon these that the book is based. He also uses his 
contacts to explain the negotiations between the 
Provisionals and the government. Unfortunately there is 
no way of authenticating his account of the Mountain 
Climber’s dialogue and it is likely that the Provisionals 
may have misinformed him of aspects of the negotiations. 
This close involvement with his material has also 
resulted in him not giving a satisfactory account of the 
collapse of the fast and the estrangement between the 
relatives and the outside leadership. He also has a habit 
of over-emphasising the personal side of the conflict. 
This has meant, that in concentrating upon the minutiae he 
loses the greater picture and is not very good on the 
1976 to 1980 period of the dispute.
There have also been two other books directly 
concerning the dispute which have not been used to any 
great extent in the thesis because they have the 
deficiencies of the Beresford book without the 
advantages. These are The Irish Hunger Strike by Tom 
C o l l i n s f22 and Bobby Sands And The Tragedy Of Northern 
Ireland by John M Feehan.23 The latter book is an 
exercise in the deification of Bobby Sands. Its
21 David Beresford,. TEN MEN DEAD. London: Grafton Books, 1987.22 Tom Collins, THE IRISH HUNGER STRIKE. Dublin & Belfast*. White Island Book Company, 1985.23 John M. Feehan, BOBBY SANDS AND THE TRAGEDY OF NORTHERN IRELAND. Dublin & Cork: Mercier Press, 2nd Rep, 
1984.
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romanticisation of the whole fast and the participants 
quotes heavily from Sands' own writings in an attempt to 
explain his motivation. This mythologiesing of a man who 
outside the prison was a rather sad and inadequate figure 
detracts from the actual act of his hunger striking to 
the death and turns him into something he was not. It is 
a paltry source book to the academic as the material it 
contains is either available else where or not worth 
using. Its analysis remains at the level of preaching to 
the converted.
Tom Collins' book is little better than Feehans': it 
also over romanticises the fast and its participants. The 
work is written in an overly familiar manner. He has an 
irritating habit of using first names which clouds any 
attempt at properly analysing the fast as all critical 
faculties are suspended in regard to the Provisionals' 
though interestingly not the INLA. As an account it is 
reasonably accurate, though it says nothing that is not 
said better else where.
Apart from the above works there have been a number 
of books published about the conflict in the North that 
have devoted substantial sections to the prison crisis. 
Rather like the specialised works, most of these 
histories have taken a position which is sympathetic to 
the nationalist perception of Northern Ireland. This is 
surprising given that the British have a valid 
perspective on the conflict although the Protestants and 
the British frequently do their best to destroy their own 
case. This is in many ways a regrettable situation as an 
outside observer's position is inevitably influenced by
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any chronicler’s biases, though recent publications by 
northerners like Martin Dillon, Chris Ryder, and David 
McKittrick have gone some way to addressing this problem.
The problem remains that much of the very 
generalised work has taken a perhaps over indulgent 
attitude to the violence of the Provisionals. Two good 
examples of this are David Reeds' Ireland, The Key To The 
British R e v o l u t i o n , 2 4 and Kevin Kelley's, The Longest 
War, Northern Ireland And The IRA,25 Reed, is a British 
Marxist who as the title suggests takes the view that the 
Northern troubles are part of the greater revolution and 
makes a Marxist analyses of the PIRA campaign. The work 
is flawed by his failure to come to terms with his 
British nationality. This means that his work is largely 
an explanation or apologia for the republican movement.
He views the more conservative sectarian sections of the 
movement as the reaction to British imperialism, rather 
than an Irish example of intolerance to outsiders. The 
failure to address the sectarian nature of the conflict 
and the republican movement, or its noted lack of success 
in winning any substantial support from the people of 
Ireland, in the end, leads one to feel that Reed will not 
address even in a constructive manner the ugly face of 
Irish republicanism. He is useful though in his slavish 
attachment to footnotes, a rather endearing habit of many 
Marxist writers. His use of republican publications which 
are difficult to otherwise have access to proved very 
useful in the initial stages of research.
24 Reed, (1984),25 Kevin J. Kelley, THE LONGEST WAR, NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE IRA. London & New Jersey: Zed Books, 1988,
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On the other hand Kevin Kelly is an Irish/American 
socialist who sympathises with the aims and ideology of 
the Provisionals but can’t in the end support the use of 
violence. Like Reed he applies what can be broadly termed 
a Marxist analyses to the troubles. At times though his 
ethnic identity gets in the way of his analyses, 
especially when dealing with the hunger strike, this can 
be seen by his emotive choice of chapter heading; They 
Hunger For Justice. It is unfortunate that he can’t see 
the logical implication of his stated views. It seems 
that at heart he would prefer to support the Provisionals 
but has problems with their blood lust. This confusion 
flaws what could have been an interesting
internationalist view of the conflict by an intelligent 
and well informed outsider. He also destroys much of his 
credibility by at the end refusing to address the 
republican movement’s increasingly northern identity and 
its inability to unite even the urban Catholic population 
of Ulster, despite all the injustices which this 
community has suffered since partition. He suggests that 
there should be some form of peaceful mass uprising by 
the people of Ireland. This form of pointless idealism is 
not appropriate for a serious work on the subject.
On the other hand the Northern Irish journalists 
Patrick Bishop and Eamon Mallie in their book The 
Provisional IRA, like many other northern observers, are 
refreshingly realistic to the point of cynicism in their 
analyses of the motivations and actions of the key
CHAPTER I
players in the Province.zs Their freedom from the 
preconceived notions that afflict outside writers makes 
depressing reading but they produce a competent and well 
researched chapter on the hunger strike which was even 
handed and gives no favours to ether side.
It is unfortunate that many of the above mentioned 
writers have not chosen to study the prison dispute to a 
greater extent and that the constraints of writing a 
general history of the Provisionals over the last twenty- 
four years have meant that in the chapters dealing with 
this period many issues could only be touched upon.
26 Patrick Bishop & Eamon Mallie, THE PROVISIONAL IRA, London: Corgie, 1989.
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2a. Introduction.
It is not easy to underestimate the power that 
history has in Ireland. One has only to wander around 
West Belfast to see this. In Protestant areas such as the 
Shankill, one is constantly reminded of the victory of 
King William of Orange against the Stuarts at the Battle 
of the Boyne in 1690 and the gable ends of the terraces 
with their "King Billys" on a charging white horse always 
make an impression. Similarly, when you cross into the 
Catholic areas such as the Falls Road, the gable ends 
will celebrate the 1916 Rising or many of the martyrs 
which republicanism has thrown up over the years. 
Prominent among these martyrs are the ten hunger strikers 
who died in 1981, and specifically the first man to die, 
Robert "Bobby" Sands.
In order to understand the motivations of Sands' and 
the other participants one must study the history of the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and examine the 
way it developed during the current conflict in Northern 
Ireland. One must also examine the long history of 
resistance which has marked the conduct of republican 
prisoners over the last hundred years or so, for as with 
much else, the events of 1981 were not an original event 
but repetition of an old battle fought through the 
decades.
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Section 2b, examines the origins of the PIRA and 
traces its ancestry back to 1916 and the Dublin Easter 
Rebellion. The steady history of schisms and division is 
explained with an emphasis upon the strain between the 
political and military wings of the republican movement.
Section 2c, takes on the evolution of the younger 
northern leadership which was to take power in the 
Provisionals during the 1970's. The conflict within the 
movement between the Southern leadership and its largely 
northern membership is also looked at. The history of the 
development of their strategy of the "Armalite and the 
Ballot Paper" which was to be launched by the 1980 and 
1981 hunger strikes is examined.
Finally, in Section 2d, the history of republican 
Prison resistance is covered. The background goes back to 
the first attempts in the 1880's by Fenians to gain 
Prisoner of War (POW) status. The later actions by IRA 
prisoners are also examined in the section in an attempt 
to understand previous precedents to the 1981 fast.
2b. A BRIEF HISTORY ON THE ORIGINS OF THE PROVISIONAL 
IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY.
In order to understand many of the actions which 
republicans took during the prison dispute which lasted 
from 1976 to 1981, it is important to look to Ireland's 
past, for all sides in the current conflict take history 
extremely seriously and often use the past to justify 
their own actions or condemn those of their opponents.
The origins of the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army, as we know it today, lie back in 1922 with the 
Irish Civil War when the first IRA, which had been formed
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in 1919 from the disparate groups brought together in the 
1916 Easter Rising, split in two, with one faction under 
Michael Collins (the Irish Republican Brotherhood's 
military commander) supporting the Anglo/Irish Treaty of 
1921 and the partition of Ireland, this group became 
Cumann na nGaedheal. The other faction under Eamon de 
Valera (President of the pre-treaty Second Dail Eireann) 
continued to use the name of the IRA and opposed 
partition.1 The two sides were soon locked in combat. 
However, the newly emerged Free State Army was able to 
win the civil war and force the IRA underground.
There was a further split in the IRA in 1926 when 
the remaining constitutionalists within the organization 
under de Valera recognized the Dail and chose to fight 
for a Republic and the unification of Ireland by largely 
peaceful means as the political party Fianna Fail. This 
left the IRA in the hands of hard-core republicans who 
strongly believed in the physical force tradition of 
Irish nationalism and refused to join what they regarded 
as a foreign controlled puppet Dail.2 The IRA continued 
to remain occasionally active in both Ireland, usually by 
killing Garda Siochana and Royal Ulster Constabulary 
(RUC) officers, and in Britain most famously in a series 
of bombings in England in 1939.2 The most recent "pre­
troubles" example was an attempted border insurgency 
campaign between 1956 and 1962, which ended due to a lack 
of support from the Roman Catholic population in the
1 J.Bowyer Bell. THE SECRET ARMY, A HISTORY OF THE IRA, 1916-1970. London: Sphere Books, 1972, 55-58.2 Bell, (1972), 55-58.3 Tim Pat Coogan. THE IRA. Glasgow: Fontana/Collins Books, 1988, 167.
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North.4 After 1962, the IRA became increasingly dominated 
by left-wingers, led by Cathal Goulding. These theorists 
preferred to look for a class based revolution which 
would unite both Protestant and Catholic workers in a 
non-sectarian socialist united Ireland.s
The by now neo-Marxist IRA began to look on Ireland 
with a view to becoming a far more constitonalist 
organization. However, in the late 1960's Northern 
Ireland began to grow unstable again. Young Catholics, 
especially from the universities, began to resent the 
domination of the Province by the Protestant unionists 
who unashamedly Gerrymandered (arranged constituency 
boundaries at the expense of the Catholics) local 
elections. This ensured that areas like Londonderry City 
with a large Catholic majority would elect a Unionist 
council which would then ensure that Catholics would be 
allocated the worst housing and allowed firms to 
discriminate in favour of Protestants along with many 
more manifestly unfair practices against the minority.® 
This was excused by many unionists on the basis that 
Protestants were loyal to the Crown and so deserved help,
4 In a statement at the end of the campaign (26 Feb 1962) the IRA said a factor had been the attitude of the public, "whose minds have been deliberately distracted 
from the supreme issue facing the Irish people- the unity 
and freedom of Ireland".Coogan, (1988), 418.5 In 1967 at the annual Bodenstown oration Goulding said that social and economic goals should take priority over the ending of partition.Coogan, (1988), 308-309.6Paul Arthur & Keith Jeffrey. NORTHERN IRELAND SINCE 1968, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988, 5.
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while Catholics were a rebel community and so should not 
be trusted.?
While this dissent was largely led by Catholics 
however, it also included liberal Protestants and was not 
at first a republican movement. In fact the civil rights 
movement made a special point of rejecting the old order 
represented as much by the Catholic Nationalist party as 
by the Protestant Unionists. This non-traditional outlook 
was shown by their use of the slogan British Rights for 
British Citizens'^ This also summarized their demands, 
which were non-discrimination, a right to a fair vote, 
and improved housing in the Catholic ghettos like the 
Bogside and West-Belfast.® This did not prevent the 
largely Protestant RUC and the brutal B-Specials (a 
Protestant militia that was officially a reserve police 
force) from viciously attacking the civil rights marchers 
and subsequently trying to enter Catholic areas, most 
notably Londonderry's Bogside. The residents of the 
Bogside defended their area well at first from the 
police, and then from the Protestant mobs that followed 
when the police were overwhelmed; this resulted in a 
period of serious rioting and the Province teetered on 
the point of civil war. This caused great concern in 
London and Dublin, who both feared the destabilizing
7 A good examination of the phenomena of Paisleyism as a creed and ideology, which explains many of the reasons behind modern Protestant bigotry is,Steve Bruce. GOD SAVE ULSTER! THE RELIGION AND POLITICS OF PAISLEYISM. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, Chapters 3 and 4.8 Tim Pat Coogan. DISILLUSIONED DECADES, IRELAND 1966- 1987. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1987, 188.
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effect which an all out civil war would have on their 
respective countries.*
The Catholics then organized Citizens Defence 
Committees which turned to the dormant IRA for weapons, 
training and help. In August 1969 the British Army were 
then sent in to aid the civil power because the police 
could no longer operate as a peace keeping force to 
restore order and prevent a civil war breaking out^o. 
However, they had arrived too late to put the IRA back to 
sleep.
As soon as the immediate threat to the Catholic 
areas was lifted by the presence of troops, the IRA began 
to discuss how it should use the situation to achieve its 
aims. It was at this time the IRA began to split again 
between physical force republicans and the more moderate 
political wing of the organization (known as the 
Officials). This time the split resembled the division 
between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks in pre­
revolutionary Russia.
The Officials did not feel that the population was 
ready for revolutionary violence while the more pragmatic 
Provisionals (PIRA) wanted to take advantage of the chaos 
that existed in Ulster after the troops were sent in.
They argued that this was probably the best chance that 
they had to force an end to British rule in Ulster.n 
Another factor was the need to act before any of the
9 Clive Limpkin. BATTLE OF THE BOGSIDE. London: Penguin, 1972, & Desmond Hamill. PIG IN THE MIDDLE: THE ARMY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1969-1984. London: Methuen, 1986, 5.10 Desmond Hamill, (1986), 7.11 Sean MacStiofain. MEMOIRS OF A REVOLUTIONARY. Edinburgh: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975, 135-137.
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reforms, which Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister, Captain 
Terrence O ’Neill had introduced, could dampen Catholic 
anger at the Protestants, although O ’Neill lost his 
position in April 1969 and was replaced by the genial but 
ineffective conservative James Chichester-Clark.
The split took take place in the autumn of 1969 
after events in August which had discredited the IRA as 
an effective protector of the Catholic community because 
of an inability to defend the gheto’s. This led to a 
dissatisfaction with the idealism of Gouldings neo- 
Marxist theorising, amongst the Northerners who needed 
protection from the Protestants. The split, largely 
confined to Belfast, was to be confirmed when in October 
the IRA’s ruleing Army Council voted by twelve votes to 
eight to abandon abstentionism (the takeing of seats in 
legislatures). This meant that by December many 
traditionalists (especially those from Belfast Brigade) 
chose to ignore an Army Convention called to approve the 
issue. When the convention approved the policy change the 
traditionalists established a new Army Convention which 
supported abstentionism and elected a new Executive with 
provisional status which then elected a new Army Council. 
This was to stay provisional for only ten months until 
September 1970, but by that time the status was to have 
given the new movement its name (with its intentional 
echo of the Provisional government declared in 1 9 1 6 ).
This split at times threatened to become an internecine 
feud, but with a few exceptions, while there was no love
12 Patrick Bishop & Eamoun Mallie, THE PROVISIONAL IRA. 
London: Corgie, 1989, 132-137.
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lost between the two factions, there was relatively 
little violence between them. Although they still remain 
hostile to one another twenty-three years later.
When the cease fire was established in 1972 the 
Official Irish Republican Army (DIRA or Officials) ceased 
violent activity, as did PIRA. However, once the cease­
fire collapsed, PIRA chose to escalate the level of 
attacks, regularly killing policemen and solders while 
the Officials chose to give up the gun.is Subsequently, 
the residue of the OIRA split again, with the remaining 
physical force supporters leaving to form the Irish 
Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) and its para-military 
wing the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).i4 Later, 
the INLA was to split in the most violent of all the 
para-military separations in 1986/87, when its Belfast 
Brigade formed the Irish Peoples Liberation Organisation 
(IPLO).
The remains of the OIRA now rest in the Workers 
Party (also known as the Republican Clubs during the 
early 1980's) in Ulster and Sinn Fein-the Workers Party 
in the Republic (now the United Left in the South after 
another split in 1992). In the South the Workers Party 
has retained much of the old IRA's support while in the 
North this support has largely gone to the Provisional 
Sinn Fein (PSF) the political arm of PIRA.
Thus, in the North a new organization which had not 
existed in 1968 had developed out of the citizens defence 
groups. This became known as the Provisional IRA. It
13 Coogan, (1988), 570.14 TIMES, 19 March 1980.
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inherited the physical force tradition of Irish 
nationalism and set out to force the British out of 
Ireland in the belief that one big push was all that was 
needed. It became properly active in 1971 both militarily 
and politically with PSF and set out on its lethal war 
with the security forces.
It was at this stage of the conflict when the 
casualty rate was at the very highest in the present 
conflict in the N o r t h . is This was also when the machinery 
of the security forces was being developed. The most 
important long term judicial effect of this period was 
the introduction of one judge juryless courts for 
scheduled (paramilitary) offences. This was because of 
the fear of the probable intimidation of juries by 
paramilitaries.i®
This special treatment for paramilitaries was not 
the only change from the judicial norm, as in August 1971 
the government at Stormont announced that it had 
introduced the internment without trial of suspected 
members of paramilitary organisations.i? As it turned out 
this became arguably the biggest mistake made in the 
’’troubles” by the authorities. The lists which the army 
and police used were frequently out of date and many 
people were unjustly imprisoned because of this mixture 
of incompetence and stupidity. Internment was abandoned 
by the Labour Party when they resumed power as it had
15 See Appendix II.
16 Lord Diplock, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER 
LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND. London: H.M.S.O, December 1972 , 17-19.
17 Robert Bell, Robert Johnstone & Robin Wilson. TROUBLED 
TIMES, FORTNIGHT MAGAZINE AND THE TROUBLES IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND 1970-91. Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1991, 152.
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patently failed and did more damage than it was worth, by 
gaining sympathy for the republicans. Further, because of 
Stormont's (the Northern Irish Parliament) impatience to 
use internment, not enough time was given to accumulate 
accurate information. Finally, despite the activity of 
the Protestant supremacist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 
all the people interned were republicans until direct 
rule (when Stormont was suspended in 1972 allowing 
Westminster to take over). This helped discredit the 
already unpopular British Army in the eyes of the 
nationalist population. Its failure has also discredited 
internment, probably for good, when it could have had a 
vital role to play in destroying the Provisionals.
Linked to the introduction of internment was the use 
of torture by the security forces in Northern Ireland 
upon internees during interrogation. The allegations 
concerning the torture of at least 250 people at 
Hollywood and Girdwood Barracks, which included beatings, 
sensory deprivation, electric shocks and sleep 
deprivation were compiled by two Catholic priests Fathers 
Denis Faul and Raymond M u r r a y . T h i s  led to the 
government of the Irish Republic deciding that it should 
take these complaints to the European Court of Human 
Rights and led to the Court's criticism of the '^inhuman 
and degrading treatment" given to eight internees by the 
A r m y . 2 0  Thus, the British had by 1975 lost all support
18 Chris Ryder, THE RUC, A FORCE UNDER FIRE. London: Madrarin, 1989, 122-123.19 John McGuffin, THE GUINEAPIGS. London: Penguin Books, 1974, 133-135.20 Paul Foot, WHO FRAMED COLLIN WALLACE?. London: Pan Books, 1990, 12.
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from the nationalist community due to a lack of 
consideration for the sensitivities of the community, 
although the population was not yet prepared to support 
the Provisionals either. It was to take a hunger strike 
and five more years of short sighted policy before that 
became a serious possibility.
However, PIRA strategy was beginning to fail by the 
mid-1970's, largely due to the successful infiltration by 
the RUG Special Branch at every level of the PIRA 
structure, leading to an operational life expectancy for 
a volunteer of only three months before he or she was 
arrested or killed.21 This led to dissatisfaction within 
the younger leadership which was largely directed towards 
the southern dominated Army Council in Dublin. This 
disaffection mirrored the feelings of the Provisionals in 
1969 towards the OIRA. The split in 1969 had been 
dominated by disaffected northerners and it was largely 
the same personalities from that split who now wanted the 
end of the southern domination of the leadership, 
specifically the leadership of Daithi O'Connell and 
Ruarai O'Bradaigh who represented the conservative Celtic 
traditional republicanism popular in the rural areas but 
an anathema to the urbanites in Belfast and Londonderry. 
2c. THE RISE OF THE NORTHERNERS IN PIRA.
While the Provisional/Official split of 1969/70 had 
been powered by the northerners especially in Belfast, 
the Provisional leadership was still largely Southern 
based and ideologically conservative or traditional in
21 Special Correspondent. THE PROVISIONALS HAVE SECOND 
THOUGHTS, FORTNIGHT, July-August 1982, 4.
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based and ideologically conservative or traditional in 
its beliefs. This outlook was not shared by the younger 
leadership from the North who had become graduates of the 
so called "Republican University" at LongKesh Prison. It 
was here that the liberal prison regime (introduced after 
Billy McKee’s hunger strike in 1972) enabled the 
prisoners to study the conflict outside the prison with a 
leisure unavailable to those directly involved in the 
fighting.
The Northerners had discussed the conclusions of 
their studies in prison and agreed that there had to be 
changes once they were released. These Northerners 
included names that were to dominate the republican 
movement for the following decade and a half and included 
Gerry Adams, Brian Keenan and Ivor Bell who along with 
Joe Cahill and Martin McGuiness, became proteges of the 
then Chief of staff Seamus Twomey, one of the few 
Ulstermen on the Provisionals ruling Army C o u n c i l . 2 2 They 
agreed a plan while still in prison which was to be 
enacted upon their release. Firstly, they had to replace 
the membership of the Army Council which was the succesor 
to the second Dail of 1921 (which the IRA recognised as 
the last legitimate government and from which it claims 
descent) from which both the OIRA and PIRA claimed their 
legitimacy. Despite this rather tenuous link to the past, 
it was felt that the Army Council was both too old and 
too conservative to enact the reforms needed.23 Once they
22 Edgar 0 ’Ballance. IRA LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS, BRITISH 
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM. London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1981, 79, & Clarke, (1987), Chap 5.
23 FORTNIGHT. July-August 1982, 4-5.
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this aim under the guidance of Seamus Twomey, allegedly 
at the point of a gun, a working party under Gerry Adams 
produced a staff report which recommended that the PIKA 
should change dramatically. This could be summarized 
under three points.24
1. Improved training to enable captured volunteers 
to resist interrogation during three day and seven 
day detention orders.
2. The phasing out of the Brigade and company system 
and its replacement with a more disciplined cell 
structure.
3. The creation of a political role for Provisional 
Sinn Fein (PSF) in republican areas, remaining under 
PIRA control at all times, trying to build up 
community support by helping in both a welfare 
capacity and giving free advice on local p r o b l e m s . 2 s 
This was linked to an attempt to outline the
movement's ideology in a new training manual which became 
known as the Green Book.
It took the northerners about three years to achieve 
their aims. First they "persuaded" the old Army Council 
to r e s i g n 2 6 .  Once the northerners had consolidated their 
power, they then reorganised the Provisionals army 
structure. In the early 1970's PIRA was run along 
traditional military l i n e s . 2 ? An Army Council was in 
overall command and was responsible for policy and
24 Document captured in 1977 published as an appendix in Clarke, (1986), 251-253.25 Ibid, 251-253.26 FORTNIGHT. July-August 1982, 4-5.27 O'Ballance, (1981), 80.
36CHAPTER II
tactics this was chaired by the Chief of Staff who was in 
effect leader of the PIRA.
Under the Army Council, which was responsible for 
the running of operations, came the Brigade’s who would 
be led by the Brigade Commander and his staff officers. 
The Brigade’s territory would follow the boundaries of 
the counties and the cities as decided, ironically, by 
the British in the nineteenth century. The British 
stopped using these counties in the early 1970’s, but the 
PIRA still clings to their use, so one would, for 
example, have the City of Derry Brigade and the County 
Derry Brigade covering the city and county of 
Londonderry. Where support was high for the Provisionals 
one would also see the counties divided, as was case with 
North Armagh Brigade and South Armagh Brigade (one of the 
most independent minded of all B r i g a d e s ) , ^ 8 Belfast, with 
the largest number of members, had the Brigade split into 
three different Battalions with an internal command 
structure each but under the over all command of the 
Brigade Commander and his lieutenants.
The "army” structure had a number of advantages in 
that it gave great flexibility in operational planning 
and allowed a Brigade Commander to organize an operation 
at the drop of a hat.29 It was also useful to get 
volunteers committed fast, ensuring greater loyalty from 
new recruits in that they would be involved from an early 
stage. Finally, it also gave people an idea of the role
28 Information compiled from ROLE OF HONOUR, AN 
PHOBLACT/REPUBLICAN NEWS, 12 April 1990.
29 FORTNIGHT. July-August 1982, 4-5.
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that they were playing and the idea that they had a full 
picture of events within their area.
These positive factors were outweighed by several 
drawbacks. The Brigades were easily infiltrated by the 
RUC Special Branch ensuring a very high loss rate amongst 
the volunteers.30 It was also very wasteful as people 
would often be taken along for the ride to operations, 
sometimes up to twelve men when only two or three would 
be needed. This led to operations being easily spotted by 
the security forces and an increased number of both 
fatalities and arrests. In addition, it was also more 
likely that an action might be blown by an informer the 
more people knew about it before it began3i. There was 
also the problem of people boasting or talking about 
their involvement when they were in a bar drinking. It is 
known that the British Army would send in intelligence 
people specifically to listen to the gossip in bars, and 
when the Green Book was being written its authors felt 
sufficiently worried to write a warning about loose talk
while drinking.32
This led the younger leaders under Twomey, to decide 
that the whole structure of the organization as well as 
training and tactics should change if they were not to be 
beaten soon. This was to be very important as the reforms 
they produced were to change the face of Ulster politics. 
The movement as a whole had to take account of the 
progression of the conflict from the early stages of the
30 O'Ballance, (1981), 79.31 Ibid, 79.32 THE GREEN BOOK published as an appendix to, Coogan, (1990), 680.
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defence of the Catholic ghettos through a "year of 
victory" policy, when they hoped to push the British out 
to a new situation of a protracted war of attrition where 
the solution would be political. The role of the PIRA was 
to make the British sufficiently tired and sick of the 
conflict to abandon the Protestants, in the same way they 
had left Cyprus and Kenya as a result of military 
resistance to the continued British p r e s e n c e . ^3 They had 
come too late to this realisation as the security policy 
of Ulsterisation had been introduced. This deprived the 
PIRA of the chance of killing many British soldiers who 
were replaced by men of the locally recruited Ulster 
Defence Regiment (UDR) and the RUC. The death of local 
security force members did not have the same impact in 
the mainland as a British death.s* The captured 
Provisional staff report taking account of the new 
situation said.
We must gear ourselves towards long term armed 
struggle based on putting unknown men and new 
recruits into a new structure. The new structure 
shall be a cell system.^^
This reflected the increasing influence that left- 
wing guerilla theorists like Che Guevara, Mao Tse-Tung, 
and Carlos Marighela were having upon the northerners. In 
Guerrilla Warfare, Guevara emphasizes the need for rigid 
central control of the urban guerrilla unit and stated 
that it should consist of no more than four to five
33 Bishop & Mallie, (1989), 171.34 Ibid, 227 & 325.35 Document captured in 1977, published as an appendix in, Clarke, (1986), 251-253.
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m e n . 3 6  He explained that this is necessary for operating 
in the urban environment which he describes as,
exceptionally unfavourable ground, where the 
vigilance of the enemy will be much greater and the 
possibilities of reprisals as well as of betrayal 
are increased enormously
This advice was taken to heart and used with the 
introduction of the cell system. It proved effective in 
reducing the numbers of PIRA losses and restricting the 
flow of basic raw intelligence on the organization being 
collected by the security forces, because of their 
reduced size. By 1990 this meant that the PIRA had 
reduced in size to some eighty men based around eight 
ASU's operating in the Province according to Richard 
Clutterbuck.38 other estimates put the size of PIRA as 
between 250 and 600.3 9 Guevara also advised that 
specialization should be increased within the cell.^o 
This was virtually reproduced in the staff report, "Cells 
must be specialized into IC [Intelligence Collection] 
cells, Sniping cells, execution, bombing, robberies 
etc. "41
There was some opposition to the new cell structure. 
However, in time most volunteers saw the advantages of 
the system though they disliked both the secrecy and 
discipline of the new structure. Those that felt they
36 Che Guevara, GUERRILLA WARFARE. London: Pelican Books, 1969, 39.37 Ibid, 39.38 Richard Clutterbuck, TERRORISM, DRUGS & CRIME IN EUROPE AFTER 1992, London: Routledge, 1990, 76.39 Bishop & Mallie, (1989), 387, and Security Forces Assesment December 1991.40 Guevara, (1969), 39.41 Document captured in 1977, published as an appendix in Clarke, (1986), 251-253.
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could not work in the new system chose to retire or went 
into Provisional Sinn Fein or the INLA.^z
The new structure had become functional by 1979 and 
PIRA has continued to use it since then. It had also 
changed the pattern of violence in Ireland as the PIRA 
became increasingly removed from their origins as 
guerrilla fighters and began to resemble the European 
Terror groups of that time. Firstly, because of their 
need for security, the cells began to become removed from 
the normal day to day life of the nationalist community 
despite the new role for PSF.^s Secondly, the nature of 
the cells would need increased organization and lengthen 
the time spent on the planning operations. This meant 
that PIRA would have to plan an operation weeks in 
advance increasing target selection and largely 
concentrating on terror tactics such as assassination 
rather than the guerilla warfare (fighting with uniformed 
soldiers on duty etc) of the early 1970's. This meant an 
increased use of soft targets like off-duty police and 
members of the UDR. This has led to a substantial drop in 
casualties, especially of soldiers who are no longer on 
the frontline, as it were, which had changed from the 
security forces on active duty to the off-duty l o c a l s . *4 
This has meant increased success in the British attempts 
to contain violence in Ulster rather than to stop it.
However, in introducing the new structure the left 
of the Provisionals probably saved their organization 
from defeat, and as such ensured that violence would
42 DAILY TELEGRAPH, 30 October 1979.43 O'Ballance, (1981), 81.44 Bishop & Mallie, (1989), 328.
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continue to be a feature of Irish politics for many years 
and so maintain the sterility of the political debate. 
This sterility is probably the Provisionals greatest ally 
as this maintains the sectarian nature of the conflict 
resulting in greater support amongst the 
Catholic/nationalist community because of their 
traditional role as defenders of the ghettos.
The use of left-wing theories, especially those of 
Che Guevara, Mao Tse-Tung, and Carlos Marighela were 
important in inspiring the changes suggested in the staff 
report especially in regard to the political role 
envisioned in it for PSF. This may seem initially rather 
surprising as they spoke from a specifically Developing 
World anti-imperialist perspective, and preferred 
rural/guerilla warfare to terrorism unlike the European 
groups that are the PIRAs peers. The European groups grew 
up from the 1960's student groups and this is reflected 
in the makeup of the groups members in that they largely 
came from the middle class and so perceived themselves to 
be an anti-government revolutionary terror groups aimed 
at radicalizing the masses.*5
On the other hand, the PIRA draws its members 
largely, though by no means exclusively, from the working 
class, so they frequently have little formal education 
beyond school l e v e l . ^6 %ts members also do not perceive 
themselves as a terror group but as the legal inheritors 
of the second Dail and so the legitimate legal government
45 US Government, TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988, 61.46 Coogan, (1988), 582.
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of all Ireland.47 In this context they see themselves as 
a resistance group fighting an anti-colonial war against 
an illegal occupying force. It must also be borne in mind 
that they regard themselves as the successors of over 
eight hundred years of resistance against the English 
going back to the Norman invasion of Ireland in 116948, 
This resistance to the English included incidents like 
the Ulster rising and Cromwell’s suppression in the 
seventeenth century, the United Irishmen’s rebellion 
under Wolfe Tone in the eighteenth century, the Fenian 
movement in the nineteenth century, and the Easter Rising 
of 1916 in Dublin. This strong romantic and often 
romanticized tradition has created a mythology which 
attracts recruits into the PIRA who have no real 
political view save for a strong feeling of nationalism 
and possibly a wish to tread along the same path as their 
forefathers.49 This has created an organization that is 
at once both revolutionary and conservative which 
despises its ideological European peers, and looks upon 
itself as fighting a war more in the context of the 
liberation movements of the Developing World with similar 
simple objectives; such as the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and the African National Congress 
(ANC). The PIRA also feels sympathy with the nationalist 
organizations within Europe like the Basque separatists
47 Bishop & Mallie, (1989), 15.
48 The GREEN BOOK states that Irish,
civilisation was a shining light throughout 
Europe prior to the Norman invasion of 1169 with 
which there commenced more than 8 centuries of 
RELENTLESS AND UNREMITTING WARFARE that has lasted 
down to this very day.
Published as an appendix in Coogan, (1988), 683.
49 Clarke, ( 1986), 1.
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Fatherland and Liberty) and the Cypriots who fought the 
British under General Grivas in EOKA {Ethniki Organosis 
Kyprion Agoniston-Eational Organisation of Cypriot 
Fighters).so
Another possible reason for Guevara's influence 
which must also be taken account of is simply fashion. 
Most of the so called northern junta came of age in the 
1960's when Guevara was as much admired for his image of 
rebellion as for his views (a revolutionary James Dean!). 
Guevara not only recommended an additional role for the 
revolutionary as a social reformer, but also 
interestingly stated that one should not use violence if 
there was even an ineffectual form of democracy. Adams 
and his allies realised that they needed violence to 
remain an important force and argue that the Six Counties 
are a gerrymander and that the only legitimate political 
unit would be the Thirty-two Counties.si The role of PSF 
in trying to involve itself in the campaigns to improve 
conditions in Dublin's more notorious housing estates, 
and the advice centres in Ulster, are both examples of 
this attempt to gain support over issues outside the 
normal areas of its appeal. This also links in nicely 
with both Marighela's and Mao's guerilla theories which 
were advocated by Adams in Republican News under his 
covername of Brownie in the mid- 1 9 7 0 's .^ 2 these 
articles he called on the whole community to become 
involved in the "struggle". As Mao states co-operation
50 O'Ballance, (1981), 79.51 Guevara, (1969), 45-47.52 Clarke, (1986), 30.
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with civilians is vital for the survival of the irregular 
fighter on enemy ground.
Many people think it impossible for guerrillas 
to exist for long in the enemies rear. Such a belief 
reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship 
that should exist between the people and the troops. 
The former may be linked to water and the latter to 
the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that 
these two cannot exist together?^ ^
It is also the case that Marighela felt that the
urban fighter had a dual role of soldier and of
propagandist, suggesting that an alternative press should
be established to inform the workers and students of the
guerillas aims so that the people know the slogan: "Let
him who will do nothing for the revolution at least do
nothing against i t " A view which the PIRA and PSF,
given the large numbers of Catholics who vote SDLP but
live in republican areas , would be keen to promote.
In all of this probably Guevara's most important
influence was in supplying a theory of irregular warfare
that involved long term conflict at a time when the
Provisionals needed it, after their first strategy of the
"year of victory" had been discredited. This has allowed
PSF to say that they feel that their victory will not
come for many years without losing to much support.
The final recommendation of the staff report was
that the movement should take a far more active role in
electoral politics while also using violence at the same
time. This was to see the end of abstentionism in any
Irish political body though not Westminster by 1986.
53 Mao Tse-Tung & Che Guevara. GUERRILLA WARFARE. London: Cassell, 1968, 67.54 Carlos Marighela, FOR THE LIBERATION OF BRAZIL.London: Penguin, 1971, 88-90.55 Coogan, (1987), 234.
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This broke with many old conventions within republican 
politics and perhaps understandably caused some 
opposition from conservatives within the movement. It 
also shocked and horrified the unionists who in many 
cases found themselves sitting beside PSF councillors 
around the Province and radically changed the political 
outlook of many nationalist areas, especially in Derry 
City Council. In the case of Derry, politics were now 
inter-nationalist, between the SDLP and PSF rather than 
unionist verses nationalist as it was before.
At the 1981 PSF ard fheis (Annual Conference) in
Dublin, Danny Morrison asked a rhetorical question to the
assembled delegates He asked if anyone would object if 
PSF and PIRA took power, "with a ballot box paper in one 
hand and an Armalite in the other" T h i s  statement was 
to summarize the new "Armalite and Ballot Box" strategy 
that was the logical progression to the plan proposed in
1977 in the captured staff report. This was also
mentioned in PIRA's training manual the so called Green 
Book which outlined the new role for PSF, which formerly 
had played second fiddle to the Provisionals up until 
then. The PSF was to remain under "Army control" at all 
times. However, it had a separate role to play: apart 
from simply supporting the armed struggle it would build 
up a support base within the nationalist community 
campaigning on bread and butter social issues through 
advice centres in the ghettoes which would provide free 
advice on things like overdue electricity bills or
56 Ibid, 233.
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council house rents.s? This it was hoped would give PSF a 
role in local government, and increased credibility as 
the representative of nationalist opinion rather than the 
anti-IRA nationalists in the SDLP. It was also a new 
stick with which to beat the British and the unionists.
This new policy created some problems with the more 
conservative republicans who felt that the abstentionist 
policy of PSF was one of the tenets of militant 
republicanism. This view is illustrated from as late as 
1978 when the ard fheis of that year rejected the idea of 
putting up candidates for the European p a r l i a m e n t .^ 8 This 
rejection of participation politics was for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, it was through a fear that the 
Provisionals were going political. This was 
understandable if one looks at the history of the IRA and 
the amount of times that its leadership grew tired of 
violence and chose the political path, as already 
outlined above. Secondly, it was feared that the new 
political campaign would be at the cost of the armed 
struggle and this is probably why the staff report and «
many of the writings of the leadership of PSF constantly 
affirm their commitment to violence. On a practical side 
one can say that PIRA has suffered as most of the best 
recruits to republicanism today go into PSF rather than 
the PIRA, but it is unlikely that this was a major 
complaint at the time.
The conservatives were also worried about the 
leftist leanings of the northerners. In 1978 the
57 Document captured in 1977, published as an appendix in Clarke, (1986), 251-253.58 Clarke, (1986), 97.
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Trotskyist leader of the Fourth International was 
introduced to the ard fheis and Adams in his own writing 
has often referred to James Connolly, the founder of the 
Irish Labour Party, as an inspiration. He has also said 
that all true Irish socialists should be republicans and 
his writing continually refers to a republicanism based 
on the fight against capitalism whilst talking about the 
Protestant workers as being duped into supporting the 
unionist ascendancy. He uses the old left-wing polemical 
style in his writing and refers to all Irish opponents as 
reactionary whether the Democratic Unionist Party (D.U.P) 
or Fianna Fail.^^ This was the reason why he and the 
other Northerners became known as the left, and a number 
of the rural conservatives with their attachment to 
traditional Catholic values did not trust the move to 
socialism. It also alarmed American sympathisers as the 
bed-rock of United States (US) support lies in the 
conservative Irish-American population who do not look on 
the armed struggle as an ideological revolutionary 
movement but simply as a "Brits Out" campaign. This has 
led to Adams being very careful in emphasising that there 
were republicans who were not socialist and that 
republicanism was a broad church with one primary aim, 
that of the expulsion of the British from Ulster and the 
removal of all British influence from the Thirty-two 
Counties as a whole.®®
59 Examples of Gerry Adams style and beliefs are seen in 
his Book THE POLITICS OF IRISH FREEDOM and his work in 
REPUBLICAN NEWS under the pseudonym of Brownie
60 DAILY TELEGRAPH, 30 October 1979.
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However by force of spirit and the large amount of 
influence that the northerners had built up, they managed 
to drop abstentionism within Ireland but not in 
Westminster or Strasburg. This left a disillusioned 
minority of hard core conservatives within the movement 
and caused a small and altogether insignificant split 
(worth mentioning only because it was led by the former 
President and Vice President of PSF, Ruairi O'Bradaigh 
and Daithi O'Connell), with the formation of an 
abstentionist party called Republican Sinn Fein in 
1986.61
2d. THE PRISONS AND THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT.
Any terrorist movement will be preoccupied about 
what happens to its fighters if they are captured by the 
enemy. This will often take the form of attempts to gain 
the release of imprisoned comrades in kidnap or hijacking 
incidents. Examples of this are manifold. In 1970 the 
British government of Edward Heath released the Popular 
Front For The Liberation Of Palestine (PFLP) hijacker 
Leila Khaled after a British plane was hijacked to 
Jordan.62 in another example the former Italian Prime 
Minister Aldo Moro was murdered in 1978 by the Red 
Brigades {Brigate Rosse) after the authorities in Italy 
refused to release imprisoned terrorists.63 The 
republican movement in Ireland is no different in this 
respect from any of its peers, though it has only rarely 
tried to kidnap people to further its aims in this
61 Clarke, (1986), 238.62 Edward F.Mickolus. TRANS NATIONAL TERRORISM, A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, 1968 TO 1979. London: Aldwych Press, 1980, 214-215.63 US Government, (1988), 71.
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manner, and in most cases when it has tried this 
technique the object was for financial gain rather than 
with any political objective as in the Don Tidey 
affair.® 4
Over time the theory has evolved that PIRA members 
in prison are not so much removed from the struggle but 
rather fighting on another front against the authorities. 
At the same time they can use the enforced leisure 
available as a valuable training period with a chance to 
teach PIRA members many of the theoretical aspects of 
republicanism and the movement's rather one sided 
interpretation of Irish history and culture. The whole 
prison strategy of the republicans could be summarized in 
a sentence by the former hunger striker and some time 
leader of PIRA in Belfast and Chief of Staff, William 
"Billy" McKee, ’’This war will be won in the prisons.
This view of prisoners has over the years created a 
mythology surrounding captured PIRA volunteers which was 
to make the H-Block protest of the late 1970's and early 
1980's an especially useful platform for the northern 
left in order to expand the arena of their war from the 
republican ghettos of Ulster, to the television screens 
of the world. However, the origin of this philosophy 
stems from the pre-independence period of Irish 
republicanism and the subsequent development of the IRA,
64 One of the exceptions to this was in the early 1970's when PIRA made plans to kidnap the Dutch Ambassador in Dublin to trade for two arms smugglers Maria Maguire and Daithi O'Connell who were at that time on the run in Holland,Martin Dillon. THE DIRTY WAR. London: Hutchinson, 1990, 429.65 Tim Pat Coogan. ON THE BLANKET. Swords,Co.Dublin : Ward River Press, 1980, 73.
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and later on PIRA. This means that it is important to 
trace the origins of this philosophy to help understand 
the motivations of the hunger strikers and PIRA during 
the prisons dispute which at times did not seem to 
outsiders to make any sense. Tim Pat Coogan's, On the 
Blanket, covers the history of the prisons dispute 
exhaustively and so the aim here is simply to give a 
brief summary of the main stages in the development of 
the philosophy of the prisons dispute.®®
The power of the idea of sacrifice in Irish culture 
should not be underestimated by the outside observer. The 
nationalist community in Ireland is strongly Catholic and 
so is brought up practically from the cradle to revere 
suffering and martyrdom. It is only a small step to 
translate the Christian belief of dying for the sake of 
others to the prisoners who may have been wrong but who 
are perceived to be fighting for a higher cause, who are 
willing to die so that their comrades can live a better 
life.®? This playing on the deep seated emotions of the 
Catholic population was both obvious and easy for Sinn 
Fein. This was made even easier because of the long 
tradition of hunger striking in Ireland.
In the medieval period the Irish Civil Code (the 
Senchus Mor) featured two recognized forms of self 
starvation. One was Trosscad (fasting on or against a 
person) and the other Cealachan (achieving justice by 
starvation).®8 The strike would normally be held on the
66 Ibid, 73.67 David Beresford. TEN MEN DEAD. London: Graphton Books, 1987, 15.68 Ibid, 15-16.
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doorstep of the person it was directed against and, if 
the strike resulted in death, the targeted person would 
be held responsible. This tradition also found a place in 
Celtic Christianity with legends of St Patrick going on 
hunger strike against God and winning. Also in many 
peoples perceptions fasting is associated with oppressed 
people fighting for justice, whether the Suffragettes or 
Mahatma Gandhi fighting the British in India.6* This has 
made starvation an extremely powerful weapon in Ireland, 
although as we shall see it is also a double edged 
weapon.
The IRA has a long tradition of creating martyrs out 
of members who have been gaoled. This dates back to the 
end of the nineteenth century when the Fenian Jeremiah 
0'Donovan Rossa was imprisoned in 1865 and refused to be 
treated as a criminal prisoner, for which he was 
punished. The conditions in which he was held were 
publicized as part of an emancipation campaign after his 
arms were manacled behind his back for thirty-five days 
after throwing the contents of his chamber pot at the 
Prison Governor. This led to his standing as a candidate 
for the Westminster by-election in Tipperary in 1870 on a 
Republican ticket while he was still a p r i s o n e r . T o  
this day O'Donovan Rossa is held in especially high 
regard by the Provisionals because of the role that his 
funeral played in Dublin during 1915. It started off the 
chain of events in Ireland which led directly to the 1916
69 Ibid, 15-16.70 Robert Kee, THE GREEN FLAG. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972, 358.
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Easter R e b e l l i o n . A t  his funeral Padraic Pearce, the 
future leader of the 1916 Rising, was to give a rousing 
oration which showed the importance of the past and the 
republican prisoners, and would not look out of place 
coming from any present day republican.
Life springs from death and from the graves of 
patriot men and women spring living nations... They [the British] think that they have pacified 
Ireland... But the fools^ the fools, the fools, they 
have left our Fenian dead and while Ireland holds 
these graves Ireland un free shall never be at 
peace.^
The initial public sympathy generated by the 
descriptions of the conditions in which 0'Donovan Rossa 
was held were increased when the leadership of the Easter 
Rising was summarily executed by the British, thereby 
creating the IRA's first martyrs.
The importance of political status to republicanism 
must be remembered. Any attempt at portraying prisoners 
as criminals would be fought at any cost. The belief that 
a republican prisoner is a patriot and not a criminal is 
fairly widespread in Ireland, even among people who are 
not supporters of physical force nationalism. The PIRA 
cherish this belief, and so all wings of the republican 
movement will resist any attempt at challenging this 
status.74
71 This view might be disputed by many modern Irish historians, however this is how the republicans read the events and so it is important to use this reading of history when covering the prisons campaign. This is most recently be illustrated in An Phoblacht/Republican News occasional series of historical articles.AN PHOBLACT/REPÜBLICAN NEWS, 2 August 1990.72 Ibid73 Coogan, (1980), 17.74 Beresford, (1987), 26.
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The prisoners taken in the 1916 Rising were to set 
the precedents for their lineal descendants in later 
years. Another ex-Fenian, Thomas Clarke, who was to take 
part in the actual rebellion, made a prison diary 
outlining his experience in the prisons. This has 
inspired many republicans who have subsequently chosen 
the same path to do likewise.
Sinn Fein also began to learn how to use the 
prisoner's plight as a propaganda weapon. Gerald Boland, 
a prisoner who went on to become a Fianna Fail Justice 
Minister, stated in Coogan's book.
We weren't badly treated really, we had enough 
to eat, we could get parcels and there was liberty 
enough in the compounds. But we made out we were 
given a dog's life. Every little thing we blew up 
for publicity. We'd do anything for a crack at the 
British. We had the whole country agog with our 
propaganda.'^ ®
Perhaps it is not surprising that he and his 
government were unsympathetic when dealing with IRA 
claims of maltreatment of prisoners in the Southern gaols 
when it was their turn to face a prisons campaign, an 
issue dealt with later in this chapter.
For Sinn Fein this propaganda also opened up the 
possibility of running prisoners for parliament, 
emulating O'Donovan Rossa's success in the nineteenth 
century. The first case of this was Joseph McGuinnes, one 
of the 1916 rebels and a prisoner in Lewes Prison, who 
was elected the Member of Parliament (MP) for South 
Longford in May 1917 after being selected by a national 
council of all Irish nationalist organisations. The
75 Coogan, (1980), 1976 Ibid, 20.
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victory was based on a campaign slogan of "put him in to 
get him out" which accompanied a picture of a man in 
prison uniform??. A contemporary report in the Manchester 
Guardian stated that this political victory by the 
republicans was the equivalent to "a serious British 
defeat in the f i e l d " . ?s This defeat was soon turned to a 
rout by Sinn Fein's victory in the 1918 general election. 
The factor that had swung support in Sinn Fein's favour 
had been caused by events at Mountjoy Prison amongst the 
prisoners.
The volunteers in the prison were demanding to be 
treated as prisoners of war. This was because the status 
of political prisoner gave no special treatment, but the 
UK gave special treatment to prisoners of war so this was 
what was called for by the republicans. In order to 
protest at the failure of the government to give them 
political status the volunteers refused to wear prison 
uniform and would not perform prison work. Then they 
decided to take up hunger strikes. The authorities had 
recent experience of politically motivated prisoners 
fasting, because of the pre-war suffragettes' use of this 
weapon (often imprisoned for what would now be described 
as acts of political violence like arson). This meant 
that it was standard practice to force feed prisoners on 
hunger strike. In total forty men were subjected to this 
process. The practice involved tying the prisoner to a 
chair and placing an eighteen-inch rubber tube down the 
throat (via either the mouth or the nose if the volunteer
7 7 Tim Pat Coogan, IRELAND SINCE THE RISING. London: Pall Mall Press, 1966, 22.78 Quoted in Coogan, (1980), 20.
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proved recalcitrant) and pumping two beaten eggs and a 
pint of warm milk into the stomach. This normally took 
five to ten minutes and the prisoner normally vomited 
when the tube went down the throat and often the nose and 
throat bled. On 25 September 1917 the process led to the 
death of Thomas Ashe.?*
The funeral plans were made by Michael Collins for 
the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). The body lay in 
state in Dublin's City Hall and the procession of between 
thirty and forty thousand people followed the coffin 
flanked by armed IRB volunteers and members of the 
socialist Citizen's Army led by Constance Markievicz. The 
death illustrated dramatically how even one dead prisoner 
could revive the fortunes of Sinn Fein when support had 
been declining. Even the Daily Express commented that the 
death had turned a hundred-thousand Sinn Feiners out of a 
hundred-thousand constitional nationalists.so Republicans 
have also argued that the use of hunger strikes has been 
effective as a weapon in forcing concessions from the 
British within the prisons, especially in the granting to 
IRA prisoners the most desirable objective, "political 
status". Gerry Adams in his Book The Politics Of Irish 
Freedom gives an account of the hunger strike by Ashe 
pointing out that the death also resulted in the 
authorities giving in to the prisoners demands.si It 
showed that one could use the plight of the prisoners as 
a vehicle for gaining more support among an electorate 
which perhaps normally would not vote for Sinn Fein, a
79 Kee, (1972), 606-607.80 Ibid, 608-609.81 Gerry Adams, (1987), 69-71.
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lesson that was not lost on the H-Block support committee 
sixty-two years later. The result of the 1918 general 
election held a month after the armistice had illustrated 
just how well the fortunes of Sinn Fein had been revived 
when seventy-three out of a 105 Irish seats were taken at 
the expense of the old Nationalist Party which wanted 
Home Rule. Of the seventy-three Sinn Fein HP's there were 
thirty-six prisoners which more than anything else showed 
the importance of the prison struggle in gaining the 
sympathy of ordinary Irish people.8%
This was also proved by Fianna Fail later in the 
decade when it managed to get elected using the banner of 
"Free the Prisoners". However, this did not prevent de 
Valera from locking up his old comrades when it suited 
him to do s o . sa
Another of the more famous prisoners to go down the 
path of the hunger strike was Terence McSwiney, the Sinn 
Fein Lord Mayor of Cork, who died as a result of 
starvation on the seventy-fourth day of his fast in 
Wormwood Scrubs Prison in October 1 9 2 0 . 8 4 His death was 
very important to the republicans as his case attracted 
sympathy for Sinn Fein and was an important propaganda 
weapon against the British during the Black and Tan war. 
One can argue that the prisons dispute at this time could 
have played an important role in the gaining of Irish 
independence. In fact Gerry Adams argues that the death
82 Kevin Kelley. THE LONGEST WAR. London: Zed Books Ltd, 1990, 35.83 Coogan, (1980), 20.84 Bell, (1972), 36.
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of Ashe proved to be a turning point in the struggle for
Irish independence.85
After the Twenty-six Counties had become a self 
governing dominion known as the Irish Free State and the 
pro-treaty forces had won the Irish civil war, it fell on 
the Irish to imprison their former comrades in arms. This 
was due to the Free State’s legitimate fear that the IRA 
would reorganize upon the release of its members from 
gaol. It also left Sinn Fein without most of its members, 
and although a legal party it found itself unable to 
function well politically.®®
This resulted in the concentration on a prison 
campaign by republicans. After the civil war the 
political activity that Sinn Fein could indulge in was 
very limited. However this meant that the prisoners 
release campaign, headed by Maud Gonne MacBride, was 
extremely vigorous to say the least.®7
The republicans at this time were hoping to achieve 
three aims according to Bell in his book The Secret Army.
1. The release of IRA prisoners.
2. To strengthen and develop Sinn Fein's political 
machinery to capture control of local bodies.
3. To reconstruct and build up an invisible machine 
for the IRA that may be used in a more terroristic 
manner amongst the civil population rather than as a 
conventional field fighting force.8®
85 Gerry Adams, (1987), 71.86 Kelley, (1990), 53.87 Bell, (1972), 59.88 Ibid, 59.
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The campaigners concentrated on both the use of the 
law and the conditions in which the prisoners were held. 
However the Free State government, under William 
Cosgrave, would not listen to the representatives of a 
movement which wanted to subvert it. In order to gain the 
release of IRA men in prison, the prisoners decided to go 
on a mass Hunger Strike. The strikers numbered 425 people 
including ten TD's (Teachta Dala, Member of the Dail) at 
Mountjoy Prison. In total the republicans claimed that 
there were about 8000 men on strike nation wide. The 
campaign outside the gaols also intensified in tandem 
with the strike. However, not everyone's temperament was 
able to sustain such a test, and inevitably the strikers 
soon reduced in number, which resulted in great tension 
between the different prisoners. This led to a number of 
defections and also meant that the strike was doing more 
harm than good for the republican cause.®®
Meanwhile, outside the prisons the campaign was 
stepped up by MacBride. The campaign used parades and 
other forms of peaceful protest. However, as the strike 
collapsed with only a few hundred protesters, they began 
to divide between themselves while the government was 
determined to refuse to give in to the prisoners.
Some of the hard-liners in the prisons like Paedar 
O'Donnell refused to give up. The strike reached its 
inevitable conclusion when in November 1923 Denis Barry 
and Andrew Sullivan died as a result of their fast. The 
mixture of deaths and defections mixed with government 
intransigence led to the calling off of the strike on the 
89 Ibid, 60.
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23 November. Soon afterwards the government felt strong 
enough to begin the release of the prisoners in small 
batches.^  °
The results of the prison hunger strikes at the 
start of what are known as the first "troubles" were very 
mixed for republicans but this did not prevent the 
physical force tradition in Irish politics from using 
this tool repeatedly often without regard for the 
consequences of their actions.
After de Valera's victory in 1932, the IRA prisoners 
held in the Free State were released. However, when the 
IRA threatened his hold on power he proved to be a 
formidable o p p o n e n t . H e  was prepared to imprison them, 
or in the case of the murder of Garda officers, execute 
the perpetrators. Sean MacBride proved an impressive 
campaigner for prisoners rights using Habeas Corpus 
proceedings to gain the release of many republicans.
The greatest defeat suffered by de Valera was at the 
hands of a fellow 1916 veteran Patrick McGrath, who 
gained political status and was subsequently released in 
deference to public opinion after a forty-three day 
hunger strike in December 1939. This was probably the 
most successful of all hunger strike campaigns run by the 
IRA. The success was only a short lived experience since 
a few weeks later the IRA directly endangered Ireland's 
security and threatened de Valera's policy of neutrality 
in World War Two. It achieved this by raiding the Irish 
Army's ammunition depot and stealing most of Ireland's
59
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military weaponry. This led to the Justice Minister, 
Gerald Boland, being appointed to the task of crushing 
the IRA, using all means at his disposal. With popular 
support for this move, the prisoners were given short 
shrift whenever the campaigners managed to get around the 
censorship which surrounded the prisons during the War.9% 
The republican prisoners who found their political 
status removed from them, immediately went "on the 
blanket" and refused to put on a prison uniform. They 
decided to embark on an offensive refusing to accept any 
facet of criminalisation. Throughout the war the 
prisoners endured appalling conditions which eventually 
led to a hunger strike in 1946. After nineteen days the 
striker, Sean McCaughey, increased the pressure on the 
government by choosing to refuse water, which led to his 
death twelve days later. The inquest into his death meant 
the public disclosure for the first time since 1939 of 
prison conditions. As a result the republican Prisoners 
Release Association was founded, which campaigned for the 
release of all IRA prisoners throughout the British 
Isles. The organization proved to be a spring board for 
recruitment by the physical force republicanism in the 
post-war years.93 The 1950's and 1960's proved a 
relatively quiet period in the prisons and it was not 
until the early 1970's that the prisons had another 
hunger strike, led by the newly mutated organization, the 
PIRA, who chose to use the prisons issue as a weapon
92 Ibid, 26.93 Ibid, 27.
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against the latter-day inheritors of Lloyd George's 
legacy in London.
In 1972, William "Billy" McKee led the Provisionals 
first, and arguably most successful, hunger strike while 
being held in Crumlin Road Prison, Belfast. The objective 
was the granting of political status by the 
a u t h o r i t i e s . 9 4  The new direct rule Secretary of State was 
William Whitelaw, a politician who was inexperienced in 
dealing with terrorism, and the situation in Northern 
Ireland (as was the whole Cabinet). This political 
naivety led to the instigation of negotiations between 
PIRA and the government, which were held at the home of a 
Junior Minister under Whitelaw (Paul Channon) in Cheyne 
Walk, C h e l s e a . 9 5  One of the reasons for the talks was 
Whitelaw's fear that Billy McKee would soon die (this was 
not directly a problem, but the fear of rioting after 
McKee died was an important worry for Whitelaw). 
Ultimately the talks collapsed with the republicans 
gaining "special status", a British euphemism for 
political status, while Whitelaw gained time through the 
temporary cease-fire to start a political process leading 
ultimately to the Sunningdale agreement of 1973.
However, whatever the reasons behind the granting of 
political status, it is with some justification that 
Gerry Adams uses this incident as proof that the use of 
the prisons as a viable weapon that could gain victory 
for PIRA and PSF, in both achieving concessions from the 
government, and in local terms, gaining the support of
94 Bishop & Mallie, (1989), 225.95 Ibid, 71.
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people who would not normally vote PSF in both the 
Republic and the North.
The later hunger strikes run by the Provisionals had 
somewhat more mixed results and illustrated the dangers 
to a movement which indulged in the hunger strikes, a 
lesson that was not lost on Bobby Sands in 1981, the man 
who was the Officer Commanding in the H-Blocks during the 
first hunger strike in 1980 and went on to become the 
first of the 1981 strikers to die.9? This was illustrated 
by his statements, which put forward the fear that the 
strike, if beaten, could destroy the republican movement, 
or at least destroy the future of an individual. An apt 
example of this is the fast of Sean MacStiofain (John 
Stephenson) a former Chief of Staff of the PIRA.
His fast lasted fifty-seven days during 1972 but was 
abandoned, he claims, on the orders of the Army Council. 
There has, however, been some dispute over whether this 
is true, and the episode destroyed his reputation within 
republicanism, since the PIRA has no place for failed 
m a r t y r s . 9 8  Later hunger strikes were somewhat more 
successful. In 1973 the two Price sisters, convicted for 
a car bombing in London, fasted for approximately 200 
days, frequently being force fed in order to keep them 
alive, as part of their campaign to be repatriated. This 
was eventually rewarded with a return to Ulster in order
96 Gerry Adams, (1987), 71.97 The IRA's manual the GREEN BOOK states in General Order No7, that Volunteers are forbidden to hunger 
strike without the express sanction of General 
Headquarters",for this very reason.Martin Dillon, (1990), 488.98 Beresford (1987), 22.
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to serve out their sentences nearer home.99 The following 
year there was a further strike in the mainland but after 
a change in government, Labour returned to power with 
experience of the North from the start of the "troubles". 
They seemed far less susceptible to the emotional 
blackmail of a hunger strike. The first striker, Michael 
Gaughan, died from a mixture of pneumonia and 
complications from force feeding.loo It is believed that 
this incident led the government to abandon this policy 
and ratify the Tokyo Medical Convention which stated that 
force feeding should not be practiced.loi Frank Stagg, 
who was in on the 1974 strike but came off after 
Gaughan's death- having received promises of 
repatriation- fasted again in a series of unsuccessful 
strikes when the promises remained unfulfilled. He 
eventually died in February 1976 after a sixty-two day 
fastioz. This death marked the end of one phase of the 
prisons dispute and perhaps predicted the end of the next 
phase at the same time.
The British government chose in 1976 to abandon 
special status and elicited the response from newly 
convicted prisoners which they must have expected. The 
new prisoners immediately went "on the Blanket" by 
refusing to put on prison uniform, as part of a campaign 
to resurrect their old political status and in rejection
99 Ibid, 22. ?100 Ibid, 23. i!101 THE POLITICS OF TERROR, INTELLIGENCE DIGEST. 1Cheltenham, Glos: Intelligence International Ltd, Digest jNo 80, June 1981. 1102 Beresford, (1987), 23. 1
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of criminalisation in a campaign that was to end with the 
1981 hunger strike.
Meanwhile in the Irish Republic {Poblacht na 
hEireann) the PIRA prisoners held in Portlaiose Prison 
were also were campaigning for the right to be held as 
prisoners of war. The prisoners objected to what they 
thought was excessive security and harassment by the 
prison warders and Gardai. This included regular strip 
searching of prisoners by warders (including the manual 
opening of buttocks and close inspection of testicles) in 
an attempt to find explosives. The security had started 
after the escape of prisoners using explosives from the 
gaol in August 1974, along with the similar escape of 
five remand prisoners from the Special Criminal Court in 
Dublin in August 1976, and an attempted escape where a 
prisoner was shot dead in 1975.
In 1977, this heavy security resulted in a hunger 
strike, starting on 7 March, demanding an end to prison 
brutality and nine points: the right to free association; 
an end to degrading and humiliating strip searches; an 
end to solitary confinement; open and respectable visits; 
the right to engage in craft work; the right to 
educational facilities; adequate recreational facilities; 
exercise facilities; and the right to communicate with 
the legal adviser of their own choice.lo*
The fast was embarked upon by twenty prisoners which 
lasted for forty-seven days ending on the 22 April 1977. 
It is curious that the end of the fast was similar to the
103 Coogan, (1988), 525-534.104 HUNGER STRIKE, Dublin: Sinn Fein (Provisional), 2a Lower Kevin St, 7 March 1977.
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deal at the end of the strikes of the early 1980's in the 
North in that it ended with the intervention of the Roman 
Catholic Church. A further similarity was that the 
prisoners never had a deal agreed officially with the 
authorities. The Republic's government simply introduced 
new changes that fulfilled the demands once the strike 
had ended.105 This allowed the situation in the North's 
prisons to become a priority of the ROW dept of PSF and 
gave republicans a precedent to follow in the fight 
against criminalisation during the 1976-1981 prison 
dispute.
105 David Reed, IRELAND THE KEY TO THE BRITISH REVOLUTION, London: Larkin Publications, 1984, 306
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3a. INTRODUCTION.
The hunger strikes of 1980 and 1981 were the 
culmination of a campaign for what PSF described as 
"political status" which had begun in 1976. In order to 
understand the reasons why the prisoners felt that it was 
correct to fast to the death, the period of the "blanket" 
protest, and its development, must be studied.
The aims of this Chapter are to catalogue the 
gradual escalation of the protest over the years and 
examine the reasons behind the dispute. Firstly, in 3b 
the origins of the fast and the reasons why the British 
chose to abandon special category status are explained. 
Then in 3c the case of the protesters and the British 
government in international law is examined, as are the 
reasons why prisoner's living conditions deteriorated and 
the prison protest developed.
3b. SPECIAL CATEGORY STATUS.
It is somewhat ironic that the history of special 
category status prisoners should begin and end in a 
hunger strike. Another irony was that the 1971 and 
1980/81 hunger strikes were directed against a 
Conservative government that at each time had been 
relatively inexperienced in Northern Irish affairs.
In 1970 the Labour party lost the General Election 
and handed over power to the Conservatives under Edward 
Heath. At the time the Conservatives were still formally
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linked to the Ulster Unionists. This led to the army 
being given a free hand in the Province for the first 
time.i There followed a series of regrettable incidents 
where the army over reacted in nationalist areas. These 
incidents included such cases as Bloody Sunday (when an 
unarmed anti-internment demonstration was fired on by 
troops in Londonderry on 30 January 1972, resulting in 
thirteen deaths). This was manna from Heaven to the newly 
formed Provisionals, who at that time were trying to 
establish themselves as the inheritors of the old IRA. 
Allegations of army brutality were an ideal weapon for 
gaining recruits and support in the nationalist ghettos, 
where the population initially saw the troops as 
liberators. But, as the army began to act against 
Catholics, with at times excessive force, nationalists 
began to change their attitude and instead looked upon 
the soldiers as latter-day Black and Tans.z It must be 
emphasised that the Provisionals did what they could to 
promote this image and as they studied the past for 
inspiration decided that perhaps this was the time to 
start a prisons campaign in an attempt to gain political 
status from the authorities, and increased civilian 
sympathy.
In 1971 William "Billy" McKee went on hunger strike 
and demanded concessions from the government on the 
position of PIRA prisoners which amounted to "political 
status". William Whitelaw, the newly appointed Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland, feared serious rioting if
1 Tim Pat Coogan, THE IRA. Glasgow: Fontana, 1988, 438.2 Ibid, 438.
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McKee died, and decided to give in to the demands of the 
prisoners. The result was a different prison regime for 
convicted terrorists in Northern Ireland, which was 
termed officially as special status.% This was introduced 
with the support of the Labour Party and gave the 
prisoners similar rights to those normal prisoners of war 
would expect to receive.*
In On the Blanket Coogan describes in four points 
the rights of special category prisoners. They were:
1. The right to wear their own clothes.
2. The right to abstain from penal labour.
3. The right to free association within their own
prison area.
4. The right to educational and recreational 
activities in conjunction with the prison 
authorities.^
Since the start of special category the prisoners had won 
a further eleven concessions from the government which 
ranged from the recognition of a paramilitary command 
structure, and the right of the PIRA prisoners Officer 
Commanding (GO) to vet the prison staff who were to be in 
direct contact with the prisoners, to the issuing of 
billiard tables and televisions in the prison huts.s 
This led to a regime that permitted PIRA and the 
other paramilitary organisations to train and teach their
3 Patrick Bishop & Eamonn Mallie, THE PROVISIONAL IRA. London: Corgie, 1989, p 225.4 HANSARD (FIFTH SERIES) VOL 905, COMPRISING PERIOD 9TH TO 20TH FEBRUARY 1976, London: Hansard, 1976, Col 1077.5 Tim Pat Coogan, ON THE BLANKET-THE H-BLOCK STORY, Swords, Co.Dublin: Ward River Press, 1980, 48.6 Tim Pat Coogan, DISILLUSIONED DECADES, IRELAND 1966-87. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987, 48.
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imprisoned personnel while they were out of action 
enabling them to improve the calibre of their volunteers. 
At the same time it allowed paramilitary prisoners a life 
style far superior to the normal life of a criminal 
prisoner.? This made prison a more tolerable and useful 
experience to both the prisoners and their organisations.
However, the Labour party returned to power in 1974, 
and with it came a new Northern Ireland Secretary, Merlyn 
Rees who commissioned, and then implemented, the 
recommendations of a committee chaired by the Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Gardiner. In a report published in 197 5 
Gardiner recommended the abolition of special category 
status for paramilitary prisoners and concluded that the 
granting of it had been a mistake.®
The Gardiner committee was appalled by the freedoms 
that were enjoyed by prisoners. They were worried that 
71% (1881 out of 2648) of male prisoners in Northern 
Ireland were housed as special category prisoners. This 
meant that the prison was not able play its expected role 
in the rehabilitation of the offender.
There are no facilities for organised 
employment. Each compound is virtually a self- 
contained community which keeps the premisses it 
occupies to such a standard as it finds acceptable 
and engages, if it so wishes, in military drills or 
lectures on military subjects
7 Thames T.V showed a documentary on the 22 September 1977 under the title LIFE BEHIND THE WIRE, which showed loyalist (UDA) prisoners receiving firearms and Bomb making lessons and contained evidence of similar abuse by PIRA prisoners of special category status privileges. TIMES, 22 September 1977.8 Merlyn Rees, NORTHERN IRELAND-A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE. London: Methuen, 1985, 27 5.9 Lord Gardiner (chair), REPORT OF A COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER, IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, MEASURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND, London: H.M.S.O, 1975, 33,
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Needless to say, the committee did not feel that this was 
an appropriate way to run a prison. They felt that the 
authorities should exert greater control in a cellular 
prison like the one being built as the Maze Prison on the 
Long Kesh site. But the way prisoners were treated meant 
they expected a general amnesty soon. Consequentially, 
the sentences handed out by the courts had lost their 
deterrent effect. This led the committee to say.
Although recognising the pressures on those 
responsible at the time we have come to the 
conclusion that the introduction of special category 
status was a serious mistake.
The committee then went on to say that the "first
priority should be to stop admitting new prisoners to
special category.
When Rees explained the reasons for the abandonment
of special category status prisoners to the House of
Commons it was in the context of a package of reforms on
the 16 February 1976, entitled the Northern Ireland
(Treatment of Offenders) Order which included; increasing
one-third remission to one-half remission, bringing
parity with remission elsewhere in the UK.n This dressed
the announcement as standardisation with the rest of the
UK. In his speech he also stressed that the abandonment
of internment had played a role in the abolition.12
All those in prison in Northern Ireland are in 
Prison by the due processes of the law. They are not 
there by executive action. They are not there by 
decisions taken uniquely by myself and it is in that 
clearer situation that I have felt able to deal with 
this matter
10 Ibid, 34.11 Rees, (1985), 275.12 HANSARD, 16 February 1976, Coll 1077-1078.13 Ibid
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He also emphasised that another important factor in 
making his decision was the restoration of control in the 
prisons to the authorities, allowing the prisons to play 
their role by preparing prisoners for normal life again 
by ensuring that they worked and earned any privileges 
they might receive. This was resolving the situation that 
the Gardiner Committee had criticised a b o v e ,
The new policy was dubbed "criminalisation" and it 
can be argued that it filled the gap in "Ulsterisation", 
the policy of police primacy and "normalisation", which 
Rees followed as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
The special treatment of paramilitary prisoners was 
contradictory to the attitude that Northern Irish 
"troubles" were essentially criminal as opposed to 
guerilla warfare. Further, special status gave the 
paramilitaries, and especially the Provisionals, a false 
legitimacy.
In his autobiography Rees states that the 
abandonment of internment together with "Ulsterisation" 
and the phasing out of special category status were 
combined, and a direct result of the Gardiner report.
I considered what use I should make of the 
report and decided to make a statement to parliament 
in the early New Year that if there was an enduring 
cease-firef I would announce a phasing out of 
detention by the end of 19 75 or mid 19 76, together 
with a phased reduction in the role of the army and 
an increase in the role of the police, I would also 
announce the end of special category status, along 
with a new parole s c h e m e ^
He intended to combine this with a political initiative
following the Feakle talks of 1974 when some leading
14 Ibid,
15 Rees, (1985), 155.
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Protestant Churchmen had held talks with PIRA leaders in 
an attempt to start a new initiative. This had led to 
direct contacts between London and the PIRA, that 
resulted in a cease-fire in February 1975.16 This led 
Rees to contemplate a political convention where PSF 
would be permitted to attend.i?
However, the political initiative and the cease-fire 
failed. This left Ulsterisation and "criminalisation" as 
the basic tenets of Labour party policy until 197 9 when 
normalisation finally ceased to be a viable aim in an 
extremely abnormal situation. The abandonment also 
resulted in the "blanket" and then "dirty" protests by 
the Republican prisoners in the gaols. This was perhaps 
the worst legacy which Rees left his NIO successor when 
he became Home Secretary. It also left the Conservatives 
with a political hot potato when they returned to power 
in 1979, and arguably gave the Thatcher government its 
first crisis, with the 1980 and 1981 hunger strikes.
3c. THE BLANKET PROTEST 1976 TO 1980.
The announcement of the abolition of special 
category status resulted in immediate opposition. There 
was some rioting in loyalist areas on the days before 
terrorist offences were to be regarded as criminal (March 
1st 1976), When questioned on this rioting both Rees and 
his Conservative opposite number, Airey Neave, reaffirmed 
their determination to phase out special category status, 
despite any loyalist paramilitary opposition.^ ®
16 Coogan, (1987), 229-230.17 Rees, (1985), 155.18 HANSARD, 1 March 1976, coll 913-915.
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When responding to support from Enoch Powell, who 
had criticised loyalists for disloyalty to the laws of 
the country which they claimed allegiance, Rees expressed 
his frustration with paramilitaries that used the, to 
him, hypocritical term loyalist when he stated.
What the right hon. Gentleman has just said 
about loyalty is absolutely correct. There is only 
one meaning for it, and he always expresses it 
correctly. That is not always true of others who 
call themselves loyalists in Northern Ireland.
However in the longer term, it was not loyalist but
Republican opposition to criminalisation that was to
concern the government.
Initially the reaction from republicans was largely
vocal, but the opposition from the Provisionals was to
become far more robust and led to an assassination
campaign directed against prison officers. The first such
murder was on 9 April 1976, when Prison Officer (PO)
Patrick Dillon was assassinated. This was soon followed
in the same month by the killing of PO John Gumming.
This was the reaction of the traditional physical force
section of the older southern based leadership, which was
soon to be over-thrown (see above in Chapter II). They
did not see much of a role for external mass action along
the lines of the protests and political moves which were
subsequently to mark the "blanket" protest period.
However, events were soon to overtake them, especially
from within the prisons.
The first protest within the Maze/LongKesh prison
occurred on 14 September 197 6 when Kiaren Nugent, a man
19 Ibid, coll 91620 Coogan, (1980), 152-153.
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convicted for his role in a van hijacking, vowed: that
they [the prison authorities] would have to nail the 
clothes to my back” if he was to be forced into a prison 
uniform, and thus c r i m i n a l i s e d . 21 it was for this reason 
that he refused visits for eight months, as he would have 
had to put on his uniform to receive visitors.
In refusing to cooperate with the new regime, Nugent 
was honouring not only over a century of Republican 
prison tradition, but also the order issued by the anti­
truce Belfast Brigade (dominated by the still imprisoned 
Gerry Adams) a few days after Rees's Westminster speech 
of 25 May 1 9 7 6 . 2 2 The Order was explicit in its 
opposition to the new prison regime, and stated:
Volunteers of Oglaigh na hEireann [PIRA] have 
been instructed that they are not to engage in any 
institutional schemes under the control of the 
prison administration. They are further instructed 
that they are not to wear any clothing provided by 
the prison administration, even if such clothes are 
of a civilian type. They will respond only to the 
commands and directives of their superior officers 
regardless of the consequences. They are political 
prisoners and any other imaginary label tagged to 
them by the British government will make not the 
slightest difference to that very basic fact... We 
are prepared to die for the right to retain 
political status. Those who try to take it away must 
be fully prepared to pay the same price.2 a
This order was important for two principal reasons in
demonstrating PIRA's responses to the end of special
category status. Firstly, that the new prison regime was
unacceptable and, secondly, that PIRA would launch an
assassination campaign against the prison administration.
21 Ibid, pl53 & p80.22 Liam Clarke, BROADENING THE BATTLEFIELD, THE H-BLOCKS AND THE RISE OF SINN FEIN. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1986, 59.23 Ibid, 60.
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choosing the easiest victims it could, the prison 
officers.
In a leaflet the northerners stated their support 
for Nugent. Keen to see his case supported by the 
Nationalist community they emphasised his youth and his 
Belfast identity.
Kieran Nugent is a 19 year old youth from 
Leeson Street in the Lower Falls area.., He is 
resolute in his demand for political status and Tve 
in Sinn Fein support and will fight for this demand 
to be afforded to all political prisoners.
The emphasis on the word political in the aforementioned
leaflet was not coincidental as they regarded themselves
as political offenders and felt "special status" was
simply a face saving term for the authorities. In a
lecture to prisoners it is interesting that the
leadership felt it had to explain to the "blanketmen"
themselves what they were fighting for.
To set down in writing everything that 
political status entails would be virtually 
impossible, it is much easier to simply say that 
political status exists at present in the same gaol 
and within a couple of hundred yards of the H-blocks 
themselves.^  5
The fact that many prisoners were not very 
politically sophisticated can also be seen in another 
lecture in which they are being informed that the protest 
could take some time.
"The protest presently being carried out in the 
H~blocks will continue until the prisoners are 
granted their rights and reunited with their
24 Provisional Sinn Fein, THIS IS KIERAN NUGENT, Belfast: 
PSF, 20 November 1976.
25 POLITICAL STATUS, anonymous typewritten prison 
lecture, undated (between 1977-80), the original is in 
the Political Collection of the Linen Hall Library, 
Belfast.
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comrades sentenced before March 19 76 who still
retain political status.
The case of the Provisionals that the prisoners 
should receive special treatment was interesting: not 
only were there precedents for the granting of special 
prison accommodation; but also, that the situation in the 
Six Counties is not regarded as normal in the UK or in 
the Republic. Indeed, the various governments in Ulster 
since 1922 have needed special legislation to deal 
with terrorism. Between 1922 and 1973, the Special Powers 
Act provided the RUG with wide ranging powers of arrest, 
questioning, detention and internment as well as giving 
the Home Minister the powers to make regulations which 
had the force of law.z? Subsequently, following the 
imposition of direct rule in the Province, one saw the 
introduction of the non-jury Diplock court and the wide 
ranging powers of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), 
that had to be renewed each year by Westminster. This 
whole array of state power was not used to fight crime 
argued the "blanketmens" sympathisers, but indicated what 
a special situation the "troubles" w e r e . ^ 8 The fact that 
the situation was abnormal was not disputed, but this was 
not a factor in the abolition of special category status. 
The principal motivations were to restore the deterrent 
factor to committing violent crime in Ulster. Further,
26 THE H-BLOCKS: THE PROTEST IN PERSPECTIVE, anonymous 
typewritten prison lecture, undated (between 1977-80), 
the original is in the Political Collection of the Linen 
Hall Library, Belfast.
27 Kevin Boyle, Tom Hadden, & Paddy Hillyard, LAW AND 
STATE, THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND. London: Martin 
Robertson, 1975, 39-40.
28 At the founding meeting of the National H-Block/Armagh 
Committee, one contributor from the anti-PIRA Peace 
People, Kiaran McKeown, called for emergency status to 
fit with emergency legislation. Clarke, (1986), 102,
J
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the government had wished to restore control of the 
prisons as part of an attempt to return all state 
institutions back to as near normal a situation as 
possible. Indeed; the temporary nature of the PTA and the 
Diplock court’s indicated this. In a similar manner it is 
the long term aim of the government to have the RUG as an 
unarmed force, the prisons were simply the first stage in 
a long drawn out policy of establishing police primacy 
and the use of the criminal courts.
The legitimacy of the republican claim under 
European or international law was easier to test. The 
"blanketmen" described themselves as POW’s, though in the 
past they had accepted special status (that is the 
facilities of the POW without official government 
recognition of this position) thus they were satisfied to 
receive treatment as political prisoners without the 
name. So the Republicans had already demonstrated the 
fact that they are not necessarily interested in POW 
status. The status of political prisoner does not exist 
in British law, unlike in some other countries (such as 
the former Soviet Union) as the motivation does not 
change the prison accommodation. Thus a convicted 
traitor, such as George Blake, although in seclusion for 
his own safety, was kept in a normal prison, despite the 
political motivation for his crime. This specific point 
was made by the Northern Ireland Office (NIG) in à 
leaflet released in 1980,
... no prisoner is imprisoned in Northern 
Ireland because of his or her political beliefs. 
There are no political prisoners, Every person
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sentenced to imprisonment in Northern Ireland has
been tried and found guilty in a Court of Law."^^
The European Convention on Human Rights further 
guarantees freedom of expression and the UK is a 
signatory of this Convention. This means that if there 
was a person imprisoned in the UK simply because of 
his/her political beliefs he/she could successfully use 
the European Court of Human Rights to seek redress. The 
Extradition Act of 1870 and the European Convention on 
Extradition of 1957 does permit political offenders to 
apply for asylum, but the 1977 European Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorism covers all offenders whose 
crimes involve "cruel or vicious means". This rejected 
the possible use of the 1870 Act or the 1957 Convention 
as a precedent for British recognition of a different 
status for politically motivated crimes.
Some "blanketmen" did bring their case to the 
European Commission on Human Rights which is also 
discussed later in Chapter IV. The application was based 
on the European Convention for Human Rights. The four 
"blanketmen" claimed that they had been subjected to 
"inhuman or degrading t r e a t m e n t " which was what the UK 
had been found guilty of after the allegations of torture 
in the early 1970’s. The principal complaint revolved 
around the treatment protesters received from the 
authorities. An example of this argument was put across
29 Northern Ireland Office, H-BLOCKS THE FACTS, 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. Belfast: 
NIG, December 1980.
30 Tom Hadden, THE BLANKET BRIGADE. Robert Bell, Robert 
Johnstone, & Robin Wilson (eds). TROUBLED TIMES, 
FORTNIGHT MAGAZINE AND THE TROUBLES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
1970-91. Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1991, 42.
31 GUARDIAN, 20 June 1980.
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by Gerry Adams in the northerners newspaper Republican 
News.
Solitary confinement was condemned, as far back 
as the end of the 19th century, by a British 
Parliamentary Committee. Today, in Long Kesh, 
Republican prisoners are held in solitary 24 hours a 
day without exercise facilities. They are naked, 
have no contact with the outside world, . . , and they 
can expect to continue in this manner for the 
foreseeable future.^^
In 1980 the Commission decided that the British were 
not guilty of this as the prison conditions were self 
inflicted by the protesters. Further, it stated that 
the prisoners could not derive any "legitimacy or 
justification from the European Convention on Human 
R i g h t s . This judgement was in line with a decision by 
the Commission on 8 July 1978 in a case brought by the 
German RAF {Rote Armee Fraktion- Red Army Faction) 
prisoners Gudrun Ensslin, Andreas Baader and Jan-Carl 
Raspe against the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal 
Republic of Germany). In the German case the Commission 
felt that prison conditions such as solitary confinement 
had been brought upon the prisoners themselves by their 
actions and so were not in contravention of the European 
Convention on Human R i g h t s . This had supported a 
decision by the German courts in October 197 5 that 
torture by isolation was RAF propaganda because of their
32 "Brownie" (Gerry Adams), TERRORISM, REPUBLICAN NEWS. Belfast: Republican Press Centre, 5 February 1977.33 Kevin J.Kelley. THE LONGEST WAR, NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE IRA". London: Zed Books. 1988, 325,34 GUARDIAN, 20 June 1980.35 Alfred Klaus, AKTIVITAETEN UND VERHAELTEN INHAFTIERTER TERRORISTEN. Bonn: Bundesministeriuim des Innern, 1983, 184-196.
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refusal to adapt to prison conditions which meant they 
had inflicted the situation upon themselves.^ ®
Finally, one returns to the international 
conventions dealing with the treatment of POW's, 
principally the Geneva Convention of 1864, and its 
updates in 1949 and the additional protocols of 1977. The 
decision over whether one receives POW status lies in the
definition of legitimate combatant” which was originally jIoutlined in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.  ^ IITraditionally one could only be classed as a legitimate 
combatant if one fulfilled the 1907 rules:
1. That of being commanded by a person responsible
!for his subordinates. jI2. That of having a fixed distinctive sign Î
recognisable at such a distance.
3. That of carrying arms openly.
4. That of conducting their operations in accordance 
with the laws and customs of war.3?
The PIRA and INLA obviously failed by these rules 
but the Hague regulations were added to by the Geneva 
Convention of 1949- that had been called to take into 
consideration the advances and changes brought to warfare 
especially by the Second World War. This had created 
different groups fighting which were not covered by past 
agreements, but were obviously legitimate combatants (at 
least so far as the allies were concerned). These 
included the resistance forces, guerrilla groups and
36 Sebastian Cobler, LAW, ORDER AND POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978, 131-132.37 Geoffrey Best. HUMANITY IN WARFARE, THE MODERN HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS. London;Methuen, 1983, 296-298.
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semi-state forces like the Free French under Charles de 
Gaulle after the official French surrender in 1940.
Further, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) felt that there needed to be some form of 
conflict regulation in regard to internal conflict. In 
this century some of the worst wars had been civil wars. 
This was especially the case with the Russian and Spanish 
civil wars when all sides had treated prisoners 
abominably. As early as 1912, at its international 
conference there had been calls for ICRC to be involved 
in civil conflict, but the Russian delegates led the 
refusal saying "insurgent bands or revolutionaries... can 
only appear in the eye of the law as criminals". By 1949, 
it had become clear that non-international wars had to 
come under some form of regulation. But due to the 
sensitivities of nations facing this situation the 
definition of internal conflict was deliberately vague 
leaving it open to interpretation. The limited protection 
went to "persons taking no part in the hostilities" or 
lawful belligerents who obeyed the rules of law (PIRA 
does not qualify as it refuses to do so), although the 
ICRC was permitted to offer its services to parties in 
the conflict as an impartial humanitarian body.^® 
Obviously under this definition the Provisionals could 
not claim any protection from international convention. 
Though this convention did open the way to the brief and 
unsuccessful attempt to mediate between the hunger 
strikers and the authorities in 1981.
38 Ibid, 299-300.
82CHAPTER III
The additional protocols of the 1977 Geneva 
Convention did offer interesting possibilities in support 
of the republicans’ case for different treatment. These 
1977 protocols were to include a new status of legitimate 
combatant. This had been inserted by some developing 
countries which had their origins as guerilla fighters. 
The new protocol declared that guerrillas or freedom 
fighters had only to distinguish themselves by producing 
weapons immediately before going into action.39 However, 
the UK (along with most other western countries) refused 
to ratify these protocols, and even if they had 
terrorists were still explicitly excluded from the status 
of combatant. Further, the paramilitaries in Northern 
Ireland would refuse to be governed by the section of the 
protocols which states that they must not undertake the 
killing, injury or capture of adversaries by "feigning 
civilian, non-combatant status". They would also refuse 
to observe the laws and customs of war, as this would 
curtail too many of their o p e r a t i o n s . 4 0  Examples of the 
rules of war being broken would be the PIRA’s refusal to 
take prisoners or the targeting of former members of the 
security forces. So even if the 1977 protocols are ever 
ratified by the British government the PIRA will remain 
outside of this coverage because of their refusal to obey 
the normal conventions of warfare. This meant that the 
republican prisoners were going to have to win the right 
of political status themselves.
39 Hadden, (1991), 42.
40 Best, (1983), 326-330.
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The views of the other political parties about the 
abolition of special category had been initially 
generally favourable, Gerry Fitt, the leader of the 
largest Nationalist party, the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP), was very positive in his reaction to 
the announcement in the House of C o m m o ns^However, by 
1978 Fitt left the SDLP inpart due to the prisons issue.
Without his influence and that of other socialists (like
Paddy Devlin) the party became increasingly nationalist 11in its outlook, although it remained hostile to violence. i
iThis meant that the SDLP and its new leader John Hume i
took the middle ground, and tried to square the circle. ÎiIThe SDLP has taken the consistent view that the ^
only punishment to which a prisoner should be |
subjected is the deprivation of liberty. All other |
punishments are in danger of infringing basic |
humanitarian conditions in prison. I
■
In plain terms they were embarrassed by the possible |ipolitical mileage that the Provisionals might gain at i
their expense. So like the Catholic Church they pressed 
both sides to compromise, using the terminology of 
liberalism. A similar criticism came from the Protestant 
law lecturer and former editor of the liberal magazine 
Fortnight, Tom Hadden, who argued that the punishments 
which the protesters were suffering were too severe and 
could be counter-productive in the longer term.^^
The journalist Liam Clarke says that the 
government’s principal mistake at this time was to 
concentrate on the wearing of prison uniform as the main
41 HANSARD, 1 March 1976, Coll 913-915.
42 John Hume, STATEMENT BY MR JOHN HUME. Belfast: Social 
Democratic and Labour Party, 38 University St, Belfast. 
30 October 1980.
43 Hadden, (1991), 41-42.
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tenet of its new penal policy.4* The government had 
initially hoped that the deprivation of clothing to 
prisoners might deter them from going on a "blanket" type 
protest. In fact the majority of prisoners had chosen to 
conform to prison r u l e s . * 5  Although this was probably as 
much to preserve their rights to 50% remission of 
sentence as to avoid the discomfort of just having a 
towel and blanket as clothing.
The spectacle of men first refusing to wear clothes 
and then embarking on the "dirty" protest (non-use of 
washing and lavatory facilities), made for very harrowing 
material for the propagandists in PSF's POW department. 
The bearded, long haired and pale protesters looking 
Christlike were portrayed in portraits upon wall murals 
in nationalist areas. Although initially the protest did 
not attract much support. Provisional propaganda led to 
the development of widespread sympathy for the protest in 
Nationalist areas of Ulster, as well as attracting 
sympathy in the Irish Republic, from a far wider public 
than normally attracted to extremist republicanism. This 
bore echoes of sixty years previously, when, during the 
Irish War of Independence, the prisons issue had played a 
role in causing Sinn Fein to become the principal 
representative of nationalist politics at the expense of 
the old Irish Nationalist Party. The recreation of this
44 Clarke,(1986), 62.45 According to NIO figures on the 6 October 1980, protesting male prisoners were housed in three H-Blocks at the Maze while five H-Blocks and prisoners located in other parts of the Province were conforming to regulations.Northern Ireland Office, H-BLOCKS, THE FACTS. Belfast: NIO, October 1980.
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position for PSF seemed possible again, a factor that 
would not have been lost on the newly emergent northern 
leftist leadership in the PIRA. The new leaders had 
always faced the problem of the PSF being the smaller 
Catholic party in both the South and in the North where 
the moderate SDLP still held sway in the ballot box.^s
The protest by the prisoners was sparked off by the 
abandonment of special category status. It was the 
attempt to win back these rights that was the priority of 
the protest, despite any developments outside the Prison 
compounds as its result. The demands which were to 
remain largely the same throughout the protest were;
1. The right to wear their own clothes.
2. The right to abstain from penal labour.
3. The right to free association.
4. The right to educational and recreational
activities in conjunction with the prison 
authorities.
5. Lost remission restored (ie. that prisoners who 
had lost remission of their sentence due to taking 
part in the protest, should have remission 
restored).
The direction which the protest took, rather than 
being an organized strategy, was haphazard and largely 
based on the precedents set by Nugent's individual 
actions. The motives behind this protest were dictated by 
two principal factors. Firstly, a desire to break one leg 
of what republicans saw as a three point attack against
46 See Appendix II, Table II47 Coogan, (1980), 48.
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them by the authorities; Ulsterisation, normalisation and 
criminalisation. Secondly, the average PIRA "Volunteer" 
thinks of himself or herself as a soldier and so would 
regard with venom any attempt to be branded or classed as 
ordinary c r i m i n a l s . * 8  This leads to the act of forcing a 
prisoner to wear a prison uniform being imbued with a 
significance that would mystify any outside lay observer. 
For the PIRA prisoners the uniform in one gesture rejects 
any recognition of the prisoners position as a political 
prisoner of war and reduces the "freedom fighter" to the 
level of a common criminal. The uniform also dehumanises 
the individual, making him part of a group and therefore 
more susceptible to pressure.
This would perhaps explain the level of personal 
feeling directed by prisoners against the new regime, and 
lead to an understanding of the sentiments behind 
statements like Nugent's ^'nailing the clothes to my 
back". The protest was very much the prisoners, with most 
of the drive and much of the direction coming from inside 
the prisons. This was to cause great difficulty to the 
republican leadership outside when it attempted 
negotiations with the government later on in the 
protest.49
Outside the prison PIRA continued to conduct its 
assassination campaign against the prison warders during 
1977. This was the principal effort by the republican 
movement outside in support of the protesters.so Other
48 Ibid, 79.49 Coogan, (1990), 612-614.50, During. 1977 their were two further assassinations of prison officers those of Wesely Millaken on the 22 June and D.E.Irvine on the 7 December.
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outside action was run by PSF and the H-Block supporters' 
groups, which largely took the form of demonstrations and 
rallies within Ireland, that were less well attended by 
the public, than the campaigners and prisoners might have 
wished. This led to the "blanketmen" feeling neglected by 
the Catholic population at large, who refused to take the 
protest as seriously as the campaign against 
internment.51 Initially the prisoners thought that there 
was some form of awareness in their community of their 
situation, but gradually they realised that this was not 
the case. One PIRA prisoner remembered the early phase.
We were under twenty-four hour lockup because 
of the protest, and we only got out for Mass. It 
happened to us at the Mass two weeks in a row. The 
priest was blathering away. He was saying things 
like, 'When you are mixing with one another, having 
conversation out in the yard or canteen or over a 
cup of tea during free association, think about this 
or think about that moral issue. ' We were all 
looking at each other! Sitting like madmen with hair 
down here... Hear’s us: 'Hold on a here, wait a
minute. We don't get free association, we're the 
"blanketmen". '... everybody that evening was up to 
the doors shouting : 'Nobody knows we're here; nobody
knows what's going on. '5 2
Within the H-Blocks tension was rising between the 
warders and prisoners. There was considerable and 
understandable resentment amongst prison officers towards 
the prisoners because of the assassination campaign being 
conducted against them. A further factor was that the 
prisoners were compiling the lists of names and addresses 
of warders for assassination, and it is likely that the
JUNE DIARY, FORTNIGHT, July 1977, & TIMES, 27 November 1977.51 Hadden, (1991), 41-42.52 Allen Feldman. FORMATIONS OF VIOLENCE, THE NARRATIVE OF THE BODY AND POLITICAL TERROR IN NORTHERN IRELAND.Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1991, 159- 160.
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officers suspected that this was the case.ss This 
exacerbated the traditional tribal enmity between the 
largely loyalist officers and the republican Prisoners. 
Often this hostility allegedly led to brute force being 
used against the prisoners at the slightest provocation- 
a form of revenge against the PIRA and INLA prisoners for 
the actions of their comrades outside.
This scenario, claim republicans, led to the 
protesters becoming increasingly fearful of physical 
attack, such that by March 1978 most were refusing to 
leave their cells even to wash. They were initially given 
wash-basins in their cells with which they could clean 
themselves but they demanded the installation of shower 
units, which was refused by the a u t h o r i t i e s . s* The result 
of this was the launching of the next phase- the "no 
wash" protest. Another version of the origins of this 
phase holds that the principal reason for the "no-wash" 
protest was that the authorities decided, in an attempt 
to increase pressure upon the prisoners, to designate the 
prisoners blankets as prison property. This had the 
effect of depriving the prisoners of the blankets outside 
of their cells, leaving them with only their towels with 
which to cover themselves. When the authorities only 
permitted one towel per prisoner it meant that after the 
protesters went to bathe they had to go naked when drying 
themselves. The "blanketmen" complained that this led to 
humiliation from the warders and the prisoners in the 
conforming Blocks.ss Finally, the government version of
53 Ibid, 197-198.54 Bishop & Mallie, (1989), 82 & 351.55 Clarke, (1986), 68-69.
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this story says that this was simply an escalation by the 
protesters of the original protest.®®
Within the prison the "blanketmen" initially felt 
that this would quickly bring the protest to a 
conclusion, but they were soon shown the folly of this 
idea. Leo Green, first thought that the protest would 
only last a further few weeks before concessions would 
bring the protest to a close. However, when he heard an 
interview on the radio with a doctor it led him to 
increase his estimates of the time before the government 
would be forced to give in, as the doctor stated that the 
human body had its own cleansing system which would 
enable the body to survive in unhygienic situations. Even 
so, he states that he did not expect the protest to last 
longer than a few months.®?
Inside the prison, relations between inmates and 
staff continued to decline, a situation which the 
republican leadership at times encouraged. Pat McCusker, 
a former prison officer, stated that Brendan "Darky" 
Hughes had admitted to him that he had ordered a few 
fights or caused disturbances himself to, "Keep the hate 
goingf to keep them together" T h i s  also ensured that 
there would be a steady stream of stories coming out of 
the prison from visitors of prisoners who observed their 
bruises and other visible signs of having been involved 
in fights with warders.
56 Rees, (1985) , 276-277 .57 Leo Green, ON THE BLANKET, THE CAPTIVE VOICE/AN GLOR GAFA. Winter 1990, 16.58 Clarke, (1986), 62.
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The deterioration resulted in a further escalation 
in the protest to that of the "dirty" protest. When 
prisoners smeared faeces on the walls of their cell 
rather than using the latrines provided and poured their 
urine through the flaps of their cell doors into the 
corridor.59 There is a fair amount of disagreement as to 
the origins of this phase: the blame for this situation 
tended to be apportioned according to the political 
sympathy of the observer.
Republicans claim that the prison orderlies used to 
collect the "slop" from the latrines in a trolley from 
cell to cell. Nugent, and other prisoners have claimed 
the latrines were returned to the cells only half empty 
by orderlies, and were sometimes kicked over on to the 
floor intentionally. This left the prisoners with no 
choice but to throw the excreta out of their windows or 
through the flaps in their d o o r s . T h e  prisoners allege 
that the warders' response was to throw the excreta back 
into the cells leaving the protesters to smear the faeces 
on to the walls of their cells using bits of foam 
mattress or clothing.si This version of events has been 
contested by the British government. One such denial came 
from the British Ambassador to the United States, Peter 
Jay in response to statements from Washington Post 
columnist. Jack Anderson, that were critical of British 
policy in Northern Ireland. In the reply Jay stated that 
the "dirty" protest was a self-inflicted part of the
59 David Beresford, TEN MEN DEAD. London: Grafton Books, 1987, 28.60 Coogan, (1980), 80.61 Clarke, (1986), 70.
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prison protest not the fault of the a u t h o r i t i e s .® 2 a
pamphlet released in 1980 by the NIO titled H-Blocks The 
Facts, the authorities denied that there was any 
foundation in the allegation's by republicans' concerning 
ill-treatment in any form of prisoners by the prison 
officers. This lack of ill treatment was despite the 
attempted provocations by the INLA and PIKA in their 
murder campaign against the prison officers. The pamphlet 
stated that any complaint by the prisoners was 
investigated thoroughly by the Prison Governor and that 
any warder found guilty of such maltreatment would be 
disciplined. It further pointed out that although by the 
time of its publication twenty-one "blanketmen" had been 
released, there had yet to be any verifiable evidence of
such maltreatment.63
Whatever their origins, the conditions the 
protesters were now living in were inhuman. Maggots 
infested the cells where the prisoners lived, slept and 
a t e . 6 4  Descriptions by visitors to the Maze during the 
protest all speak of the revulsion which they felt about 
the conditions which the protesters endured whether they 
were self inflicted or not. When the Catholic Primate of 
all Ireland, Archbishop Dr Tomas O'Fiaich, visited the H- 
Blocks in August 1978 he described them in a forthright 
condemnation of the government.
One would hardly allow an animal to remain in 
such conditions, let alone a human being,.. The 
stench of rotten food and excreta scattered around
62 Coogan, (1980), 173.63 H-Blocks the facts, NIO, (1980).64 Bishop & Mallie, (1988), 352.
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the walls was almost unbearable. In two of them I 
was unable to speak for fear of vomiting.
Another observer who has also spoken about the conditions
faced by the protesters was a former prison officer, Pat
McCusker, who described his first visit to the protesting
Blocks rather more crudely and a bit more graphically
than the Archbishop.
The doctor and I had to put on our wellies to 
go down to it. I was after my dinner and boked my 
guts up [vomited]. The stink and the stench - there 
was piddle under the doors and when they opened one 
of their doors, I'm not exaggerating now, you 
couldn't see the paint on the door for the shite 
that was on it.^^
The reaction by the authorities to the obvious 
health and hygiene problems presented by the "dirty" 
protest was initially to attempt to disinfect the cells !
iusing high powered hoses (160 pounds per square inch) and i
the use of ammonia and bleach disinfectants. The smell 
and fumes from these led the prisoners to destroy the 
newly replaced windows in their cells in order to try and 
ventilate their rooms. They preferred to endure winter 
temperatures rather than the smell of cleaning agents.
The authorities finally dealt with the broken windows by 
putting in unbreakable fire proof frosted glass. A 
further problem with the hoses was that the orderlies 
(largely Protestant criminal prisoners) were none too 
careful about flooding the cells which led to greater 
discomfort for the p r o t e s t e r s . A t  this time the 
prisoners conditions had became more uncomfortable as the 
protesters had destroyed all their furniture which was
65 Ibid, 352-353.66 Clarke, (1986), 70.67 Ibid, 70.
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not replaced, leaving them only with a mattress, latrine 
and some religious literature.®^
As this was obviously unsatisfactory the authorities 
started the system of wing shifts. Prisoners would be 
moved from a dirty wing of a prison to a clean one which 
they would then start to foul, while the soiled wing 
would be cleaned out using steam cleaning equipment. This 
would be carried out about once every ten days, and in 
1980 at every fourth wing shift the cell would be re­
p a i n t e d . This seemed to control the problems of the 
hygiene and cleanliness of the prison cells. However, the 
problem of the protesters' health remained. Apparently 
the rubbing action of the blanket ensured that the 
protesters bodies were relatively clean, but their faces 
soon took on what witnesses described as a sickly grey 
colour, while their long uncut hair and beards were dirty 
and greasy. One answer to this was forced washing and 
hair cutting by prison officers.’®
The first forced washings took place around 
Christmas 1978, and according to one eyewitness this 
resulted in the atmosphere within the protesting blocks 
became extremely t e n s e . T h e  process of forced washing 
just became one more point of tension between the 
prisoners and the authorities. Prisoners would not 
cooperate with the prison officers so officers would have 
to use minimum force against the prisoners to perform 
their duty. This led inevitably to more republican
68 Coogan, (1980) , 200.69 H-Blocks the Facts, NIO (1980)70 Clarke, (1986), 75-76.71 Green, (1990), 16.
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allegations of ill treatment by the prison officers. It 
is probably the case that at times minimum force did 
descend to the level of heavy handedness, however, this 
has never been conclusively proven. A description of a 
forced washing was given by one protester, Liam 
McCloskey.
A door opened and almost immediately the sound 
of thuds, slaps, and shouting, and moans and groans.
It was Martin Hurson on the receiving end. He was 
dragged out of the cell to the doctors surgery where 
he was in a mess. He spent three weeks in the prison 
hospital recovering from the assault. That morning 
five men were treated in a similar m a n n e r ^
Leo Green, writing ten years after the event gives an
equally harrowing account of a forced wash.
Six or eight of them [Prison Officers] would 
rush the cell, pin the two men to the floor and kick 
and punch them. Then they'd drag each separately 
down the wing to the wash area. They went from cell 
to cell in a systematic fashion. iI
Green implies that this excessive use of force was in j!
some ways a morale booster to the protesters. "The noise
of each successive beating had made us tense, nervous ji
maybe, but it was [sic] the screws [prison officers] who i1were the cowards. j
This concurs with the earlier evidence that the j
Provisionals, at least in part, consciously chose to try ]
and provoke violence to increase group bonding amongst j
prisoners to encourage a "them against us" attitude. In |
1979 the conditions within the prison deteriorated, j
1although at the start of the year the authorities made a j
few concessions. In the wake of the case brought by four j
i"blanketmen" to the European Commission of Human Rights |
72 Clarke, (1986) , 76.73 Green, (1990), 16.
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the protesters punishment diet was removed, returning the 
’’blanketmen" to the standard prison food. At the same 
time disciplinary hearings of the "blanketmen" before the 
Prison Governor, over the protest, were reduced from once 
a fortnight to once a month.
The principal reasons for the worsening situation 
were twofold. Firstly, the escalation in the murder 
campaign by PIRA and the INLA against the prison officers 
discussed later in Chapter IV. Secondly, the 
psychological toll that the protest was taking on the 
"blanketmen" themselves. The protest had by early 1979 
been going on for nearly two years and did not seem to be 
anywhere near resolution. This produced problems of 
morale amongst the prisoners as they had underestimated 
the determination of the government to face the protest 
head on. As the prisoners had hoped that the "blanket" 
protest would be enough to win, it meant that they 
realized that they would have to give up or try the tool 
of the hunger strike.
During the early days, according to Leo Green, the 
protesters felt that they were near victory. It seemed 
that all the sceal (news) as the rumours in the 
republican blocks were known, had stated that 
international support for their cause would soon bring 
the British to the negotiating table.
At one point it seemed the American dockers 
could (and soon would!) dictate all British policy 
in Ireland, We heard that they supported the men in 
the H-Blocks and the women in Armagh and would soon 
boycott all British goods until we were granted 
political status,
74 Clarke, (1986), 76.75 Green, (1990) , 16.
96CHAPTER III
Sometimes the search for good news meant that prisoners 
became easy material for practical jokers.
For days we pondered the rising up of dockers 
all over the world on our behalf till someone spiked 
the latest sceal that the Swiss dockers had joined 
the smash H-Block bandwagon with the revelation that 
Switzerland was landlockedJ ^
By 1979 there did not seem to be any solution in 
sight. The NIO with Roy Mason as Secretary of State, 
seemed bullish in the extreme about the war with PIRA and 
therefore did not look kindly upon any republican prison 
dispute. This led the PIRA, in alliance with the INLA, to 
step up the murder campaign against the prison officers 
at the expense of the main campaign against the security 
forces. Tim Pat Coogan has speculated that this was due 
to requests from the prisoners to organize some form of 
pressure on the authorities from outside the prison. 
However, the traditionalists within the PIRA did not want 
to organize protests in front of army and police 
surveillance.77 It must be remembered that at this time 
PSF was very much under the control of the PIRA. The 
southerners only regarded it as a flag of convenience or 
as a cover. The strong political wing with an independent 
membership and different priorities did not appear until 
the 1980's. While PSF's predecessors had in the past 
used the prisons issue to great effect (see Chapter II)
76 Ibid, 16.77 In 1979 ten prison employees were killed by the republicans, a fivefold increase in the number of assassinations in the two previous years. This was essentially the response of the traditionalists in the movement, who did not understand the role of politics in their struggle, unlike the newly emerging leadership in the North. However, it was popular with the protesters inside the jail.Tim Pat Coogan, (1980), 152-153.
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especially during the Irish War of Independence, the 
later generations of physical force republicans had grown 
cynical about the role of political action in the 
struggle. This was probably due to the very recent 
memories of the split with the OIRA at the start of the 
"troubles" when they chose to go political. However, as 
is discused later, the strategy of mass demonstrations 
and the use of the "Armalite and the Ballot Box" was to 
prove extremely effective by the end of the protest in 
1981. This complete reversal in attitude demonstrated the 
increasing influence of the urban northerners on the 
republican movement.
The escalation to the "dirty" protest had finally 
attracted international attention, especially in the 
United States, which was not only the UK's closest ally, 
but also a traditional sympathizer to the Irish cause.’®
It was perhaps at this stage that the British government 
could have made a magnanimous gesture towards the
protesters that might have solved the prison problem and jishown neither side as victorious. A deal could have |
probably been struck involving the right to wear civilian I
dress and the restoration of lost remission for the ,j
protesters. In the end this was the compromise offered by j
James Prior in 1981 and it would presumably have been *
possible to make such an offer at this time.’s This would i
still have left the authorities in control of the prison j
78 Bishop & Mallie, (1988), 355. j79 In 1980 Cardinal O'Fiaich secured from the relatives jof the protesters the concession that the protesters ,iwould be willing to make a deal involving civilian |clothing and the right to refuse prison work. }Clarke, (1986), 120.
J
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while the protesters would not have had to submit to the 
indignity of wearing a prison uniform. It is likely that 
after several years of living in appalling (though self 
inflicted) conditions the protesters would have grabbed 
at anything that seemed like a concession. The PIRA 
leadership would have welcomed a compromise which would 
have ended what was essentially a dangerous diversion 
from the organization's raison d'etre, the forcible re­
uniting of Ireland.
This would seem to be supported by the account of 
the protest within the prison given by Leo Green. In it 
he describes the atmosphere within H-4 after the murder 
of two prison officers, (one each by both PIRA and the 
INLA) which he alleges caused a period of physical ill 
treatment known as "an seachtain dona" (the bad week) 
amongst the republican prisoners.
On Sunday, when we all came together for Mass 
in the canteen it was usually like the tower of 
Babel. That Sunday after seachtain dona, it was more 
like the tower of Pisa, none of us very sure just 
how much longer we could we could hang on. . . The 
sceal maith, the American dockers, the other 
optimistic rumours were all, by then an age away.^^
This desperation inevitably led to the prisoners'
thoughts turning to potential escalation of the protest
and this inevitably led to the possibility of a hunger
strike, a traditional Irish republican weapon of last
resort.
When the new year began the chances of avoiding a 
fast appeared extremely low. The attitudes on both sides 
were hardening; both were too committed to be flexible. 
The protest had entered its fourth year when the newly
80 Green, (1990), 17.
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appointed Conservative Secretary of State, Humphrey 
Atkins, rejected the proposed compromise that had 
resulted from the intervention as a mediator of the newly 
appointed Cardinal, Tomas 0 ‘Fiaich,, after his first 
visit to the H-Blocks in 1978.
This had led to a debate within the prison as to 
what the next step should be. This debate also involved 
the PIRA leadership outside, like Danny Morrison in his 
capacity as a member of the H-Block c o m m i t t e e . T h e  PIRA 
leadership was in fact hostile to the idea of a hunger 
strike. Gerry Adams told Bobby Sands (who was now Brendan 
Hughes's right hand man) that the leadership was 
tactically, strategically, physically and morally 
opposed" to a hunger s t r i k e .®2 Furthermore, as PIRA 
prisoners regarded themselves as disciplined soldiers 
they would probably not have embarked on a fast without 
the permission of the Army Council.®® Within the prison 
however the "blanketmen" were starting to favour a hunger 
strike, and in the summer of 1980 two Blocks had voted 
for a strike.®*
The attitude of the "blanketmen" had been quite 
clear, this was that conditions were so bad that the idea 
of death was at times preferable to having to endure the 
conditions they lived in. Bobby Sands, states this 
clearly in his posthumously published gaol journal, "...
81 Bishop & Mallie, (1988), 356.82 Clarke, (1986), 121.83 PIRA General Order No 7:- Volunteers are forbidden to undertake hunger strikes without the express sanction of General Headquarters.From the GREEN BOOK published as an appendix to;Martin Dillon, THE DIRTY WAR. London: Hutchinson, (1988), 488.84 Clarke, (1986), 76.
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things became so unbearable that you just couldn't care 
less whether you lived or died just as long as you could 
escape the hellish nightmare.
Leo Green succinctly recollects the motives behind 
the prisoners' call for a hunger strike. He states that 
by mid-1980 any illusions the protesters held about the 
"blanket" protest winning concessions from the 
authorities had gone, and when the 0'Fiaich/Atkins
dialogue had collapsed a hunger strike became inevitable. ]
IHe ends his account with what he regarded as the options 
available to the prisoners in 1980.
The choice was stark! to sit and hope that a 
solution would fall into our lap or to go for one 
final intensification of the fight for political 
recognition.
In effect, no choice at alll^^
From mid-1980 the protesters began to prepare for a 
fast to the death, with a request for volunteers sent out 
by the PIRA OC of the prison, Brendan Hughes. In October, 
when Hughes learnt of the failure of the 0'Fiaich/Atkins 
talks, the final preparations were made. On the 10 
October the "blanketmen" announced that the hunger strike 
would commence from the 27 October. In a statement they 
released, their objectives were outlined as a claim for 
"as of right, political recognition and that we be 
accorded the status of political prisoners"
Subsequently, the list of names of the hunger 
strikers were released; it was to be made up of seven men 
who would start together, in a conscious emulation of the
85 Bobby Sands. ONE DAY IN MY LIFE. Dublin & Cork: Mercier Press, 1983, 54.86 Leo Green, (1990), 17.87 Clarke, (1986), 123.
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martyrdom of the seven signatories of the 1916 
proclamation. In 1980 the names released were Brendan 
Hughes, John Nixon, Sean McKenna, Raymond McCartney,
Tommy McKearly, Tom McFeely and Leo Green.
Despite a last minute attempt at accommodation by 
the government, which was rejected as too little to late, 
the hunger strike was embarked upon as planned. This was 
in the full expectation that some or all of the 
protesters would die as a result of their f a s t . 88
This was despite an extremely lively campaign 
conducted outside the Maze by what became the National H- 
Block/Armagh Committee. It was the external campaign that 
was to produce the high points of the fast in the winning 
by Maze prisoners of one seat in Westminster and two 
seats in the Dail during 1981. This campaign is examined 
in the next Chapter and in Chapters VII and VIII.
88 TIMES, 28 October 1980.
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4a. INTRODUCTION.
Away from the ’’blanket" protest within the Maze 
Prison, there were a number of attempts by Republicans to 
demonstrate their solidarity with the H-Block prisoners 
by taking the dispute outside the protesting wings of the 
gaol and onto the streets.
The campaign could be broadly separated into three 
subdivisions. These were,
1. The PIRA assassination campaign directed against 
prison employees (largely warders but also clerks 
and others within the prison administration) that is 
looked at in 4b.i
2. The Provisional Sinn Fein dominated campaign 
organised through the National H-Block/Armagh 
Committee and the Relatives Action Committee looked 
at in 4c, which tried to lobby the authorities on 
both sides of the boarder by the use of pickets, 
demonstrations and other forms of legal protest.
This culminated in the election of prisoners to 
Westminster and the Dail Eireann.z
3. The protest at Armagh women’s prison examined in 
section 4d, which claimed to have its own agenda, 
but was principally a demonstration of solidarity 
with the male H-Block protesters. This included the
1 Tim Pat Coogan, ON THE BLANKET. Swords Co.Dublin: Ward River Press, 1980, 152.2 Liam Clarke, BROADENING THE BATTLEFIELD. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1986, 101-102.
CHAPTER IV 10 3
use of a form of "dirty protest" and eventually an 
attempted hunger strike led by the Armagh Prison 
Republican Officer Commanding (OC) and the future 
Gibraltar bomber Mairead Farrell.%
As was mentioned previously, the protesters in the 
Maze had been disappointed by the nationalist community's 
initial reaction to the abolition of special category 
status, and to the low level of public support that the 
"blanket" protest had attracted. This had resulted in the 
prisoners feeling neglected and led to pressure from the 
prisoners and the relatives on PSF/PIRA to increase the 
campaign outside the prison. Further more, maintaining 
morale within the prison was a major problem for the 
Provisional's leadership. During the days of the Long ;
Kesh Cages, the relaxed atmosphere and paramilitary |
Idominance had ensured that prisoner morale remained high, i
but in the H-Blocks, where control was firmly in the 
hands of the authorities, the PIRA leadership was faced 
with a depressed prison membership.* This probably would 
have spread throughout the movement as the average 
volunteer would expect at least one term of imprisonment 
during membership of the organisation. Initially, it was 
hoped that the "blanket" protest would maintain morale, 
but the prisoners made it clear that they needed more 
support.5
3 James Adams, Anthony Bambridge & Robin Morgan, AMBUSH, ITHE WAR BETWEEN THE SAS AND THE IRA. London: Pan, 1988, !139. 14 Keith Bryett and Joanne Wright, PROPAGANDA AND JUSTICE j 
ADMINISTRATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND, TERRORISM ANDPOLITICAL VIOLENCE. London: Frank Cass, Summer 1991, 31- j32. !5 Ibid, 31-33. !
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The prisoners had lobbied the outside leadership 
partially to prove that the issue was still alive, but 
also because they felt that external action would 
pressurise the authorities to grant the concessions 
required for the successful solution of the dispute.®
Further, as the protest continued into the early eighties 
the northern left knew that perhaps the issue was the key 
to gaining the level of electoral support which their new 
policy of the "Armalite and the Ballot-box" needed. This 
was demonstrated in two specific incidents during the 
1981 Hunger Strike. These were the Fermanagh and South 
Tyrone by-elections, in which Bobby Sands first became 
elected. Subsequently, his election agent Owen Carron 
became the constituency’s MP, and the 1981 Southern 
general election several prisoners stood for and two won 
seats in the Dail Fireann.? However, even before this 
high point the prisoners had argued that the dispute 
could help the Republican movement achieve its more 
general aims.®
4b. THE PIRA ASSASSINATION CAMPAIGN.
The PIRA assassination of prison officer Patrick 
Dillon, was to become the first reaction by the 
Republican movement to the abolition of special category 
status.9 It was probably the most tragic and certainly 
the most controversial part of the prison campaign, 
although with hindsight, the least studied by observers
6 Clarke, (1986), 85-87.7 The results for the two By-elections in 1981 were victories by Sands with 30492 votes and Carron with 31278 votes. TIMES, 11 April 1981,& IRISH TIMES, 22 August 1981.8 Clarke, (1986) , 120.9 Coogan, (1980), 152-154.
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after the end of the prison protest. It is sobering to 
note that over the five year period of the protest lasted 
nearly twice as many prison officers died than did hunger 
strikers.10 Although the prison officers deaths often 
provoked little reaction outside Ulster, the conditions 
of the protesters, who would eventually choose to die, 
became a matter of international concern.
The initial decision to launch the campaign had been 
the action of the more conservative Southern wing of the 
PIRA, and represented an attitude more reminiscent of the 
early 1970's than the latter part of the decade. This 
wing of PIRA had an ingrained dislike of anything that 
carried the overtones of going "political". This was 
partly the result of suspicions following the feuds and 
splits that the IRA had suffered as recently as 1969.
Further more, militarily, the Provisional leadership felt 
that this form of protest was preferable to Republican 
demonstrations, as the latter would be subject to 
monitoring by the security forces, perhaps compromising 
members who had so far managed to avoid detection.n
The attacks were probably also felt to be a more 
effective form of outside action by a leadership that 
had, according to some observers, become "soaked in 
blood". The level and ferocity of the fighting in the 
early seventies seemed to have a brutalising effect upon 
some of the prominent leaders who at times seemed to 
indulge in violence for its own sake.
10 In the period of the protest eighteen warders (and one iwife) were Killed compared to ten hunger strikers: iClarke, (1986), 77. i11 Coogan, (1980) 151. I
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Assassinating prison warders was also an attempt to 
pressurise the prison authorities directly by making the 
job of prison officer less attractive to potential 
recruits, while also trying to terrorise existing 
officers into leaving prison work. It is however 
difficult to assess the effect this had on the warders.
The campaign may also have been intended to tempt 
officers into taking some form of physical revenge 
against the "blanketmen". It is certainly the case that 
the NIO believed this.12 It was known by the officers 
that the assassination lists were largely being compiled 
by the Protestant paramilitaries such as the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association 
(UDA) outside the prisons, and then transmitted via the 
prisons to Republican inmates, who then compiled 
assassination lists for the PIRA and INLA.is Prisoners 
have also claimed that maltreatment frequently occurred 
after assassinations such as the alleged "an Sauchen 
donna" incident (discussed in Chapter III). In this case 
prisoners were said to have been systematically 
maltreated for a week by prison staff after two officers 
were assassinated in separate incidents by the INLA and 
the PIRA.14 This might have provided evidence for 
Republican accusations from independent medical experts.
This though was never forthcoming and, as outlined in the 
previous chapter, while there had been some heavy-
12 Northern Ireland Office, THE H-BLOCKS, THE FACTS, Belfast: NIO, 1980.13 Allen Feldman, FORMATIONS OF VIOLENCE, THE NARRATIVE OF THE BODY AND POLITICAL TERROR IN NORTHERN IRELAND.Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. 198.14 Leo Green ON THE BLANKET, AN GLOR GAFA/THE CAPTIVE VOICE. Belfast: PSF-POW dept, 1990, 16-17.
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handedness there was no evidence of brutality, so this
tactic was not successful . is
According to one informant the prisoners used the
assassinations to torment the warders and try and provoke
them. When the officers did not seem too frightened by
the threats their wives were attacked instead as one
account by a former prisoner illustrates.
" Skelly [a Prison Officer] says to Clinkie [Clarke, a prisoner]; 'What do you want scumbag?'..,
Clarke says: 'Hey, got your name down here on
the hit list. '
'So what? What do you want me to do?' He knew 
he was getting banged anyway...
Skelly says:'I dont give a fuck, send it out'"
Three weeks later the prison officer and Clarke talked
again, and Skelly was informed that his name is no longer
on the hit list, instead his wife was on the list for
letter bombings, this according to the prisoner managed
to gain a violent reaction from the officer concerned.
This served as warning to officers and was an attempt to
intimidate them, as well as illustrating the level of
emotion that the protest was causing resulting in the
killing of people by the Provisionals who do not normally
fit their definition of legitimate targets.
The campaign however ensured the prisoners did
realise that the outside movement had not forgotten them
and that there was some way in which the Provisionals
could get at the prison officers.
It is interesting to note that the assassination
campaign did not seem to only target employees of the
Maze Prison, but employees of the whole Northern Irish
15 H-Blocks the facts, (1980).16 Feldman, (1991), 197-198.
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penal system, regardless of their role in it.i? The 
number of attacks also seemed to reflect the level of 
optimism within the movement for a resolution of the 
protest. In the early days of the protest the hope of the 
prisoners was that the NIO would relent fairly easily. At 
this time the annual number of assassinations was 
relatively low {in 1976 there were three murders but this 
dropped to two killings each in 1977 and 1978). However, 
in 1979 with the prisoners realising that the Government 
was not prepared to bargain, the number of killings rose 
(in this year ten warders were murdered). This was a 
reflection of the frustration felt by Republicans with 
the authorities and was another way of intensifying the 
pressure and trying to maintain morale within the protest 
blocks.
In 1980 the PIRA only killed one warder as it did 
not want to take press and public attention away from the 
Maze as a hunger strike began to look increasingly 
likelyiG. The Provisionals also suspended the 
assassination campaign in March 1980 for a period to help 
Cardinal O ’Fiaich and Bishop Cathal Daly in their 
negotiations with the NIO Minister Michael Alison. But 
after the dialogue collapsed the PIRA fired on a prison 
officer in Belfast in June and then subsequently 
announced that it was resuming attacks.19
At the commencement of the hunger strike in 1980, 
the PIRA decided to scale down the level of violence (see
17 Coogan, (1980), 153.
18 Ibid, 153.
19 David Reed, IRELAND, THE KEY TO THE BRITISH 
REVOLUTION. London: Larkin Publications, 1984, 323.
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Appendix II). This was to ensure that the visiting media 
who had started to cover the protest in detail for the 
first time, would not be distracted away from the central 
issue in the campaign; the blanketmen themselves. In 1981 
the PIRA did not resume the prisons campaign, but unlike 
1980 did not reduce other activity, in fact violence 
increased, partly because of the increased tension and 
the increase in rioting after the deaths of the hunger 
strikers. It was not until after the fast had ended that 
they started to go out for revenge as will be discussed 
in Chapter eight.
4c. THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN.
As outlined in Chapter 11 the period in which the 
protest lasted was concurrent with the change in PlRA's 
leadership away from the more conservative and largely 
southern based older leadership to the so called northern 
left.20 The new leadership was far more sympathetic to 
the concept of political action within the "armed 
struggle". The "blanket" protest was to prove the issue 
with which this new policy was launched and proved to be 
a heaven sent opportunity to open up a new battlefield 
with which to confront the British authorities.
Two groups initially dominated the campaign, PSF and 
the Relatives' Action Committee (RAC). It is interesting 
to note that while relations between PSF/PIRA and the RAC 
were originally good, by the end of the protest the 
relations between the groups had deteriorated 
significantly.. This is probably due to the problem that 
while at the start of the protest the two groups shared a
20 Clarke, (1986), 40 - 42.
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common agenda by the end of this period the aims of the 
two groups had diverged significantly. The PSF had 
started to look upon the protest as the springboard for 
gaining a foothold in the political process, while the 
relatives' priorities remained the successful resolution 
of prison conditions.
The RAC was formed as a result of the controversy 
that had followed the death of hunger striker Frank Stagg 
in 1976 . Disagreement arose between some members of his 
family and the PIRA over his funeral arrangements. The 
PIRA wished to give him a paramilitary funeral, while the 
relatives, who blamed the Provisionals as much as the 
British for his death, opposed this. The end result of 
this was a farcical dispute over were the body should 
lie, which led to PIRA disintering the body some months 
later and re-burying it in a Republican plot.21 
The fear of repeating this resulted in the 
Provisionals allowing the RAC to be formed in Belfast in 
April 1 9 7 7 . 2 2 The RAC was to play an important role in 
establishing the prison protest as an issue in the 
Catholic ghettos of Ulster, considering the initially 
apathetic reaction which earlier PSF organised rallies 
had received during 1976 and the first half of 1977.2 3
The RAC was a relatively new departure for PSF which 
was traditionally hostile to the formation of political 
groups outwith its direct control. This was an example of 
a clear policy shift within the party. It was felt to be
21 For more information on this incident see Clarke, (1986), 86-89.22 Ibid, 86-87.23 Kevin J.Kelley, THE LONGEST WAR. London: Zed Books, 1988, 262.
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important to avoid the mistakes that had occurred with 
relatives in the past. It was also hoped that it would be 
useful to broaden out the issue to enable it to become of 
general concern to the nationalist community as a whole
and not just militant R e p u b l i c a n s .
This had been an aim which the northern left had 
been planning for some time. PSF had chosen at this time 
to open up contacts and alliances with like minded groups 
over common issues. An example of this was the Irish 
Front (IF), a coalition which consisted of the PSF, the 
IRSP, and the remnants of the old Irish Nationalist 
Party, it opposed "criminalisation and repression" and 
sought the restoration of special category status. On 
St.Patricks day in 1977 the coalition had organised a 
rally in support of the prison dispute which attracted 
about 3000 people. The IF though split up shortly after 
this, largely due to PSF fears of SDLP i n f i l t r a t i o n . 2 5
This new policy had originally come to the notice of 
the authorities in the document captured by the 
Garda Siochana when they raided Seamas Twomeys flat in 
1977. The document, which was thought to have been 
written by a committee chaired by Gerry Adams in the 
Cages of LongKesh Prison, outlined a new role for PSF.
This involved PSF developing a life of its own within the 
Republican Movement. It also stated that the Provisionals 
should try and make common issues with like minded 
g r o u p s . 2 6  "SF [Sinn Fein] should be directed to
24 Clarke, (1986), 262.
25 Kelley, (1988), 264.
26 Captured staff report published as an appendix to Clarke, (1986), 251-253.
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infiltrate other organisations to win support for, and 
sympathy to, the movement"
PSF was at all times to under direct PIRA 
supervision and guidance, there was to be no chance of 
going totally political. The IF had not been a resounding 
success, by any analysis, as it did not win any 
concessions in regard to its role as a pressure group or 
as a catalyst for attracting the Catholic community's 
support.28 Its end though came about largely due to PSF 
intolerance.
This was not the first time the PSF had failed in an 
attempt to coalesce. As early as 1972 the PSF had formed 
an alliance with Peoples Democracy (PD). They campaigned 
under the banner of the Political Hostages Release 
Committee, but arguments about the legitimacy of PIRA 
violence caused fragmentation.29 similarly, in 1976 when 
they attempted to align again it fell apart. The PD's had 
by this time built strong links with the Paris-based 
Trotskyist Fourth International and had a far left 
ideology. At the time PSF released an arrogant statement.
Sinn Fein will not allow itself to be used to 
support the meandering politics of PD nor will it 
allow pseudo revolutionaries to bathe in the glory 
of Irelands recent dead.so
At this point it is interesting to examine Gerry Adams's
interpretation of PSF during this period, in the account i
ihe gives in The Politics Of Irish Freedom. "Within Sinn |
Fein we lacked a structured national political response {
to the prison crisis... This began to change after the
27 Ibid, 251-253.28 Kelley, (1988) , 264.29 Clarke, (1986), 87.30 Ibid, 87.
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1978 Sinn Fein Ard F h e i s . i go even within militant 
Republicanism there is the acceptance that politically 
PSF was unprepared for the dispute which (until the 
creation of the National H-Block/Armagh Committee) 
resulted in the leading role of the campaign being taken
by the RAC. One of the explanations for this, proposed by
Adams, was the nature of Sinn Fein in the North during 
the days of the Ulster Unionist government in Stormont.
In Ulster the party had been illegal unlike in the 
Republic. This meant that in the Six Counties, PSF, in 
Adams own words was, "still emerging from a basically 
conspiratorial type of organisation", Further more, 
republicanism was suffering from a high rate of attrition 
at this time. Many of the people who had been involved in 
earlier prison disputes had either abandoned 
republicanism or were imprisoned, thus depriving PSF of 
experienced campaigners.3% In the early stages it had 
released leaflets trying to publicise the campaign by the 
"blanketmen". An early attempt. This Is Kieran Nugent, 
was released by PSF in November 1976, trying to explain 
to the nationalist population why the protest had 
started. It and other attempts were not very
successful.33 As far as most people were concerned the
blanketmen were a non-issue. This eventually became 
apparent to the protesters in the Maze, though initially 
because they refused visits, the protesters were isolated
31 Gerry Adams, THE POLITICS OF IRISH FREEDOM. Dingle Co Kerry: Brandon Books, 1983, 74.32 Ibid 75.33 Provisional Sinn Fein, THIS IS KIERAN NUGENT. Belfast: PSF, Republican Press Centre, Falls Road. 20 November 1976.
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from the apathy outside the prison and so were unaware of 
the indifference to their cause. When they realised that 
they were forgotten they determined to grab the 
h e a d l i n e s . 3 4  Thus, much of the behaviour of the prisoners 
must be seen in the terms of propaganda and self 
conscious martyrdom with the outside propagandists trying 
to publicise the events in the Maze.
Originally the RAC was based around Belfast, a 
factor that was partly a strength in that West Belfast is 
the most important concentration of nationalists in the 
North. So the Committee tapped into a very important 
support base. However, this provincial origin was not an ]
ideal launching pad for a Thirty-two County and an i
international campaign.
The organisation was undeniably republican in |
Inature, a fact that is obvious from the rules of Belfast I
•ICentral RAC in which both the short and long term i
jobjectives of the campaign are outlined.  ^ j
Our immediate demand is that political status 
should be retained and extended to all prisoners who j
are in gaol because of their opposition to British I
interference in Irish affairs. We further demand j
that there should be a total amnesty for all Irish 1
political prisoners. We finally demand the 
withdrawal of all British troops from Ireland and 
the re-establishment of a Thirty-two County 
Republic...
The rules outlined that they would concern themselves 
with all matters relating to imprisoned republicans, and 
that Central RAC should mobilise both nationally and 
internationally.35 Thus, the organisation was in full 
political sympathy with the aims of PSF/PIRA. The latter
34 Feldman, (1991). 159-161.SSPublished as an appendix to Clarke, (1986), 253-254.
Certain people will say that they [the Peace People] should have been allowed freedom of speech. 
Well we are sick and disgusted listening to their 
freedom of pro-British speeches seven days a 
week....
... true they the 'Peace Women' or British 
agents, as I class them were driven out of Turf
CHAPTER IV
therefore did not perceive the largely female RAC as a 
threat.
The RAC set about the task of pushing their case and 
publicising the plight of the prisoners with vigour. They 
organised marches frequently with a symbolic "blanketman" 
leading the march. As the marches often featured the 
wives and families of prisoners they provided very 
emotive propaganda as well as good television pictures.
This humanised the protest, bringing home to the general 
population the conditions in which prisoners lived and so 
arousing Irish sympathy for the underdog.36
The campaign grew from its humble origins in the 
Turf Lodge area of Belfast. By the end of 1978 there were 
branches of the RAC all over Northern Ireland.3? The RAC 
groups were to become important in militant 
republicanism's fight against the Peace People, a group 
of northern women who campaigned against PIRA's violence.
This campaign brought out the most intolerant tendencies 
in the Provisionals, viz a viz their attitude to |iCatholics who opposed them. The Peace People were j
confronted through RAC marches titled. Peace with i
Justice, which tried (and succeeded) to drive the Peace i
People off the streets in nationalist areas. This was jjjustified by one leading RAC activist Lily Fitzsimons. |
36 Chris Ryder, THE RÜC, A FORCE UNDER FIRE. London: Mandarin, 1989, 236-238.37 Reed, (1984), 296.
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Lodge and their car wrecked. We the Irish mothers of
Irish children do not want or need them.^’^
By the end of 1978 the RAC had grown and matured as 
an independent, but, republican organization. It picketed 
Embassies and organised rallies throughout Ireland as the 
tensions inside the prisons escalated. At this time PSF 
chose once again to enter into a wider based campaign, 
despite the previous failed attempts. This was to prove 
more successful than previous attempts and largely took 
over many of the roles which had previously been only the 
RACs. This was eventually officially launched in 197 9 as 
the National H-Block/Armagh Committee and was a direct 
response, along with the founding of PSF's POW 
department, to pressure from the prisoners upon the 1978 
PSF ard fheis.s* The prisoners hoped for a broad based 
campaign in the spirit of what Bobby Sands was later to 
call for. '’Everyone, republican or otherwise, has his own 
particular part to play. No part is too great or too 
small, no one is too old or too young to do something".
This campaign, which was to become a relatively 
broadbased anti-Unionist coalition, had its origins in 
the 1978 Coalisland Conference, which had failed largely 
due to PSF's attitude to parties which would not give 
unqualified support to the armed struggle. The conference 
however had prepared the ground for the next RAC . 
organised meeting in 1979. This was held at the Green 
Briar Hotel in Andersonstown during October with 
representation from the RAC and the IRSP, PD, PSF, the
38 Reed, (1984), 295.39 Adams, (1986), 75-77.40 The Republican Movement, NOTES FOR REVOLUTIONARIES. Belfast: Republican Publications, 1982, 7.
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Trade Union Campaign Against Repression, Women Against 
Imperialism and smaller groups like the Peace People.
There were however two important omissions from this 
conference; the old Officials now named the Republican 
Clubs/Sinn Fein the Workers Party(SFWP) and the SDLP.
The delegates this time agreed to form a coalition 
based upon the criminalisation issue which was named the 
National H-Block/Armagh C o m m i t t e e . T h e  success of this 
coalition was a direct result of a change in attitude 
within PSF.
Earlier in 1979, PSF had held its own conference to 
consider the prison's issue. This was in fact the first 
time that the party had addressed a single issue, and 
according to Gerry Adams marked an important new 
development for the o r g a n i s a t i o n . T h e  role of the POW 
department was expanded from that of simply a service for 
prisoners to that of an active propaganda department, it 
now began to publicise the prison issue and transformed 
itself into single issue political campaign in its own 
right.43 The PSF conference also marked an important 
maturing of the parties attitude to other sympathetic 
organisations. Previously offers of support by groups 
critical of the PIRA had not been taken seriously, but by 
the time of the Green Briar Conference PSF had come to 
realise that a policy of "... critical support was better 
than one of not supporting at all”. This new political 
maturity had allowed PSF to play a constructive role in 
the Conference, while avoiding the mistakes of earlier
41 Kelley, (1988), 317.42 Adams, (1983), 75.43 Ibid, 75
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attempts at forming coalitions. Thus, the National H- 
Block/Armagh Committee was formed.4* This was to mark a 
new phase in the prison protest which coincided with the 
rising tensions within the prisons, making a hunger 
strike increasingly likely.
The Green Briar Conference was dominated by PSF 
which sought to have the prisoners' five demands accepted 
by the Conference, It was at this stage that the 
possibility of running prisoners as candidates in 
elections was first discussed. The original idea came 
from a PIRA Block OC, in the Maze prison, Bobby Sands, 
who thought that once elected, candidates (or if still 
imprisoned a co-opted representative) could then sit in a 
Republican Assembly based on the model of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) General Council. The 
analogy with the PLO was intentional, as Sands then hoped 
that an assembly might be the root for PIRA getting 
international recognition like the PLO. The extent of PSF 
domination was illustrated when all of its proposals were 
accepted. However, this served also to polarize the 
Conference between the Provisionals and the more moderate 
nationalists in attendance. This was further reflected 
when PSF became the strongest voice in the seventeen 
strong committee which was elected.4 5
Subsequently, on the 18 December 1979, a similar 
conference was held in Dublin. A sub-committee of the 
National H-Block/Armagh Committee was elected that had 
responsibility for the co-ordination and expansion of
44 Ibid, 76.45 Clarke, (1986), 101-103.
CHAPTER IV 119
activities in the Republic. This, like the Committee in 
the North, was intended to widen the range of support to 
include people who did not necessarily support the "armed 
struggle" or militant r e p u b l i c a n i s m . *6 This was 
emphasised by PSF's Vice-President Gerry Adams in a 
speech to the conference when he stated.
For those who are unable to support the armed 
struggle in the North there is nothing in the 
demands put forward by the committee which cannot be 
supported on humanitarian grounds.
In 1980 the situation within the prison became
increasingly tense. In February an incident within the
women's prison in Armagh led to the female "dirty"
protest being launched. The situation was further
exacerbated when in March the Northern Ireland Secretary
Humphrey Atkins, announced his decision to remove the
right to special category status to people newly .
convicted of crimes committed before the old cut out date
of the 1 March 1976 (offenders after this date were at
first the only people "criminalised"). As outlined in the
previous chapter, this contributed to the long feared
prospect of a hunger strike, which the republican
leadership and the relatives were trying to prevent.
Then in June 1980 it was announced that the
prisoners last resort before embarking on a hunger strike
had failed. Some of the prisoners had taken their case
for political status to the European Commission on Human
Rights. The 105 page report that had been ruled upon two
months previously (but not released until June) decided
in favour of the British government though it did
46 Reed, (1984), 302.47 Ibid, 320.
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criticise some aspects of the prison policy in U l s t e r .
However, the most important part of the ruling was not 
favourable to the prisoners who ’^ cannot derive any 
legitimacy or justification from the European Convention 
on Human Rights." Though the report also stated that,
"... the Commission considers that in such a 
situation the state is not absolved from its 
obligation under the convention because prisoners 
are engaged in what is regarded as an unlawful 
challenge to the authority of the prison 
administration.
The report went on to say that the authorities were
obliged to reconsider the regime as the prisoners were
obviously not prepared to accept it as it stood. This
required that Atkins reconsider his decision in order to
try and reach a compromise.so Both the protesters and
their supporters realised that greater pressure had to be
placed upon the government, this inevitably meant a
hunger strike.
Within the prison the preparations were made with
the requests for volunteers in the late summer and the
early autumn of 1980. By Monday the 27 October the names
of the hunger strikers were released to the press.si
Similarly preparations were also made by the H-
Block/Armagh Committee for the playing of this final
card. With plans being made on the 17 of October for
marches in Belfast, and Dublin on the 26. The day before
the fast was due to start and then simultaneous to the
48 GUARDIAN, 20 Junel980.49 Ibid.50 Kelley, (1988) , 325.51 TIMES, 28 October 1980.
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fast starting a press conference was held in London by 
Charter 80.5%
The prisoners themselves sent in ideas to the 
Committee to try and publicise the protest. This included 
the attempt to establish an informal news network based 
on the bush telegraph principal. Friends and relatives 
were asked to spread information in workplaces etc, they 
were also asked to send material to friends abroad and 
put posters up in their w i n d o w s . ^3 Former "blanketmen" 
like Kieran Nugent were also sent abroad to try and 
increase international pressure upon the British. On 26 
October he arrived in Paris with a former Armagh 
prisoner, Maureen Gibson. They stated that their job was 
to help form and support European action committees 
similar to the one in France which had already organised 
a 5000 signature petition to try and persuade the British 
Government to accede to the five d e m a n d s ^ * . in the United 4
States the pro-republican Irish-American Groups like the j
Irish National Caucus and the notorious Noraid (Irish |
Northern Aid) stepped up their policy of lobbying |
Congressmen. Internationally H-block prison supporters j
picketed various British targets including b u s i n e s s e s . 55 j
Inside Ireland the campaign was built up on a 
Thirty-two County basis. This was an attempt to force the 
Irish Republic's Government under the republican minded 
Taoiseach, Charles Haughey to put pressure upon the
52 Minutes of the National H-Block/Armagh Committee meeting of 17 October 1980, in 30 Mountjoy Sqr, Dublin. I53 H-3 prisoners, IDEAS TO PUBLICISE THE PROTEST. A j
Comm" smuggled from HMP Maze, Unsigned and Undated but iprobably pre 1981. j54 TIMES, 28 October 1980. i55 Reed, (1984), 342 - 343. j
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British G o v e r n m e n t . A  regular column in the northern 
Magazine Fortnight, entitled the Letter From Dublin, 
remarked upon the attitudes of people in the Republic to 
the Provisionals and the H-Blocks at this time. The 
columnist noted that people in the Republic were largely 
in favour of the death penalty for murder, although they 
also supported the demands of the prisoners (including 
murderers). The columnist felt that this was largely due 
to the desire to ignore the protests that the H-Block 
supporters were putting on, which made people aware of 
the problems in the North, something most Southerners 
wished to avoid. In the Republic opinion on Ulster is 
somewhat contradictory. Most people are in favour of a 
united Ireland but opposed to the "armed struggle" and 
the aims of the Provisionals. Similarly most Southern 
republicans have never been to the North, despite their 
claimed nationalism. These contradictions were being 
brought to the attention of Southern opinion by the 
prison dispute so the impression was that if the British 
gave in then they could forget about the North again, and 
the contradictions it inevitably i n v o l v e d . 5? However, it 
was not until the 1981 hunger strike that Irish public 
opinion on the dispute became politically important on 
either side of the Border; when the issue was used in the 
Irish General Election and in a series of by-elections in 
the Westminster constituency of Fermanagh and South 
Tyrone.
56 Joe Joyce & Peter Murtagh, THE BOSS, CHARLES J HAUGHEY IN GOVERNMENT. Swords, Co Dublin: Poolbeg Press, 1983, 148.57 LETTER FROM DUBLIN, FORTNIGHT, December 1980.
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The propaganda, in support of the hunger strikers, 
was very effectively written, the blame was firmly placed 
upon the British, anybody who was not involved was 
further attacked.
The British government needs you if it is to 
defeat the hunger strike in the H~Blocks of Long 
Kesh prison camp. It needs you to bury your head in 
the sand,
... it was the British who created the 
conditions which have led to the present c r i s i s ^
The propaganda also used very emotive language making the
prison and the authorities very much the aggressors and
the prisoners victims. The leaflets also tried to get
people directly involved, "... the battle for political
status is not Just the prisoners it concerns all the
Irish people. ^
This did lead to pressure being placed upon Humphrey
Atkins by John Hume, the leader of the SDLP who met with
him on 4 December and afterwards released this statement,
"J belive that it is possible to achieve a step by step
de-escalation of the problem which will be satisfying to
everyone involved"
This reflected the growing concern within the
nationalist community, including people from outside the
normal range of republican supporters. The strike also
opened up the possibility for the protesters’ case to be
heard on the British mainland. This took a far more
considered approach, looking and sounding like a human
58 PSF, H-BLOCK HUNGER STRIKE. Belfast: PSF-POW Dept, 1980.5 9 PSF, BRITAINS HELL HOLE, Dublin & Belfast: PSF-POW 
Dept, 1980.6 0 John Hume, STATEMENT BY JOHN HUME, LEADER OF THE SDLP 
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE MR 
ATKINS, SDLP, 4 December 1980.
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rights group at its founding rally on the 27 September.
This was captured even by the name that the propagandists 
used Charter 80. They had to educate the British public 
to a greater extent than in the Irish case.
There are now over 400 prisoners living in 
appalling conditions in H-Block and Armagh gaol.
Most are covered only by blankets, denied all 
privileges, continually locked in their cells.
The 1980 hunger strike had ended in confusion over
the deal that had allegedly been agreed between the
protesters and the British Government. What is clear was
that the prisoners, their supporters and leaders outside
prison were extremely unhappy with the outcome of that
strike, and decided that there should now be an all out
fast to the death to force the British to change their
minds.® %
Initially the new hunger strike was to be a solo 
affair with new strikers appearing every two weeks or so.
It was hoped this would increase pressure on the 
Government. The first prisoner was to be Bobby Sands the 
prison OC during the 1980 hunger strike.
The eventual decision to re-start the strike was 
taken by a special PSF conference on the prison protest 
which was called to start a new political campaign in 
support of the new hunger strike in which it was realised 
there would probably be fatalities. At this time plans 
were also made for a rally in Belfast town centre at the 
start of the strike.63
61 Charter 80, HUMAN RIGHTS FOR IRISH POLITICAL 
PRISONERS. London: Charter 80, September 1980.62 David Baresford, TEN MEN DEAD. London: Grafton Books, 1987, 52-54.63 IRISH TIMES. 10 February 1981.
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During the conference some PSF members had privately 
expressed reservations about the desirability of a hunger 
strike. This was because of the fear that after a fifty- 
three day strike before Christmas 1980, the nationalist 
population would not be ready, or would possibly even be 
apathetic to the cause. Further, they had serious doubts 
as to the likelihood of the Thatcher government giving in 
to the five demands and that foresaw only pointless 
deaths and eventual defeat. However, there were still 
hopes that the government would be prepared to bargain 
over the principal issues in the protest; clothing and 
work.® 4
The Provisionals ruling Army Council (AC) was also 
worried about starting a second hunger strike. The 
principal problem was that the AC felt that their should 
not be a repeat of the crisis at the end of the 1980 
fast. It also decided that unlike in the 1980 hunger 
strike there would be no running down of the "war effort" 
by the PIRA.^s
In an early show of strength on the 25 February, 700 
people attended a pro-H-Block rally in Coalisland Co 
T y r o n e . 6 6  This was an attempt to show public support and 
focus attention upon the Sands hunger strike which was 
due to start on the 1 March 1981.
On the second day of Sands' strike there was a 
further rally, in the Catholic centre of Belfast the 
Falls Road. This attracted about 4000 people. There was
64 Kelley (1988), 330-333.65 Colm Keena, A BIOGRAPHY OF GERRY ADAMS, Cork & Dublin: Mercier Press, 1990, 89.66 IRISH TIMES, 26 February 1981.
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press speculation that mass marches were needed, as much 
to bolster up the morale of the hunger strikers, as to 
pressurise the government. On the mainland, 10 Downing 
Street was picketed, while internationally 3000 rallied 
in New York outside the hotel where Margaret Thatcher was 
receiving the US Medal of Freedom.
The propaganda campaign was run upon a theme of 
"Britain Reneges". The leaflets constantly outlined how 
the British had refused to honour the agreement which 
brought the 1980 hunger strike to an end.
At the end of fifty-three days of the last 
hunger strike, with one man hours from death, the 
government agreed to what the prisoners demanded:- 
No prison uniform, no prison work, normal remission 
of sentences, weekly letters and visits, free 
association with other prisoners and their own 
educational facilities.^^
Other material adopted a similar betrayed tone. "Clothes
brought to the gaols by relatives were refused by the
authorities and parcels were not allowed. *
Internationally the H-Block issue was raised at a
meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
in Geneva. Maura McCrory addressed the assembly in her
capacity as a member of the Women's International League
for Peace and Freedom. She urged the Commission to
investigate post trial treatment of Northern Irish
prisoners. The response of the Irish representative was
that he felt there were adequate European outlets for
prison grievances rather than the UN. The British reply
67 IRISH TIMES, 2 March 1981. j68 AD-HOC HUNGER STRIKE COMMITTEE. London: 1981. !69 National H-Block/Armagh Committee, BRITISH RENEGE ON I
HUNGER STRIKE COMMITMENTS. Dublin: National H- îBlock/Armagh Committee, 30 Mountjoy Sqr. 1981. j
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stated that the prisoners' case was closed when it was 
rejected by the European Human Rights Commission.
Within the North the campaign to support Sands' fast 
was meticulously planned. The series of rallies starting 
in Tyrone were to climax, on the forty-ninth day of the 
fast, with a mass rally in Dublin, The pressure was 
further increased when in his fourth week Sands was 
joined by two new hunger strikers Patsy O'Hara (INLA) and 
Raymond McCreesh (PIRA).^!
The next important development politically was the 
by-election on 9 April 1981 in the largely nationalist 
constituency of Fermanagh and South Tyrone. The 
possibility of a prison candidate seemed a godsend and 
Adams put forward the idea that the candidate should be 
Sands.72 This led to some friction within the National 
Committee, as one member Bernadette McAliskey {nee 
Devlin) had hoped to run on a prisons ticket. However, 
this was resolved when on the 26 March, Bobby Sands was 
nominated for the seat.73
The possibility of dividing in the nationalist vote 
worried PSF, so aspiring candidates were prevailed upon 
to withdraw. The SDLP did not want to be blamed for 
blocking the prisoners' chances of winning, so it decided 
not to endorse any candidate, and to support Noel 
Maguire. Later on in the campaign who called upon anti- 
Unionist voters to abstain from voting rather than vote 
for Sands.74 This action demonstrated the growing
70 IRISH TIMES, 12 March 1981.71 IRISH TIMES, 23 March 1981.72 Keena, (1990), 90,73 TIMES, 27 March 1981.74 Kelley, (1988), 335.
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polarisation caused by the hunger strike within Northern 
Irish society. By preventing a split in the nationalist, 
vote the SDLP blurred in the eyes of many Unionists, the 
distinction between the SDLP and PSF.^s
The other possible rival to Sands was Noel Maguire, 
the brother of the former HP Frank Maguire, Noel Maguire 
was persuaded to withdraw and issued a statement to the 
press.
I have been told that the only way of saving 
the life of Bobby Sands is by letting Sands go 
forward in the election, I just cannot have on my 
own hands the life of another man, I am calling on 
my supporters to throw their weight behind Bobby 
Sands .^ ®
As Sands' condition worsened tension began to grow 
between the two communities in the North. The Northern 
Ireland Secretary Humphrey Atkins decided to ban an H- 
Block parade in Cookstown, Co Tyrone, because two planned 
Protestant counter marches which might have clashed with 
it.77
On the 9 April, Sands won the by-election with an 
impressive 51.2% of the vote. He gained 30492 votes 
compared to the Official Unionist Harold West who 
received 29046 votes (48.8%). This was probably the high 
point in propaganda terms that the Provisionals were to 
h a v e . 7 8  To republicans one and a half counties of the Six 
Counties had voted in support of the "armed struggle", or 
had at least supported the prisoners demands. Increased 
attendance at rallies indicated that nationalist support
7 5 Michael J. Cunningham, BRITISH GOVERNMENT POLICY IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1969-89, ITS NATURE AND EXECUTION. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991, 146.76 TIMES, 31 March 1981.77 SUNDAY TIMES, 5 April 1981.78 TIMES, 11 April 1981.
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was growing in the rest of the Six Counties as well.79 In 
fact, this was the opposite to the apathy that PSF had 
felt dooming the strike only a few months before. The 
Committee had also now found a centre piece for their own 
campaign. Sands' election agent, Owen Carron, said after 
the victory.
The nationalist people on the behalf of the 
Irish people have voted against Unionism and against 
the H-Blocks. It is time Britain got out of Ireland 
and put an end to the torture of this country.
This reaction was not shared by the other representatives
of northern nationalism. The SDLP said it was more a vote
against Unionism in a nationalist seat than anything
else. In an editorial The Times described the victory as
a "...brilliant propaganda coup for the Provisional IRA.
It authenticates their H-Block protest as never
before.
The propaganda made great use of what the 
Provisionals felt was an electoral justification which 
they had never before received.
Last week we witnessed history being made in 
Fermanagh/South Tyrone. The massive electoral 
mandate given to Bobby Sands and his hunger striking 
comrades in their campaign for the five demands has 
made nonsense of the British criminalisation 
policy.
The attendance at rallies continued to be impressive. On 
the 15 April an estimated 3000 people attended an anti-H- 
Block rally in Belfast, which was prevented from entering
79 Kelley, (1988), 336.80 TIMES, 11 April 1981.81 National H-Block/Armagh Committee, CIRCULAR-DAY 45. Dublin: National H-Block/Armagh Committee, 30 Mountjoy Sqr, 1981.
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the city centre. There was also a half day strike in the 
nationalist areas of West B e l f a s t .
This had meant that unprecedented international 
attention had been gained for the prisons' issue. Three 
back bench TD's from Dublin, Neil Blaney, John O'Connell 
and Sile de Valera, visited Sands in Prison. In an 
attempt to intercede on his behalf the TD's requested an 
interview with Mrs Thatcher. It was not a great surprise 
to most observers that this was refused.
At this stage, the gap between the relatives (under 
the increasing influence of the Catholic Church and the 
Republic's government) and the Provisionals began to 
widen again. At the request of Bobby Sands' sister,
Marcella Sands, the European Commission on Human Rights 
became involved in the issue once more. She had made the 
request citing three violations of Sands' human rights, 
these were.
1. The right to life.
2. The right to protection from inhuman treatment.
3. The right of freedom of expression. (This was a
specific reference to the constraints placed on 
contacts he was permitted to make while campaigning 
for the Fermanagh and South Tyrone by-election).
The Commission responded to her complaint by sending 
two Scandinavian members to investigate, the acting 
President Prof Carl-Aage Norgaard (Denmark) and Prof 
Torkel Opsahl (Norway). The Commissioners had a ninety 
minute meeting at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in
82 IRISH TIMES, 16 April 1981.83 TIMES, 22 April 1981.
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London and then flew to Ulster.84 This new attempt at 
mediation to save Sands life failed. After eight hours in 
the Maze Prison they left without seeing Sands.
Procedural problems arose, Sands would only speak to the 
Commissioners in the presence of the PIRA prison 00 
Brendan McFarlane, along with Gerry Adams and Danny 
Morrison. Reluctantly the British permitted this, but the 
Commission was only willing to take part in such an 
interview if Sands was prepared to pursue his sister’s 
claim, this meant suspending his fast for at least over a 
month until the Commission could investigate further.8 5 
Sands worried that the investigation was possibly a 
delaying tactic by the Government, and that it would be 
unlikely that the momentum of the protest could be 
regained, consequently he declined to pursue the 
complaint. In a previously prepared statement he 
criticised Charles Haughey, the Irish Taoiseach, for the 
"... cynical and cold-blooded manipulation" of his 
sister, by convincing her that the Commission would be "a 
vehicle for getting the British off the H~Block/Armagh 
hook". He also reiterated that the five demands were 
still the important factor in ending the dispute in the 
prisons.
Now that the Commission discussion is out of 
the way and the confusion deliberately created by 
its intervention has cleared, we, the political 
prisoners, call once again for the people to support 
our demands.
The next international attempt at mediation was 
launched by the Vatican. The Pope’s emissary Msgr John
84 GUARDIAN, 25 April 1981. j
85 OBSERVER, 26 April 1981. I86 Ibid. Î
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Magee was Northern Irish, and a well respected Church 
diplomat. The meeting with Magee and the Atkins was not 
successful. The British felt that the prison was one of 
the most modern in the world and that the Government 
would continue to improve conditions if it could, but 
there could be no change until the fast e n d e d . 8? This 
last ditch attempt to intervene before Sands died caught 
the National Committee unawares, transferring the 
initiative at least on this front, to the Church of 
Rome.88
Bobby Sands' condition was deteriorating rapidly, 
and people within the National H-block/Armagh Committee 
were preparing for the next act. In Londonderry the 
Committee distributed a statement in preparation for 
Sands death. It called for a one day strike and three 
days of mourning in the event of his death. The statement 
explained. "We intend to express our anger and sorrow 
over the three day mourning period in a solemn manner."
The final funeral arrangements were made, and assembly 
points for demonstrations protesting against his death
were announced.89
On the 5 May 1981 Bobby Sands died after sixty-six 
days of fasting. His funeral attracted a number estimated 
at between 50,000 and 100,000 people, in a mass display 
of nationalist sympathy and support to militant 
republicanisms latest martyr.*0
87 Northern Irish Information Service, STATEMENT AFTER 
THE MEETING BETWEEN FATHER JOHN MAGEE AND THE 'SECRETARY 
OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, 29 April 1981.88 TIMES, 29 April 1981.89 TIMES, 30 April 1981.90 Kelley, (1988), 337-339.
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The immediate result of the death was rioting on a 
scale that had not been seen in the North since the early 
1970's. In the Republic, the long held fears of the 
Southern establishment, that the violence in the North 
might spill over the border seemed to be realised. In 
Dublin, there was rioting on the night of Sands death, 
and on the day of the funeral. Shops that had refused to 
close in protest were targeted, as were British owned 
establishments such as the Ulster Bank (part of the 
National Westminster Group) and Lombards Merchant Bank.
The British Home Stores shop in O'Connell Street was also 
attacked on the 13 May.
This violence served to expose the split in the 
Southern group of the National H-Block/Armagh Committee, 
ie between the physical force republicans, and the anti­
violence faction. A Committee statement condemned the 
violence and called for :"...peaceful and dignified 
demonstrations” While An Phoblact/Republcan News the 
Provisional newspaper commented.
The intensity of the rioting^ spearheaded by 
angry youths, and with the approval of the bulk of 
the nationalist community has provided a welcome 
sign of the revived spirit of republican resistance 
amongst a saddened people.
The strain of these contradictions was at its greatest in 
the Republic, where the coalition became undermined owing 
to disputes between the pro and anti violence factions.
Those who took their position from a human rights stand­
point were increasingly alarmed by the levels of violence 
caused by the dispute in the Republic. This difference
91 Reed, (1984), 355-356.92 AN PHOBLACT/REPUBLICAN NEWS, 9 May 1981, quoted in Reed, (1984), 356-357.
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resulted in the demise of the Southern Committee. These 
factors, combined with the problem that the British now 
were not going to concede to the five demands no matter 
how many prisoners died and how much rioting there would 
be.93 Later this was to become a problem in the North 
when the relatives and the Catholic Church grew 
increasingly hostile to the continuation of the strike, 
realising that they could not win. Indeed as early as the 
14 May the panic factor was already demonstrated when 
Cardinal O'Fiaich sent a telegram to Margaret Thatcher 
pleading, "In God's name, don't allow another death".
However, a few options remained open to the 
activists. In the North, while PSF was unable to stand
for the local elections on the 23 May, due to a I
Iresolution at its previous ard fhes, pro-prisoner |
candidates made a good showing. Perhaps most dramatically |I
of all, they defeated Gerry Fitt in the West Belfast !
Council seat that he had held for over twenty y e a r s , 9 5  jIhighlighting the dangers for constitutional nationalists 1
who opposed the republican cause too loudly. jIIn the Republic Charles Haughey, the new leader of 
Fianna Fail, sought a mandate as Taoiseach, but had >
idecided against an election until the instability caused |
Iby the situation in the North had abated. However, the |
hunger strike continued, so he decided to hold an i
!election on the 11 June 1981.9 6 ;
93 Reed, (1984), 358.94 GUARDIAN, 14 May 1981.95 Kelley, (1988), 339.96 Joyce & Murtagh, (1983), 152.
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Within the "smash the H-Blocks" camp there were some 
divisions as to the form of the ticket which candidates 
would run on. The PD's and the IRSP groups ideologically 
more Marxist, felt that their candidates should have a 
wide based left wing agenda, as well as, the prisons 
issue. On the other hand PSF felt that a single issue 
campaign in certain carefully selected constituencies 
would be more successful. As in most discussions within 
the national committee PSF by force of numbers won. This 
resulted in the selection of nine candidates who were all 
prisoners including four hunger strikers.s?
The prisoners ran on the basis of their five demands 
on a ticket similar to the one Bobby Sands had 
represented in the North. Their Manifesto used the 
election very much as platform to get the attention of 
people who would not normally concern themselves with the 
PIRA or PSF.
The hunger strike continues : Joe McDonnell,
Kieran Doherty, Kevin Lynch and Martin Hurson have 
taken the place of their dead comrades. Mrs Thatcher 
refuses to move an inch.
The manifesto also attacked the Republics government for
helping border security with Irish troops and for not
doing enough for the prisoners.
Without Irish Troops on the border, she [Margaret Thatcher] doesn't have a military 
strategy...
A No 1 vote for the Prisoners is a demand that 
the Irish Government stand up to the Brits in 
defence of the Prisoners lives.^^
97 Kelley, (1988), 340.98 National H-Block/Armagh Committee, ELECTION MANIFESTO ; 
H-BLOCK/ARMAGH PRISONER CANDIDATES. Dublin: National H- Block/Armagh Committee, June 1981.
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Outside of the constituencies in which the prisoners 
stood there were also attempts to make the fast an 
electoral issue. Campaigners released leaflets 
criticising named TD's from all the principal political 
parties. Accusing them of complicity in the deaths of the 
hunger strikers by dint of not saying anything in support 
of the prisoners.99 The eventual result was that two 
prisoners were elected to the Dail. Paddy Agnew in Louth, 
and the hunger striker Kieran Doherty in 
Cavan/Monaghan.100
The two prisoners elected were to be instrumental in 
ensuring that Fianna Fail lost power to a Fine 
Gael/Labour coalition. This was because the two were 
elected in traditional nationalist (Fianna Fail) areas, 
thereby depriving Haughey of two important votes in 
Parliament, as the prisoners could of course not take 
their seats even had they wanted to (they would not 
have). This was to spoil Thatcher-Haughey relations for 
years to come when Fianna Fail retook office later in the 
decade, as Haughey felt that Thatchers intransigence had 
cost him power.101
The electoral battle also continued in the North 
when, regardless of earlier promises to desist, Owen 
Carron, Bobby Sands' election agent, announced his 
candidature for the Fermanagh/South Tyrone seat in the 
forth coming by-election caused by the hunger striker's 
death. Legislation had been swiftly passed in the 
Westminster Parliament to ensure that imprisoned
99 COBH H-BLOCK COMMITTEE, Cobh, Co.Cork: June 1981.100 Reed, (1984), 360.101 Joyce & Murtagh, (1983), 153.
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convicted felons could not stand for Parliament, to 
prevent a repetition of the previous by-election.102
During June, the by now commonplace announcements 
that new hunger strikes were to begin, continued with 
four further names announced. A further attempt at 
mediation was made by the Southern establishment. This 
time the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace (ICJP) 
became involved in the dispute. The prisoners chose to 
reject the solution proposed by the ICJP, but it 
continued its contacts with the relatives and the 
National Committee (for further details see Chapter 
VII).103
In July, Martin Hurson died after a forty-six day 
fast. The first cracks were beginning to appear in the 
strike. On the 31 July the family of another hunger 
striker Paddy Quinn asked for medical intervention after 
he had fallen unconscious on the seventy-seventh day of 
his fast. This was overshadowed when Kevin Lynch died 
after seventy-one days on the 1 August. The following day 
Kiern Doherty also died as did Tom McElwee on the 8 
August and on the 20 August Michael "Micky" D e v i n e . 104 
At this stage the Provisionals were apparently 
determined to see the strike through to the bitter end.
An article in An Phoblact/Republcan News maintained that,
The key to real progress, which is the saving 
of the hunger strikers lives, remains whether 
palatable or not, the ability of the prisoners 
supporters to move the Catholic hierarchy, the SDLP 
and the Free State [Irish] g o v e r n m e n t ^
102 Kelley, (1988), 341.103 Reed, (1984) , 360.104 Ibid, 361.105 AN PHOBLACT/REPUBLICAN NEWS, 15 August 1981, quoted in Reed, (1984), 361.
CHAPTER IV 138
The prisons campaign received a boost when Owen 
Carron was elected to Westminster with a larger vote that 
Bobby Sands had originally gained. Carron received 31,278 
votes while his Unionist rival Ken Maginnis received 
29,048. This was despite the candidature of two non- 
Unionist parties, the Alliance Party and the Workers 
Party/Republican Clubs (the old Official IRA).^®®
The propaganda released by the Provisionals was 
tantamount to a justification for continuing the fast. 
Disillusionment had beset many supporters, who believed 
that the British were not going to give in, giving rise 
to the feeling that further deaths were pointless. This 
meant that a theme of "perfidious Albion" was a very 
strong element in the leaflets.
The prisoners endured four and a half years of 
torture and degradation in the protest in the H- 
Block and Armagh before they felt driven to use the 
only weapon left to them- the weapon of their own lives.107
What is the basis for faith in a government 
which humiliated Cardinal O'Fiaich and Bishop Daly 
and callously exploited the intervention of the 
Irish Commission for Justice and Peace, and the 
International Red Cross. ..
The blanket men and women in Armagh know this; 
the hunger strikers are enduring it.ios
However, by this time, discord became apparent as the
Church authorities led by Fr Dennis Faul an assistant
prison chaplain were persuading the relatives to
intervene once the hunger strikers had lost
consciousness. Faul first managed to persuade the
106 IRISH TIMES, 22 August 1981.107 National H-Block/Armagh Committee, WHY THE HUNGER 
STRIKE CONTINUES, Dublin: National H-Block/Armagh Committee, 1981.108 Belfast H-Block/Armagh Committee, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
THE HUNGER STRIKE, Belfast: Belfast H-Block/Armagh Committee, 1981.
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relatives of Pat McCeowan to intervene. Then the 
relatives of Matt Devlin and Lawrence McKown followed 
suit. The next stage was reached when Liam McCloskey 
ceased to fast when he was informed that his family would 
intervene. Subsequently Fr Faul called a meeting of the 
relatives of the men still on the fast, which resulted in 
a statement from all, but one, of the families that they 
would i n t e r v e n e . 1 0 9  The prisoners tried to look for 
various ways of circumventing this problem. However, the 
relatives and the Church had finally outmanoeuvred them 
and they had no choice but to give up.
The Provisionals had been undermined when the INLA 
decided that its prisoners would no longer participate as 
the British were intransigent. Besides, they were fast 
running out of INLA members in the Maze.ii®
On the 24 August, Michael Devine became the last 
hunger striker to die after sixty days of f a s t i n g . m  On 
the 26 August 1981 the authorities announced that they 
were prepared to concede on several points including 
clothing and some remission. These concessions were made 
conditional; both the "blanket" protest and the hunger 
strike had to end. Later on the new Northern Ireland 
Secretary of State, James Prior, made it clear that 
reforms would be only made after the dispute was over, so 
at 3.00pm on the 3 October the remaining hunger strikers 
broke their fast 217 days after Bobby Sands had first 
refused his breakfast.11%
109 Reed, (1984), 361-366.
110 IRISH TIMES, 2 2 August 1981.
111 INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 24 August 1981.
112 Kelley, (1988), 344-345.
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In the end the external campaign had been unable to 
maintain a proper anti-Unionist coalition, but for a time 
it had at least ensured that PSF was not in direct 
conflict with the relatives, though in the end when this 
broke down it effectively killed the protest. Fr Faul, 
for all his hard work, would not have broken the strike 
if he had not already had soft ground on which to work.
The protest was able to attract a level of support 
in areas which had never before supported the 
Provisionals. This support came from the nationalists in 
the North, people in the Republic and internationally.
The dispute, when it was initially started by Kieren 
Nugent in 1976 had been practically ignored, but by the 
end of its life span it was commanding world wide 
attention; from Iran were the British Embassy is situated 
on Bobby Sands Street to Los Angeles were at the time of 
writing an actor with well known Irish republican 
sympathies, Mickey Rorke, is attempting to make a film 
about Bobby Sands, The hunger strike was amplified and 
this would not have happened without the external 
political campaign which started in the Turf Lodge estate 
by the RAC.
Finally, the campaign marked the political coming of 
age of PSF where the new northern left learnt how to !
conduct electoral politics and use the media to best |
1effect, an ability which the Southern conservatives never Î■ihad. This prepared the scene in the eighties, for the i
battle with the SDLP over the nationalist vote. A direct !Î
result of this was the defeat of Gerry Fitt by Gerry 
Adams in the 1983 general election, which signalled the
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final coming of age of the Armalite and Ballot Paper 
policy, that was to worry all of Humphrey Atkins' 
successors.
4d. THE FEMALE PROTEST AT ARMAGH PRISON.
The female republican paramilitary prisoners were 
all housed in Armagh Prison. They had not joined the 
"blanket" protest in 197 5 as they had enjoyed a form of 
special status which had never been removed. For instance 
all women prisoners were permitted to wear their own 
clothing.113 However, prison officers in Armagh gaol were 
never exempt from the outside assassination campaign.
This naturally led to tensions within the gaol causing a 
grave deterioration in relations between the warders and 
the prisoners.
The "dirty" protest spread to Armagh in February 
1980.114 This was an escalation of a limited protest by 
the thirty republican prisoners that had started to 
protest against the abandonment of official special 
status in October 1976. Initially thirteen women were 
involved in the dispute, but by March 1978 this had 
increased to twenty-four protesters. The limited protest 
had resulted in the boycotting of prison work, but, 
perhaps due to the liberal inclinations of the prison 
Governor Hugh Cunningham. Although they were punished the 
prisoners did not escalate their protest, as the men had 
done, and daily exercise continued in the gaol yard.n^
When Cunningham moved to Magilligan Prison his 
replacement at Armagh was George Scott, allegedly a
113 Reed, (1984), 282.114 Coogan, (1980), 114.115 Reed, (1984), 282.
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strict disciplinarian, who was blamed in some quarters 
for the series of incidents that led to the decisions by 
the prisoners to escalate to a full "dirty" protest in
1980.116
In 1978, when Scott was appointed, he attempted a 
variety of changes in the running of the prison. At 
Easter he tried to integrate republican, loyalist and 
"criminal" prisoners in the same cell blocks. Owing to 
opposition from the prisoners he was forced to abandon 
these reforms but he remained determined to end the 
protest. On the 7-8 May protests from remand prisoners 
were allegedly met with a baton charge by male 
warders.117 As a result prisoners were locked up in their 
cells for several weeks over the early summer which had 
led to some residual resentment amongst the inmates 
towards the prison regime.iis
In 1980 a PIRA member was killed while transporting 
a bomb by train in Portadown. As he had three sisters 
serving sentences in Armagh the republican prisoners 
chose to hold a commemorative ceremony for him within the 
gaol. This involved a parade in the uniform of Cumann na 
mBan (the female wing of the PIRA). This was regarded by 
the authorities as an unacceptable provocation and they 
decided to conduct a search of the cells in the B-Wing of 
the prison looking for the black skirts that make up the 
paramilitary uniform.n®
116 Coogan, (1980), 114-115.117 Clarke, (1986) , 63.118 Coogan, (1980), 114-115.119 Ibid, 89 & 115.
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On 7 February, during the evening meal, the 
prisoners were allegedly surrounded by sixty male and 
female warders, who after some disturbances, placed the 
women in two large association cells. The inmates own 
cells were then searched for the uniforms and some of the 
women prisoners were brought before the governor. The 
women were then allegedly deprived of sanitary 
facilities. This resulted in the now familiar routine of 
prisoners throwing urine and excrement into the 
corridors, and then out of the gaol windows until these 
were boarded up. The result of this was that by 12 
February a full scale dirty protest was in action, with 
faeces and menstrual blood being smeared upon the cell 
walls and protesters refusing to put on clean 
clothing.^20
The PIRA leadership had been attempting to restrain 
the female prisoners from escalating the protest to a
full "dirty” phase. Essentially the National H- j
Block/Armagh Committee and the Provisionals' Army |ICouncil, while understanding the womens wish to be jI
involved, was aware that this protest was very sensitive i
and if a mistake was made it could back fire upon the •
campaigners. The prisoners had wanted to embark on it for i
about six months beforehand, but as the male protest at j
!the Maze was already using up much of the Provisionals' ]
time and organisation a female protest was thought to be i
iimore of a hindrance than a help.121 .
120 Reed, (1984), 321-322,121 Coogan, (1980) , 118.
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After the authorities had made toilets and sanitary 
towels again available to the protesting inmates the 
dispute entered into a regular pattern in which the women 
would accept a change of clothing every three months.
Although the protest lacked both the issues and the 
momentum of the Long Kesh/Maze dispute, the resolution of 
the Armagh situation was inevitably linked to a solution 
for the H-Blocks, and so could only be ended when the 
five demands of the male prisoners had been addressed.122 
It was certainly the case that the situation in 
Armagh was useful in the propaganda war. Catholic 
Ireland, as has already been stated, is an extremely 
socially conservative nation. The women's protest 
occupied an extremely interesting position; public 
opinion held that women were not supposed to engage in 
such degrading things as the dirty protest and so it made 
a very strong impression. Tim Pat Coogan, in the 1987 
revision of his history. The IRA, stated that conditions 
in Armagh made a greater impression upon him than the 
Maze.
I visited Long Kesh and Armagh during the 
strike and found the Armagh conditions the worst,
...the fact that in addition to faeces the women's 
menstrual blood was smeared on the walls of the 
cells, which I found particularly nauseating.
This is perhaps why he seemed to over estimate the
importance of the female protest in his contemporary
account of the prisons dispute produced in 1980. In On
The Blanket, he devoted three chapters and significant
sections of the rest of the book to the Armagh protest
122 Clarke, (1980) , 112.123 Tim Pat Coogan, THE IRA. Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1988, 618.
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despite the fact that, even at that time, and 
subsequently the Maze attracted more attention, and that 
the smaller female dispute was subsidiary to the H- 
BlOCkS.12 4
The protest was also useful conversely in 
influencing left wing feminist support for the 
Provisionals. For instance, Nell McCafferty, writing 
about the protester, Pauline McLaughton said.
Shall we feminists record that she is 
inflicting the condition on herself in case any 
question of moral dereliction arises against us? The 
menstrual blood on the walls of Armagh prison smells 
to high heaven. Shall we turn our noses up.izs
This form of polemic was backed up by events that
emphasised the role of women in the prisons and the
republican struggle generally.
On the 8 March 1981, International Women's Day there
was a picket of Armagh Prison organised by the National
H-Block/Armagh C o m m i t t e e .^^6 This increased female
participation also fitted with the new lefts wish to
promote an increased role for women in the struggle.
It was during the first 1980 hunger strike that the
women decided that they should also join the strike,
despite seeing the psychological damage that a hunger
strike could cause. The Price sisters who had been force
fed during their campaign for repatriation to Ireland
were now in Armagh but, despite their victory, now
suffered from Anorexia and had to be released from prison
early for health reasons. On the 1 December 1980, three
woman from Belfast, Mairead Farrell, Mary Doyle, and
124 Coogan, (1980), Chaps 9, 10, and 15125 Clarke, (1986), 113.126 Reed, (1984), 347.
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Mairead Nugent, joined the month old male strike.1%? This 
strike dictated that the protesters only took water and 
salt tablets for eighteen days, before abandoning the 
strike when it seemed that the issue was being resolved 
by Humphrey Atkins.
The dirty protest was to last a total of thirteen 
months during which the protesters endured their self 
imposed conditions essentialy in support of the males in 
the Maze, Not only did they endure the smell of their 
cells as described above but also, they did not wash, 
brush their teeth, or change clothing including underwear 
for three month periods. Prisoners on the dirty protest 
had also ceased to have any exercise outdoors as a 
punishment.129 That they had endured these conditions 
largely on a point of principle, not only showed a 
striking dedication to their cause, but it also was an 
example of their fanaticism. It is also an indication of 
the leadership qualities and politicisation of the Armagh 
OC, Mairead Farrell, who upon leaving prison joined the 
pro-Adams wing of the Provisionals in both PSF and in the 
PIRA General Head Quarters Staff. She subsequantly was 
picked to lead the team that was to plant a bomb in 
Gibraltar in 1987, where she was killed by the Special 
Air Service (SAS), when they thought she and her unarmed 
colleagues were about to set off a radio controlled 
bomb.130 She was thus propelled into the pantheon of 
republican martyrdom.
127 Clarke, (1986), 127.
128 Adams, Morgan, & Bambridge, (1988), 139.
129 Coogan, (1988), 618.
130 Adams, Morgan, & Bambridge, (1988), 165-167.
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The effect of the Armagh protest was only useful in 
terms of propaganda. The Unionists ignored it as they did 
much of the protest (as will be outlined in later 
Chapters). It did not play an important role in the 
general protest. To the authorities it could only be 
described as an irritation, while to republicans it was 
an unnecessary side show. In effect, the endurance of the 
appalling conditions for thirteen months was wasted as it 
neither shortened nor lengthened the eventual resolution 
of the prison dispute.
This was also true in a more general sense with the 
external campaign as a whole. The external campaign was a 
vital part of the prison protest yet like the internal 
dispute it underestimated the determination of the 
government to see the protest defeated. The campaign must 
take responsibility for the end of the protest as it 
failed in two principal ways. It failed to maintain a 
united front between the relatives and the Provisionals 
during 1981. It also misjudged the attitude of the 
government and so failed to warn the prisoners that, 
after the first few deaths, a compromise was the only 
solution, recognizing that the five points were now 
unachievable. This failure to read accurately the 
messages emitting from the NIC led directly to 
unnecessary deaths and the ignominious end of the fast on 
the 3 October 1981.
The prisoners and the outside campaigners had also 
failed to address the moral and ethical dilemmas that the 
hunger strike presented. This failure was to play an 
important role in the defeat of the fast and the split
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between the Church and the H-Block campaign. The fuller 
philosophical issues as well as the medical aspects are 
discussed in the next Chapter, before the events within 
the prisons during the hunger strike are discussed in iIlater sections of the thesis, !
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5a. INTRODUCTION.
The concept of hunger striking in prison presents a 
series of moral problems to both the individual hunger 
striker and to the authorities who are confronted with 
it. The problem is exacerbated further if the hunger 
strike has political undertones. If the prisoner has been 
convicted of violent crimes that come broadly under the 
banner of terrorism it presents a complicated dilemma to 
the government that has to respond to the demands of the 
striker in some way.i That is, the government will have 
to address the problem to which the protesters are 
objecting without falling into the trap of being seen to 
legitimate the terrorist organisation that the prisoner 
is a member of, or to encourage others to try and emulate 
this success.
When one brings in the Irish dimension to this 
equation the issues cloud further. The prisoners face the 
problem of having to reconcile a hunger strike that is 
possibly going to result in death, (which was arguably 
the case in the 1980 and 1981 strikes) with a Catholic 
doctrine that is fundamentally opposed to the taking of
1 In calling PIRA a terrorist organisation I use the definition as outlined by the Dutch academics, Schmid and Jongman, who reviewed the academic literature on terrorism and defined a minimum consensus on its definition. For more details see;Alex P.Schmid and Albert J.Jongman, POLITICAL TERRORISM,A NEW GUIDE TO ACTORS, AUTHORS, CONCEPTS, DATA BASES, THEORIES AND LITERATURE. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1988, 25-28.
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one's own life. However, Christianity also has the 
concept of martyrdom. This religious acceptance of laying 
down your life for the good of others was backed up by 
the old Celtic Irish Civil Code the Scenics Mor, which 
held the person at which the fast was targeted 
responsible for the death of the hunger striker.%
Further, historically the hunger strike has taken a 
place in the public imagination as the final recourse of 
the disadvantaged and downtrodden. This association can 
be traced back to the strikes by the suffragettes and 
Mahatma Ghandi in the early part of the twentieth 
century. In Irish history there has also been a tradition 
of canonising Republicans after their deaths while they 
had been vilified when still alive. An example of this 
was the Dublin crowds treatment of the 1916 martyrs. They 
were jeered at the time of capture but once executed they 
became national heroes.% This factor was well summarised 
in a statement about Ireland attributed to Terence 
MacSwiney. ”It is not those who can inflict the most, but 
those that can suffer the most who will conquer"
These problems have not been addressed by the 
literature on the prison protest, which as stated in the 
introduction has tended to be journalistic, or polemical 
without pretence of being impartial. This omission from 
the literature is further in need of rectifying, as the 
governments of many democratic countries when dealing 
with hunger striking terrorists have reacted differently
2 David Beresford, TEN MEN DEAD. London: Grafton, 1987, 14-15.3 J. Bowyer Bell, THE SECRET ARMY, A HISTORY OF THE IRA 1915-1970, London: Sphere Books, 1972, 24-27.4 Ibid, 2.
CHAPTER V 151
to the British when faced with similar dilemmas. However, 
the prison protest has set precedents for the treatment 
of prisoners guilty of politically inspired violent 
crimes.5 The Spanish and German governments have had to 
face hunger strikes, mounted respectively by ETA and the 
RAF. In 1991, the Portuguese government released members 
of the FP-25 group {Forces Populares 25 de Abril- Peoples 
Forces of 25 April) from gaol in response to a hunger 
strike.® Further, and more recently, the Irish government 
in 1990 had to respond to the hunger strike of Dessie 
Ellis an alleged PIKA member who opposed his own 
extradition to the UK on the grounds that he would not 
have a fair trial (he was acquitted), and that he was to 
be tried for a crime that he had already been punished 
for in the Republic.? In 1991 the British have again had 
to face up to hunger strikes in Northern Ireland as part 
of the campaign against the integration of Remand 
Prisoners at Crumlin Road Prison.
In the mid 1970’s the West German authorities had 
been faced with a hunger strike by the far left Baader- 
Meinhof Terror group (RAF). They had also fasted for the 
status of political prisoners, and claimed to suffer from 
psychological torture through isolation and their cells
5 When the European Commission of Human Rights rejected 
the prisoners complaints, it can be speculated that this 
was because it might have proved an embracing precedent 
in the treatment of terrorists else were in Europe, 
especially given its rejection of the RAF prisoners 
complaints in 1978 as mentioned in Chapter III.
GUARDIAN, 20 June 1980.6 EUROPEAN, 19-21 July 1991.
7 For details of the Ellis hunger strike the best 
coverage came from the PSF newspaper.
AN PHOBLAGHT/REPUBLICAN NEWS,11 October to 15 November 1990.
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being constantly lit for twenty-four hours a day. The 
fast eventually resulted in the death of Holger Meins.®
This has meant that a detailed examination of the 
medical and moral aspects of hunger striking is necessary 
to this thesis. In section 5fo the medical condition of 
starvation is examined. This is followed in section 5c by 
an examination of the ethical problems that are presented 
to the prison authorities and medical staff by such a 
fast. In section 5d the question of whether the hunger 
strikers were suicides or martyrs is discused with 
specific reference to Christian philosophy. Finally 5e 
explores the attitude of the churches in Northern Ireland 
to the fast.
5b, THE MEDICAL DEFINITION OF STARVATION.
The medical definition of starvation is described as 
undernutrition of sufficient severity to warrant in­
patient treatment in hospital", This normally occurs when 
the body weight is reduced to less than 7 5% of the normal 
weight of the patent.®
The process of starvation is well documented in 
medical textbooks, though the form of starvation from 
which most of the data is compiled comes from sufferers 
of the psychological neurosis known as Anorexia Nervosa 
or victims of famine disasters. However, the essential 
stages are as underlined below, though often anorexics 
kill themselves inadvertently before the final stages of
8 Jillian Becker, HITLERS CHILDREN, THE STORY OF THE BAADER-MEINHOF TERRORIST GANG. London: Michael Joseph, 1977, 269-273.9 John Macleod (ed), DAVIDSON'S PRINCIPALS AND PRACTICE OF MEDICINE, A TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND DOCTORS.Edinburgh & New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1981, 86.
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starvation by breaking their fasts and gorging themselves 
rather than concisely choosing to die.
Immediately after the deprivation of food there is a 
rapid loss of weight, though this soon slows down as the 
body adjusts itself to starvation with a reduction in the 
size of most glands and muscles, so less energy is 
required for their maintenance. The human metabolism also 
slows down and voluntary movements are curtailed in the 
effort to save energy. This combined with the simple fact 
that the body needs to exert less energy to move about 
due to weight loss ensures that the body will stabilise 
for a period. At this stage there might also be secondary 
problems connected with Anaemia (the lack of red blood 
cells).io
The second stage of starvation is brought on after 
the prolonged deprivation of food. This is when "famine"
Oedema begins to appear. Oedema (excess water leading to 
the swelling of body cells) is caused by the wasting of 
tissues without a corresponding loss of body water.1%
During the third stage of famine, Hypothermia becomes a 
great danger to the patient. This was a real risk to the 
protesters as they remained on the blanket in cold cells 
during the 1980 protest and the first part of the 1981 
strike. At this stage psychological symptoms frequently 
occur. These are demonstrated by mental restlessness, 
irritability and displays of indifference to the troubles 
of others coupled with physical apathy. By this time the 
patient no longer feels hungry. It is at this stage that
10 Ibid, 87.
11 Ibid, 87.
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if they are to facilitate a full recovery the patent must 
be force fed by doctors. At this point secondary 
infections also become a great problem. The respiratory 
muscles are now seriously weakened by wasting and 
bronchopneumonias which carry an increased mortality 
rate; diarrhoea and blindness is also common.12 Soon 
after this coma sets in, which is shortly followed by the 
death of the patient.
The death of a hunger striker can be speeded up if 
they are not in a healthy state at the start of a hunger 
strike. For instance this occurred in the case of Martin 
Hurson, the seventh death of the 1981 strike, who died as 
a result of kidney failure causing toxins to enter his 
body. They killed him when they reached his brain after 
forty-five days fasting. It was thought that the kidney 
failure was caused by alleged sever beatings received 
from the police at the time of his arrest in 1976 and 
during the forced washings of the protesters in 1978.13
If a hunger striker survives a fast there are a 
variety of psychological problems which may result in 
long term problems for the individual. Aside from the 
danger of brain damage caused by the latter stages of 
food deprivation, the victim may suffer from a variety of 
neuroses as a direct result of a fast. During a fast the 
body will attempt to protect the brain from the effects 
of starvation for as long as it can, due to the brain 
being probably the single most important organ in the
12 Ibid, 87.13 Liam Clarke, BROADENING THE BATTLEFIELD, THE H-BLOCKS AND THE RISE OF SINN FEIN. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1987, 179.
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body. However, in the last stages, especially during 
coma, the brain is not supplied with sufficient oxygen by 
the body; permanent damage results.
The neuroses which the striker might suffer from are 
largely formed by a distaste for food which might have 
been caused by forced feeding by the authorities during 
the strike (though the patient will have to be forced fed 
if he/she comes off the strike in its final s t a g e s ) . in 
the case of the Price sisters who chose to fast, 
demanding repatriation to a Northern gaol rather than 
serve their sentence in a mainland British one, this led 
to a long hunger strike with frequent force feeding, 
which was eventually successful. Subsequently, they were 
transferred to Armagh Prison but they had developed 
Anorexia Nervosa and had to be released for medical 
reasons early from gaol.is This is yet another side to 
the sacrifice a hunger striker may have to face when they 
embark upon hunger strike even if they do not die.
5c. THE ETHICAL DILEMMAS FACED BY THE AUTHORITIES IN A 
HUNGER STRIKE.
The principal ethical dilemma faced by both the 
authorities and prison medics in the case of hunger 
strikes is whether they should force feed the protester 
or permit the person to die. Traditionally, the British
14 Tim Pat Coogan, ON THE BLANKET, THE H-BLOCK STORY. Swords Co.Dublin: Ward River Press, 1980, 120.15 Marion and Delores Price were released early respectively in 1980 and 1981 on humanitarian grounds. Robert Bell, Robert Johnstone & Robin Wilson (eds), TROUBLED TIMES, FORTNIGHT MAGAZINE AND THE TROUBLES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1970-91, Belfast: Black Staff Press, 1991, 188-190.
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have chosen the option of force feeding.^® This has the 
advantage of preventing a death which could be 
politically embarrassing to the government, while 
allowing doctors to honour their Hippocratic oath not to 
kill patents and fulfil their duties of caring for the 
patient.17 This also means that doctors need not 
reconcile their own professional duties with the 
patient's wishes, as the state chooses for them.
After the death of Michael Gaughan from 
complications arising from force feeding during a hunger 
strike, the British are thought to have decided that the 
policy of force feeding was counter-productive.i®
Subsequently, the UK government chose to change policy in 
accordance with the Tokyo Medical Convention.is This had 
the advantage of clearly stating the British policy had 
changed and that unless the family of a striker 
intervened then the strike would last to the death. It 
was hoped this might deter prisoners from using such a 
method and ensure that the British could not be accused 
of playing cat and mouse with prisoners lives. Finally, 
at the level of human rights it recognised that a 
prisoner was ultimately judged to be able to make such
16 When the authorities were faced by an earlier hunger strike launched on the Mainland by the PIRA they chose the option of force feeding which led to the hunger strike of the Price Sisters lasting 206 days.Kevin J. Kelley, THE LONGEST WAR, NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE IRA. London: Zed Books, 1988, 223.17 The Hippocratic oath (the ancient Greek medical code of ethics) states that the doctor should "he for the 
benefit of the patients.,. not for their hurt or for any 
wrong" .18 Tim Pat Coogan, THE IRA. Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1988, 517-520.19 THE POLITICS OF TERROR, INTELLIGENCE DIGEST, Special Brief No 80, 19 June 1981.
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decisions and so able to take responsibility for the 
consequences of their chosen course of action. This view 
is not shared by all Western democracies. The Germans 
read their constitution as stating that they must 
preserve life when prisoners go on hunger strike and so 
will force feed them.
The new British attitude to fasting ensured that, in 
the case of the 1980 and 1981 hunger strikes, the 
participants knew that they would die unless they chose 
to take food, as the state would not intervene without 
the consent of themselves or their relatives.
5d. THE MORAL PROBLEMS OF HUNGER STRIKING.
The protesters all came from the Catholic community, 
which entailed an attempt to reconcile their actions with 
Christianity- which condemns suicide categorically- and 
the Catholic Church which is theologically conservative 
and therefore extremely hostile to the taking of one's 
own life. The traditional definition of suicide is "the 
act of taking one's own life''. Psychiatrists would define 
the hunger strikers as altruistic suicides; that is self 1
Idestruction motivated by "excessive altruism and sense of |
duty". This includes religious martyrdom, euthanasia, the |
Itraditional Japanese hara-kiri (ritual self !
disembowelment), and Hindu sati (when a widow throws ;
herself on her husbands funeral p y r e ) . 20 Theologians and |
Philosophers though take an alternative view
Idifferentiating between separate forms of altruistic !Îsuicide. Î
20 Erwin Stengel, SUICIDE & ATTEMPTED SUICIDE. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969, 14 & 49.
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Christian teaching maintains that humans are not the 
authors of their own lives, nor absolute owners. It is 
not up to a person to choose how long a life should be 
lived but God. So suicide, which is defined normally as 
the direct and deliberate taking of ones own life for any 
self-regarding motive is opposed.21 Suicide is held to be 
a religious offence on three different counts.
1. It is a sin against God and a rejection of his 1
!love and a denial of his sovereignty. 1
12. It is an offence against ones own person which is I
made in God's image, and a violation of the sixth 
commandment; an act of despair which precludes 
repentance.
’3. It is an offence against mankind that deprives 
one's family and society of a member prematurely, 
and also denies society the opportunity of 
ministering to a persons n e e d s .22
This has led to both criminal and cannon law holding 
suicide as an offence and punishing it, if unsuccessful 
as a crime, or if it results in a death by denying people 
a Christian burial. Similarly, traditional European 
folklore, holds that suicides are condemned to walking 
the earth for an eternity; their bodies were frequently 
buried at cross-roads with stakes through their hearts to 
prevent the ghost from rising.2 3
In the case of Ireland this meant that if the hunger 
strikers were in fact committing suicide, then the Church
21 John Macquarrie (ed), A DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS. London: SCM Press, (1967), 335.22 Ibid, 335.23 Stengel, (1969), 7.
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would have to condemn them. However, if they were not 
committing suicide then they could receive burial. This 
led to some strong theological discussion within the 
Catholic Church that frequently seemed more a matter of 
the individual's political views and nationality than 
their faith. Within the Church the English Cardinal,
Basil Hume, condemned the hunger strike while O'Fiaich 
chose to be ambivalent about it.2 4
The debate revolved around several issues. Firstly, 
who or whom were responsible for the deaths of fasting 
prisoners? The authorities who would not give in to the 
prisoners demands or the hunger strikers? Secondly, was 
the strike itself an act of violence or non-violence? And 
thirdly, were the hunger strikers martyrs or suicides?
This debate was to initially split the Catholic Church.
During the opening stages of the 1981 hunger strike 
the Catholic Church was openly divided as the Bishop of 
Derry, Dr Cahal Daly, was openly hostile to the strike. 
Meanwhile Cardinal Tomas O'Fiaich was sympathetic, at 
least to the aims of the protesters, and his actions 
seemed to imply that he held the authorities to blame for 
any deaths. After Bobby Sands had died and Francis Hughes 
was dying O'Fiaich sent a telegram to 10 Downing Street 
beseeching Margaret Thatcher to prevent another death.zs 
This attitude was in keeping with the medieval Irish 
tradition of hunger striking as outlined in the Senchus 
Mor. This system of laws held that the person held 
responsible for the death of a striker was the person at
24 Clarke, (1986), 149 & DAILY TELEGRAPH, 23 June 1981.25 GUARDIAN, 14 May 1981.
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which the fast had been directed not the striker.2 e But 
this has no place in traditional Christian theology.
It is arguable that the British, having outlined 
clearly that they would allow any hunger striker to die, 
and having clearly stated that they would not submit to 
this form of moral black mail, had ensured that the 
responsibility for the death of a prisoner by fasting was 
the individual's. This meant that the strikers were 
breaking the rule that Pope Leo XIII wrote in 1891 to the 
German and Austrian Bishops saying, "The divine law 
forbids anyone rashly to lay his life on the line" (ne 
quis temere vitum proiciat suam),"^'^ This attitude was 
reflected by Dr Daly when he said in a speech on the day 
that Bobby Sands started his fast,
I do not belive that it is morally 
justified to endanger health or life by hunger 
strike in the present circumstances, nor do I 
belive that it is right to risk ones mental and 
physical health by living in cells fouled by 
ones own excrement. This, to my mind, degrades 
the dignity of the individual.
There is a further argument that, the question of 
whether or not the hunger strikers were suicides was 
reflected not in the act of fasting to the death but in 
the greater context of the strike. The argument follows 
that the definition of the act depends on whether it is 
an act of violence or of non-violence. When Gandhi went 
on hunger strike fully intending to die if necessary it 
was a supreme form of non-violence in keeping with his 
strong pacifist views. They were carefully designed 
elements in a non-violent protest against British policy
26 Beresford, (1987), 14-15.27 DAILY TELEGRAPH, 23 June 1981.28 IRISH TIMES, 2 March 1981.
CHAPTER V 161
in India. His twelfth and final strike was an attempt to 
prevent the Hindu and Islamic communities from attacking 
one another during the intercommunal strife attached to 
the partition of I n d i a , I n  Ireland however the hunger 
strike was in the context of violence.
The hunger strikers were all convicted of violent 
crimes and committed to an armed struggle that included 
assassination, bombing, and the terrorising of opponents, 
whether from within their own community- the likes of 
Gerry Fitt, Paddy Devlin and the Peace People- or from 
without. Further, the organisations which the prisoners 
belonged to were still operating, despite the pleas of 
the entire Church leadership (including the Pope) to 
abandon violence. Finally, the tensions brought about in 
the wider community by the fast had caused rioting and 
death. This meant the strike was not an act of non­
violence but one of violence. Thus, while not absolving 
the authorities of all responsibility for a death most of 
the blame for any death was firmly laid upon the 
individual.  ^®
It was in this context that the Irish Bishops, in a 
statement released after their regular meeting at 
Maynooth College, Co Kildare, eventually described the 
fast as "evil". The statement explained that the Bishops 
feared an escalation of violence if the strike continued 
and therefore called upon the strikers to,
.., reflect deeply on the evil of their 
actions and their consequences. The contempt 
for human life, the incitement to revenge, the
29 Raymond E.Helmick, N IRELAND IN MORAL FOCUS, THE 
TABLET, 30 May 1981.
30 Ibid.
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exploitation of the hunger strikers to further j
a campaign of Murder, the intimidation of the 1
innocent, the initiation of children into \
violence, all of this constitutes an appalling |
mass of
This leads on to the final justification of the hunger 
strikers as martyrs and not suicides. Martyrdom is j
defined as the laying down of your life for your beliefs |
and/or for the comfort of others. The Provisionals claim 
that the hunger strikers died in order to improve the |
prison conditions in which their comrades lived. One |
could draw parallels to actions like that of Captain I
L.E.G Oates who walked out of his tent to certain death 
in the snow in order to stop holding his colleagues back 
in their ill-fated attempt to return from the South Pole ialive in the 1910/12 British Antarctic expedition. ji
Republicanism has in the past managed to get hunger 
strikers to be regarded as martyrs for the Irish War of 
Independence. These individuals chose to protest about ;
prison conditions and died. Subsequently prison |
"martyrs", like Terence MacSwiney the Lord Mayor of Cork, ,j
Ibecame regarded as being among the founding fathers of ;1the modern Irish State. It was in these peoples' ;
footsteps that the men of the Maze chose to follow. |
However, martyrdom within the Judao-Christian I
tradition involves a respect for the sanctity of life as I
i
one can not be martyred with one's own hand. It is one |
ithing to die or be prepared to die for one's beliefs, but I1
if there is any morally acceptable way out then one must jItake it. Martyrs who have been killed for their beliefs I
•!or teaching their creed were prepared to die, or take j
31 TIMES, 19 June 1981
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actions that could lead to death, but if they were given 
the choice of death or imprisonment without compromising 
their beliefs then they would have had to choose the 
latter course of action for they could not choose death 
over life as this is God’s decision and not mankind’s.3%
Even in the case of Captain Oates he did not choose to 
directly take his own life (eg. with a revolver), but to 
follow a course of events that would lead to his death by 
exposure. It was the weather and not Oates himself that 
caused the death.
However, in the case of the hunger strikers they 
chose a path where they deprived themselves of food and
they themselves could have accepted food at any time |
I!without having to compromise their own beliefs. The t
I1authorities had made it clear that they would not give in ]
to the prisoners’ demands. This meant that, certainly in 
the case of the later hunger strikers who replaced the !
first few dead prisoners on the fast, they were clearly I
Ichoosing death and not simply availing themselves of a ;
series of circumstances which might lead to their deaths.
!
5e.THE ATTITUDE OF THE CHURCHES TO THE HUNGER STRIKE. j
!The role and attitude of the Churches to the hunger 
strike, especially that of the Catholic Church, was of I
great interest and controversy in the British media. |I
Perhaps predictably the UK press attitude to the role of |1
the Catholic Church was hostile and misunderstood much of I
what the it was trying to do. The person probably
32 For further information on Christian ethics in regard 
to self-sacrifice and Martyrdom see: Ronald M. Green, 
RELIGION AND MORAL REASON. New York & Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988, 93-98 & 107.
33 During the 1970's Paul together with another priest Fr Raymond Murray wrote and published several pamphlets about human rights abuses in Castlereagh for example THE 
CASTLEREAGH FILE and H-BLOCK. Coogan, (1980), vi .34 Clarke, (1987), 177.35 WORLD IN ACTION, Granada T.V, Manchester, 1981.
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subjected to the most criticism was Fr Denis Faul of 
Dungannon who helped keep the ministry in the Maze 
Prison, and with Fr Raymond Murray had been tireless in 
exposing the abuses of power and injustices that had 
happened in the Castlereagh detention centre during the 
1970's.33 Faul was known in the tabloid press as the
I"Provo's Priest". Paradoxically, this hostility to him
was also shared by many of the Provisionals who knew of ?
Ihis opposition towards the armed struggle and distrusted iIhim as an uncontrollable independent influence upon the |Î1
p r i s o n e r s . 3 4  He wanted to resolve the protest and acted |
as O'Fiaich's representative. At first Faul acted as an j
!independent spokesperson for the prisoners, gaining :IIbetter treatment from the press than a PSF spokesperson \
would. For instance in one case he appeared on Granada |
iiTelevisions World In Action programme in 1981 to put the |
prisoner's c a s e . 3s This on the other hand in the end did
not prevent him helping to end the 1981 strike, after it ;ibecame clear that the British were not going to give any ;s
concessions while the strike was on. j
Faul's original view was that if hunger strike was '
intended to gained better conditions then it was not
suicidal or sinful. This changed after the deaths started jimounting up and began to become a death strike, with the i
!intention of more and more funerals as publicity events i|
!for PSF: this was sinful and in the context an act of i
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v i o l e n c e . 3 6  Before the deaths had started Paul and Murray 
had published at least one pamphlet in support of the 
prisoners explaining the reasons behind the hunger strike 
without condoning it.
Prisoners have few means of protest. When 
it was clear that the British government 
intended to go on living up to... being 
inflexible and more concerned to punish than to 
seek solutions.
They then went on to say that much as one disagreed with
the hunger strike the prisoners felt that they did not
have any choice left to them.3?
Paul continued his ministry to the prisoners and
their relatives, much to the suspicion of Brendan
McFarlane the prisoners leader, who rightly guessed that
by the end he was trying to persuade the relatives to
announce that they would intervene and end the by this
stage pointless fast. Paul's example shows the problems
faced by the Church as he was under attack for giving
ministry to the prisoners. This is vital in all prisons,
and is a job which is rightly encouraged by the
authorities. But he was regarded with hostility by the
media, largely because he had a respectable position but
criticised the British government regularly, with an
honesty and conviction that could not be easily refuted
if his arguments were listened too. Hence the jingoistic
treatment he received from the British tabloid
newspapers. The Catholic Church was similarly attacked
and found itself in a very difficult position.
36 Clarke, (1987 ) , 178.37 Denis Paul & Raymond Murray, HUNGER STRIKE- WHY 
BRITISH RULE HAS FAILED TO SOLVE PRISON PROBLEMS, PRISON BULLETIN 1981, March 1981.
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The Church has a long history of opposition to 
physical force nationalism, and has at times chosen to 
directly take on PSF in order to prevent it filling a 
political vacuum. This has been the case for instance 
during the 1980‘s when the Church took on the 
Provisionals in their heartland of West Belfast,
campaigning with what observers described as, "all the j
style and vigour of the counter r e f o r m a t i o n " But a
Church has to reflect the views of its congregations, I
!which led to the comments that the English critics ;Idisliked. i
!Much of the criticism came from leading British lay- j
Catholics who were angered by the role of the Church. The |Ï
former Labour Party Cabinet Minister (latterly one of the
founders of the ill-fated Social Democratic Party) !1
Shirley Williams described the role of the Church in the j
hunger strikes as amounting to "an admiration of I
violence", While Lord Rawlinson said that he was j
ihorrified and ashamed of the statement by Cardinal Tomas i■IO'Fiaich which threatened the government with the wrath iIof the nationalist population if it did not compromise on 1
the prison issue, this was seen as tantamount to
supporting the prisoners' aims,^9 j
The establishment broadsheet (quality) papers also ^
carried criticism of the Irish Catholic Church. The Times j
Î
!in a carefully balanced leader, which was at pains to ^
attack the bigotry of Protestant extremists such as the j
38 John Whyte, INTERPRETING NORTHERN IRELAND, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, 91.39 TIMES, 27 May 1981.
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Rev Dr Ian Paisley, said after complimenting the Popes 
condemnation of violence when visiting Drogheda in 1979.
Yet the words and actions of some members 
of the Church have undoubtedly fed 
misinterpretations of what is happening in 
Northern Ireland.*^
The leader went on to say the Catholic Church and some of
its priests had, perhaps unintentionally, in the eyes of
the world aligned itself with the strikers and conferred
quasi-martyrdom upon the dead men. The leader ended with
a call for the Church to condemn terrorism '^without
ambiguity or saving clauses"
This was a bit unfair as the senior clergy were
divided, and in the case of Dr Daly the Bishop of Derry,
totally opposed. On the eve of Sands embarking on his
fast Daly had whole-heartedly condemned terrorism, the
PIRA, the "dirty" protest, and the hunger strike.4% This
was perhaps understandably overshadowed by O'Fiaich's
some what panicky and frustrated statements immediately
before and after Sands' death. When it became clear that
the strike was hopeless, and yet continued, the Irish
Church increasingly agreed with Daly's views. On the 18
June the Irish Bishops meeting Maynooth College issued a
statement ending the ambiguity of the Church's position
and firmly condemning the hunger strike.*3
However, this did not silence all the critics of the
Church. Later in June a British lay-Catholic, Christopher
Monckton, writing in the Daily Telegraph, complimented
O'Fiaich upon his anti-PlRA statements but argued that
40 Ibid.41 Ibid.42 IRISH TIMES, 2 March 1981.43 TIMES, 19 June 1981.
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the hunger strikers deaths were suicides and should be 
condemned as such. He also argued that as suicides the 
hunger strikers under Canon 1240 of the Code of Canon law 
should be refused Christian burial except in the case of 
a last minute repenting of their sins before death. He 
said that if this happened there should only be a private 
burial and not a public one such as the rallies which 
accompanied the funerals of the hunger strikers.4*
The criticism of these commentators was often unfair 
on the Church which found itself in a very difficult 
position. While condemning the PIRA, as it had always 
done, the problem remained that the issue of prison 
conditions commanded a large amount of sympathy from the 
laity; and a Church is never above but part of a 
community. On the issue of the burial of suicides the 
Church has reformed much of its old attitude, in that if 
it can it prefers to give the dead the benefit of the 
doubt by allowing burial leaving the decision to God. The 
Church had attempted to mediate in the prison dispute and 
was frustrated with the intransigence of the NIG and felt 
that this was responsible for the fast. Inevitably this 
meant that the British attracted criticism from the 
Church, which in the heightened atmosphere of the period 
meant that such complaints were regarded by the UK media 
as pro-PIRA, which was not the case.
The Protestant Churches did not have the same 
problem and so were wholehearted in their attacks upon 
the hunger strike. The situation in the North has 
hardened the whole community to death and violence, and
44 DAILY TELEGRAPH, 23 June 1981.
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when one reflects that the whole Protestant community 
looks upon the killing of policemen and soldiers as 
sectarian murders, could one reasonably expect them to 
feel any sympathy for a Provisional prisoner who might be 
guilty of murder or attempted murder? The Protestant view 
was that the hunger strikers at least had a choice over 
their own deaths, which is more than they ever gave their 
victims. The Church of Ireland's (Anglican) Bishop of 
Down and future Primate, Dr Robin Eames, was able to 
freely denounce the calculated blackmail and 
intimidation" of the f a s t . ^ s  whereas. Dr Robert Runcie, 
the Archbishop of Canterbury, when visiting the province 
said.
You cannot but have sympathy as one 
Christian to another for the families of hunger 
strikers. But I have said before that I cannot 
condone that kind of protest which is bound to 
create and increase the violent attitudes".
The more extreme elements among Protestants were not
so sympathetic. In reflection of the polarisation that
the fast was causing, Ian Paisley, the moderator of the
Free Presbyterian Church was performing one of his
periodic attempts to form a quasi paramilitary group that
was to fight against any possible merger with the
Republic, after the Thatcher-Haughey talks. This one,
known as the Third Force, was paraded in front of
selected journalists at night in the hills of Antrim when
pieces of paper (allegedly gun licences) were w a v e d . 4?
This rather unusual Christian response summarised his
45 IRISH TIMES, 11 May 1981.46 GUARDIAN, 4 June 1981.47 Reed, (1984), 350-352.
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views and that of his constituency in Ulster to the 
strikers and the situation.
It is unfortunate but not surprising that all the 
Churches in Ireland chose to reflect the views of their 
congregations rather than going for a higher ground. But, 
in the North it is unlikely that any Church could divorce 
itself from the tribal loyalties of the laity in a 
situation like the hunger strike. As such the responses 
were all one could expect, and while not above criticism 
they are still understandable.
It is difficult to know to what extent the above 
debate was reflected from within the Maze. In some 
accounts of the protest Sands was said to have debated 
the moral aspects of the fast with Paul. It was said he 
reconciled himself to his likely death with the view that 
the authorities inflexibility was responsible. However, 
as the later chapters will show the moral dimension of 
the fast had not been properly examined by the 
participants and this was to play a role in the eventual 
defeat of the strike.
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6a. INTRODUCTION.
As outlined in earlier chapters, the first hunger 
strike of 1980 was intended to resolve the prison 
dispute. The "blanket” and ”dirty” protests were grinding 
on with no end in sight. The NIO, despite the change of 
party in power in 1979 from Labour to Conservative, was 
still steadfastly stating that it was not going to give 
in to the prisoners' demands for "political status", as 
summarised in the "five demands". As will be discussed in 
this chapter the British authorities felt that they could 
not give the necessary concessions, to solve the protest 
and looked upon the situation as a test of strength where 
anything other than full submission by either side would 
not solve the dispute. This led to perhaps excessive 
belligerence on the part of the authorities which may 
have been exacerbated by Margaret Thatcher's strong pro­
union views and her personal animosity towards ;irepublicanism as a result of the murder of her close |jfriend and political ally, Airey Neave, on the eve of her j
1979 victory. This was said to have strengthened her i
belief that one must not negotiate with, let alone give ■{
in to terrorists. In this situation it would have been an I
anathema for her to submit to the demands of convicted 11
criminals. |
By 1980 the prisoners had been involved in the j
dispute from the abolition of special status in 1976. The :I
conditions in which they lived have already been outlined :!
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earlier and could only be described as atrocious even if 
self inflicted. It was no surprise that the prisoners 
were increasingly keen to resolve the dispute. The 
assassination campaign had not progressed anywhere, it 
had also failed to gain the required concessions. When 
the dialogue between Cardinal O'Fiaich and the NIO had 
broken down, and the verdict in the case brought against 
the UK government in the European Commission For Human 
Rights had favoured the government position, the 
remaining options were limited. In fact, the protesters 
felt they had no choice but to escalate to a full hunger 
strike.1 It was this or continuing the dispute for an 
indeterminate period, and face the possible collapse of 
the protest.
Generally, the prisoners were loyal to the northern 
wing of the Provisionals and were sympathetic to the wing 
of PSF that was led by Gerry Adams, thus believing in a 
combined strategy of political action and the armed 
struggle. This new policy had yet to find an issue with 
which to launch itself into its constituency. It should 
also be recalled that PSF had only recently been allowed 
to operate legally in the Six Counties.
The protest in the gaols had been recognised by some 
prisoners as an issue with which to launch PSF and its 
new electoral strategy. However, the policy still needed 
the boost which the final catalyst of a hunger strike 
would provide. Indeed, Bobby Sands felt that a hunger 
strike might even be a repeat of the 1916 rising for the
1 Leo Green, ON THE BLANKET, AN GLOR GAFA/THE CAPTIVE VOICE. Belfast: PSF-POW dept, Winter 1990, 17.
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North, in that the treatment of the leadership of the 
Easter Rising by the authorities had won the sympathy of 
a considerable amount of previously hostile opinion. This 
sympathy was then turned into votes by Sinn Fein partly 
using a "free the prisoners" ticket to gain votes. Sands 
hoped that a hunger strike would have a similar effect 
upon the Catholic community in Ulster. Indeed, the number 
of hunger strikers was consciously chosen to recall the 
seven leaders executed after the 1916 rising as well as 
representing each of the six Counties of the North with 
the seventh prisoner representing the South.%
However, the first hunger strike was to end in panic 
and confusion, despite its well organised start. The 
principal controversy was over the agreement secured 
between the prisoners and the NIC which had resulted in 
the end of the fast. During the strike negotiations had 
been conducted both directly and through intermediaries 
(provided by the Catholic Church). Ultimately, the result 
was a deal that ended the hunger strike. Problems were to 
arise though, as both sides interpreted the agreement 
differently. This resulted in the decision by the 
prisoners to start the second fast in early 1981 in order 
to get the British authorities to honour the agreement as 
they interpreted it.s
This chapter will explore three separate themes: 
British government prison policy in the province; the 
aims and hopes of the prisoners; and the agreement to the
2 Liam Clarke, BROADENING THE BATTLEFIELD, THE H-BLOCKS AND THE RISE OF SINN FAIN. Dublin; Gill & Macmillan, 1987, 124.3 David Beresford, TEN MEN DEAD. London & Glasgow: Grafton Books, 1987, 9-14.
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1980 fast, and will analyse the reasons why both sides 
had such different interpretations of what was agreed. In 
section 6b, the interpretation of the prison dispute by 
the government is explained and examined. Further, the 
reason why the British adopted such a seemingly 
inflexible position is considered closely. Section 6c, 
looks at the actual events of the 1980 fast and the 
pressures that these placed upon the prisoners and the 
hunger strikers, especially towards the end of the fast 
when the men's lives were in danger. In section 6d, the 
resolution of the first hunger strike is discussed. The 
factors behind the misunderstandings that followed are 
also investigated as are the vital periods during 
Christmas 1980/81 when the decision to restart the fast 
was taken by the prisoners.
6b. THE BRITISH PRISON POLICY.
The UK government did not view the prison dispute as 
a struggle for human rights or better prison conditions, 
but as a struggle by the PIRA for legitimacy as an ethnic 
independence movement, in the mould of the PLO or the 
ANC. With some justification the NIO pointed out that 
conditions in the Maze were amongst the best in Europe, 
and certainly far better than equivalent high security 
prisons on the. mainland. Most of the prisons in the North 
were modern and had excellent sporting and educational 
facilities.^
4 The two old prisons were Crummlin Road Prison (largely used to house remand prisoners) and the Woman's Prison in Armagh.Northern Ireland Office, THE H-BLOCKS, THE FACTS.Belfast: NIO Stormont Castle, October 1980.
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The authorities did understand that the paramilitary 
prisoners from both sides of the sectarian split were 
hostile to the new prison regime. This was no great 
surprise but it might be useful to repeat the reasons why 
the British chose to abolish special status. When he 
announced the abolition of special status to the House of 
Commons, the then Northern Ireland Secretary, Merlyn 
Rees, made it clear that he felt that the abandonment of 
internment and the abolition of special status were 
closely linked.5 While people were interned without trial 
one could make a cogent argument that in such a situation 
prisoners and especially internees could justifiably 
expect special status. In the mid-1970s the authorities 
chose to cease internment as an active policy which meant 
that prisoners were all convicted criminals, though 
admittedly in the jury-less Diplock courts often using iemergency laws. This return to a limited normality meant iI
the British felt that a PIRA or INLA prisoner should be 1
treated as a normal high security prisoner. i
The attitude to the "dirty” protest was clearly j
!explained in a statement released by the NIO after i
criticism from Archbishop Tomas O'Fiaich that had ’
resulted from a visit to the prison in 1978. |
ÎThese criminals are totally responsible for the *
situation in which they find themselves. It is they j
who have been smearing excreta on the walls and J
pouring their urine through the doors.^
This view remained when Rees was replaced by Roy Mason, |
who was in turn replaced by Humphrey Atkins when Labour \
lost power. To a large extent Northern Irish policy has
5 HANSARD, 16 February 1976, coll 1077-1078.6 Clarke, (1987), 95.
known as a strong ally of Thatcher and shared her pro­
union views combined with a strong right-wing ideological 
position opposed to the pragmatism of the Labour party 
and the liberally inclined Conservatives like Humphrey 
Atkins. Neave may well have made stronger statements but 
in practice he probably would not have made any 
difference to the events that actually happened.*
Despite its view that the change in regime had been 
correct, the NIO, by offering concessions such as extra 
visits, did indicate that it recognised that the dispute 
had to be solved. This was probably a recognition that in 
the running of a gaol successfully, protests like the 
"dirty" and "blanket" protests were a great hindrance.
7 This remained the case even as Bobby Sands was dying in 1981, the Labour Party Northern Ireland spokesman, Don Concannon, visited him in the Maze Prison Hospital to explain that the opposition was in full agreement with government policy. Beresford, (1987), 129.8 TIMES, 19 March 1980.9 This is said because the British policy was hard line any way in regard to the prisons and it was not until James Prior took over in 1981 that a liberal approach was taken to the prisons.Martin Dillion, THE DIRTY WAR. London: Arrow, 1990, 284- 285.
1
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been a matter of cross-party consensus and in the case of 
penal policy this was certainly true. It is interesting 
to note that it was a Labour government that originally 
sent the troops into Ulster and Labour who abolished 
special category status, while the Conservative party had 
introduced it and the ill-fated power sharing executive.?
One can speculate whether this consensus would have 
survived had Airey Neave not been killed by the INLA in
:i
March 1979, shortly before the Conservative victory which l
might possibly have placed him in the NIO.s He was well |
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The cells had to be regularly cleaned, a process which 
involved the movement of whole wings to new parts of the 
prison and entailed the use of large numbers of staff. 
Further, the steam cleaning process which was used to 
clear up the fouled cells meant that after a few cleans 
the cells had to be re-painted. Meanwhile, outside the 
prisons the PIRA was continuing to assassinate prison 
staff, a tragic loss of life which obviously affected the 
warders morale. Added to this the cost of protecting them 
was also great and imposed an increase in the workload of 
the security forces.
However, the government felt that their hands were 
tied as they did not believe there was a consensus in the 
North that would allow them to come up with a compromise 
face saving formula such as the one adopted at Portlaoise 
Prison in the Republic after a similar prison protest 
campaign in 1977. The unionists at this time had an 
effective veto on prison policy. The government felt that 
granting special category status had been a mistake that 
was rectified by Rees, and that Protestant opinion would 
oppose any repetition of this mistake.lo
As the prison dispute worsened, the UK was prepared 
to show some willingness to negotiate on minor issues but 
would not give way upon the separate status of 
paramilitary prisoners. During 1980, O'Fiaich and Atkins 
were involved in a dialogue in an attempt to resolve the 
issue before a hunger strike started with the deadlines 
which this would present. The authorities were prepared
10 Tim Pat Coogan, ON THE BLANKET-THE H-BLOCK STORY. Swords, Co.Dublin: Ward River Press, 1980, 196-197.
11 Clarke, (1987), 113 - 114.12 Kevin J. Kelley, THE LONGEST WAR, NORTHERN IRELAND ANDTHE I.R.A. London: Zed Books, 1988, 325.& Clarke, (1987), 114.13 Clarke, (1987), 119.14 TIMES, 28 October 1980.
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to negotiate through third parties such as the Church, 
the SDLP, and relatives g r o u p s . I n  fact the only people 
that they would not talk to were the Provisionals. But as 
1980 progressed according to one source close to the 
PIRA, David Beresford, this was to change.
In March 1980 Atkins had emphasised that the 
government's resolution to break the protest continued.
He announced at Westminster that newly convicted j1prisoners who had committed crimes before 1 March 1976 no |
■1longer had the option of special status. Later, on 23 
March, minor concessions were made that allowed inmates 
to wear prison sports gear rather than uniform during 
exercise periods and the number of letters allowed to 
prisoners was quadrupled to one per week.i%
The next British concession occurred at the end of 
August, when Atkins gave the protesting prisoners the 
same rights to compassionate parole as conforming 
prisoners. They also had the option of closed visits 
where the prisoners were separated from visitors by a 
screen. This meant that the prisoner did not need to be 
searched before and after the visit.is However, the talks 
between O'Fiaich and Atkins collapsed. This resulted in 
the PIRA's attacks upon prison officers being resumed and 
led to the decision to embark upon a hunger strike on the 
27 October 1980.14
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In October, before the hunger strike had started, 
but after its announcement, partly because of the mild 
criticism from the European Commission for Human Rights, 
the British offered to substitute civilian style clothing 
for a uniform. This was rejected by the prisoners as they 
wanted to wear their own clothing, not what they saw as a 
different type of uniform. Besides, there was no movement 
on the other issues that were in the "five demands" that 
the protesters demanded, especially not on the 
differentiation between the paramilitary and criminal 
prisoners.15 The government would not publicly moderate 
its position against the prisoners after the start of the 
1980 strike. Indeed, a statement issued by the NIC 
mentioned that it would not grant status to prisoners who 
had committed criminal acts of terrorism.i®
In his account of the protest David Beresford claims 
that the government was actually moderating its attitude 
by talking with the PIRA. During the latter stages of the 
hunger strike, when at least one man on hunger strike, 
Sean McKenna, was approaching his death, a meeting was 
arranged between representatives of both sides under 
strict conditions of secrecy. The initial contact was 
arranged by Catholic Churchmen who may or may not have 
had official sanction. Beresford states that the 
government was represented by the Foreign Office 
(probably the Secret Intelligence Service, SIS) while 
PIRA sent a senior member to argue its side. They 
eventually met in late December as the threat of the
15 Kelley, (1988), 325. & Clarke, (1987), 124.16 Kelley, (1988), 326.
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first death was looming. The meeting was held at 
Aldergrove airport (now Belfast International) near 
Antrim. The Army Council was given a copy of a face 
saving solution which the NIO was proposing. It was 
arranged for the representative to visit the prison, but 
the abandonment of the strike preceded him and the Army 
Council's advice to the prisoners on their response.i? 
Unfortunately the nature of the above negotiations are 
such that it will be many years before any conformation 
of the above story will become available. Until then we 
must treat it with a great amount of caution.
On 17 December the NIO had announced that it was 
preparing a compromise proposal but mentioned that the 
proposed reforms would not be implemented unless the 
hunger strike was abandoned. On 18 December, in the 
knowledge of this statement, the secret talks, and the 
imminent death of Sean McKenna, the remaining five lucid 
hunger strikers chose to call the fast off.i*
The abandonment of the strike gave the advantage to 
the government. The proposed face saving proposal was a 
variant of the October concession of civilian style 
clothing. This was felt by the PIRA to be a useful start 
in the negotiations but by no means a solution.is 
Needless to say this view was not shared by 10 Downing 
Street, which by this time was controlling the response 
to the crisis. After the fast was abandoned the 
government was no longer prepared to discus reforms, 
probably feeling with some justice that it was unlikely
17 Beresford, (1987), 9-13.18 Kelley, (1988), 327.19 Beresford, (1987), 44.
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that the hunger strike could be repeated again. However, 
the government had underestimated the importance placed 
on the prisons by the Provisionals, and especially the 
still insecure northerners who badly needed a success for 
their new political direction. Thus the seeds of the 1981 
hunger strike were already being sown, even before the 
1980 fast had been properly finished.
6c. THE FIRST HUNGER STRIKE.
The possibility of a hunger strike had been worrying 
all of those involved in the protest for some time. 
Indeed, the prisoners had as early as 1979 discussed the 
option with the outside leadership. The leadership had 
counselled against such a move for in the words of Gerry 
Adams the leadership was "tactically, strategically, 
physically and morally opposed" to a hunger strike.20 As 
it is widely thought that Adams was also the Chief of 
Staff of the PIKA,21 this would not have been advice but 
a direct military order. The Green Book, which contains 
the rules and regulations of the Provisionals, lists 
embarking upon a hunger strike by a volunteer without the 
permission of the outside leadership as an offence with a 
maximum penalty of dismissal from the organisation.22 
Both Bobby Sands and Brendan Hughes the prison OCs, were 
sympathetic to Gerry Adams and the northern wing of PIRA, 
so they would not disobey a direct order from him.
20 Clarke, (1987), 121.21 Edgar O'Ballance, IRA LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS, Paul Wilkinson (ed) BRITISH PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981, 79.22 The GREEN BOOK, is published as an appendix to Dillon, (1990), 482-496.
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The protest by the autumn of 1980 had not extracted 
anything concrete out of the British. The National H- 
Block Committee, which was formed after a conference at 
the Green Briar Hotel, had been able to mobilise 
significant displays of public support and international 
attention. At the same time PIRA had been conducting its 
assassination campaign against prison employees for 
several years and had yet to show any real progress from 
this front. The involvement of the Catholic Church in 
influencing the government had also been harnessed, and 
despite the involvement of even the Cardinal it had 
failed to change the treatment of prisoners. The 
involvement of the Irish government had also been 
similarly unsuccessful. The final straw that broke that 
camel's back had been the rejection of the "blanketmen's" 
case by the European Commission of Human Rights. The 
republican movement now felt that it had only two options 
left; complete defeat or to embark upon a hunger strike.
The PIRA, who had not achieved a political successes 
since the fall of Stormont, and the imposition of direct 
rule from Westminster in 1972, were in no position to 
contemplate defeat. Especially after the recent rise to 
power of the politicised northerners who had been so 
critical of the old Dublin based leadership.
Within the prisons the "blanketmen" were similarly 
determined to see the protest through. They felt that 
they had endured so much in the appalling conditions of 
the "dirty" protest that failure would be a betrayal of
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themselves and their supporters outside. Thus, as Leo 
Green said, they had "In effect, no choice at all"
In the late summer of 1980 the prison OC, Brendan 
Hughes, chose to ask for volunteers prepared to embark 
upon a fast to the death. On 27 September it was 
announced in An Phoblacht/Republican News that the 
dialogue between O'Fiaich and Daly with Atkins had 
finally ended in deadlock.z* It was then that a 
statement, smuggled out of the H-Blocks on 10 October, 
announced that a hunger strike would commence from the 27 
October. The strikers, interestingly, did not claim the 
"five demands" that had been recently called for by the 
prisoners but, "... as of right, political recognition 
and that we be accorded the status of political 
prisoners" .^  s
Why had the prisoners chosen to revert back to the 
1976 demands? Possibly, they were showing the republican 
movement's growing political maturity, in choosing to opt 
for a demand that they knew was unacceptable to the 
British government as a negotiating ploy in the hope of 
reaching a compromise agreement. Conversely, it might 
have been an indication of naivete, in that the prisoners 
may have hoped that once they had embarked upon a hunger 
strike the government would cave in as they had in 1972 
when special status was won. One could also speculate 
that they were simply emphasizing their position to show 
that minor reforms were not going to solve the dispute
23 Leo Green, (1990) , 17.24 David Reed, IRELAND THE KEY TO THE BRITISH REVOLUTION. London: Larkin Press, 1984, 326.25 Clarke, (1987), 123.
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and give the government a reminder that they opposed any 
thing that smacked of "criminalisation". However, the 
most likely answer was that the idea of using the strike 
as a catalyst for the protests outside the prison needed 
a short snappy demand that could be readily understood by 
the public rather than using their rather complicated 
formula for negotiations.
The names of the seven hunger strikers were 
released. Brendan Hughes was to lead the strike as OC, 
though he shared this title with Tom McFeeley, in case he 
deteriorated at a faster rate. This ensured that there 
would be a strike leader at all times. The other five 
were Sean McKenna, Leo Green, Tommy McKearney, Raymond 
McCartney, and the INLA prison OC John N i x o n . 2 6
The number of men was chosen as a symbol of the 
seven leaders of the 1916 rising who had been 
subsequently executed by the British.2 ? Strategically, 
the Provisionals made two mistakes. All the strikers 
started on the same day, meaning that the protest had 
only a very limited period before they all died. It was 
also a mistake to allow the fast to be commanded by a |
striker. This was to have a great significance later on i
when the strike was in its final stages and the prisoners !
were too weak to make the important decision on whether j
to continue or accept the deal offered by the government. |
The involvement of the INLA in an essentially !
Provisional protest demonstrated not only the wish of the 
outside leadership for the issue to be part of an anti- i
26 TIMES, 28 October 1980. ;27 Clarke, (1987), 124. .jj
J
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unionist coalition (as with the National H-Block/Armagh 
Committee) but also the camaraderie between the 
republican prisoners. The PIRA were in a sufficiently 
dominant position both inside and outside the prison that 
they could afford to allow the INLA some of the 
recognition that the protest would give.
When the prisoners first refused their food on 27 
October 1980 they could not have had very strong hopes of 
a settlement. The government had refused to move on the 
prisons issue despite the "dirty" and "blanket" protests, 
the PIRA's assassination campaign, and the rallies 
organised by s y m p a t h i s e r s . What could they have hoped 
for? Over a decade after the strike it is still difficult 
to find an answer to this question. By their later 
actions it is clear that they had not intended to die 
simply to fuel the protest with funerals. It is most 
likely that they hoped to gain international attention 
for their demand of political status. This was probably 
in the hope that the British government would be 
sufficiently embarrassed into giving them their demands.
Further, they were almost certainly hoping to 
pressurize the British authorities indirectly through the 
Republic's government. It was known to the prisoners that 
the new Taoiseach, Charles Haughey, was keen to test 
himself in the polls, in the hope that an election would 
confirm him as the undisputed leader of Fianna Fail and 
the country. The prisons issue would have been judged by 
Haughey as a divisive single issue that could upset his 
calculations on when to dissolve the Oireachtas. This
28 Kelley,(1988), 326.
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fear would be born out in a lead article in An 
Phoblact/Republican News.
...the British collaborators in the leadership 
of Fianna Fail and the SDLP are going to quake in 
their shoes and go crawling to their British masters 
pleading with them to grant the prisoners ' five 
demands on a humanitarian basis in order to restore 
'normality '.
But if they thought this was the case they were mistaken. 
Margaret Thatcher, an uncompromisingly anti-terrorist and 
pro-union politician would have been unlikely to change a 
policy that was based on principle, to help the leader of 
a party known to be hostile to the British presence in 
Ulster. She was not a believer in pragmatic politics 
anyway, certainly not when it could be avoided.
Why would the prisoners labour under such a 
misconception? It is very possible that the prisoners 
actually believed their own propaganda that classified 
the Republic as a neo-colonial regime. If this was the 
case the protesters might have accepted that the British 
government might change policy in order to stop the rise 
in republican activity in the South.
The probable answer is that the Provisionals, had 
never come across an ideologically driven Prime Minister 
who was by nature confrontational and combative. It seems 
that the Provisionals seriously misjudged the 
situation.^  °
Essentially, the Provisionals were expecting the 
government to act in a similar manner to the previous 
regimes that they had encountered. If this was the case
29 AN PHOBLACT/REPUBLICAN NEWS, 1 November 1980, quoted in Reed, (1984) , 338.30 Clarke, (1987), 99.
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an extraordinary misjudgement by Michael Alison, the NIO 
Minister responsible for the prisons, would have helped 
to make them think that a fast could be successful.
During an interview broadcast by Ulster Television, in 
its Counterpoint documentary of the 24 September 1980, he 
admitted the reason for the granting of special status in 
1972.
Special category status was won not just by a 
hunger strike^ it was won by the enormous outburst 
of lawlessness, concentrated like a dam bursting 
into a particular moment in history which made it 
impossible to build in our prisons, to introduce a 
normal prison regime.
This would have encouraged the Provisionals to think that
the situation was not very different in 1980 to 1972.
However, the level of violence in 1972 was far higher
than in 1980. Also after over a decade of civil strife in
Northern Ireland the police and army were in a far better
position to deal with any unrest in the Province than in
1972.32 Further, the authorities only gave special
category status as part of the PIRA conditions for a
cease-fire. The hunger strike was only one factor among
many in the mind of the g o v e r n m e n t . 3 3  i n  1980, there was
no British interest in a truce or negotiations, and this
time it was the Provisionals who were under pressure.
In early November the hunger strikers had been
transferred to individual cells in the "A" wing of Block
Three (H-3) in the Maze. Inside there had also been an
31 Reed, (1984) , 335.32 According to RUG figures, 1972 was the worst year for violence resulting in; 10,628 shootings and 467 deaths. But by 1980 this had fallen to; 642 shootings and seventy-six deaths.RUC, STATISTICAL INFORMATION, 1969-31 JANUARY 1991. Belfast: 1991.33 Reed, (1984), 335.
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increase in the number of prisoners who were "on the 
blanket" to approximately five hundred men.s*
At the end of November, as the prisoners ended the 
first month of their fast, the news from outside the 
prison had been good to a point. In Dublin a pro-H-Block 
demonstration had attracted 12,000 people, and southern 
opinion had been split down the middle over the protest 
(far higher than support for the armed struggle). The 
leader of the SDLP, John Hume, had also become 
sufficiently concerned about the issue to arrange a 
meeting with the PIRA in Dublin to discuss it.^s But the 
British government remained unmoved by any of this.
The Provisionals thought that the time had come to 
escalate the pressure upon the British government from 
within the prisons again. It was decided to increase the 
number of people on the fast with the addition of three 
female prisoners from Armagh Prison on 1 December, the 
same day that the male hunger strikers were transferred 
to the hospital wing of the Maze Prison.ss The female 
hunger strikers were the republican 00 of Armagh, Mairead 
Farrell, along with Mary Doyle, and Mairead Nugent.s? The 
reasoning behind this move was fairly simple: Irish 
society has a very strong masculine character with a 
corresponding patronizingly protective instinct to women. 
This meant that although the fast by the seven men was 
bad enough when three women also went on strike it became 
horrific for many people. The argument was that
34 Ibid 340.35 Clarke, (1987) , 125.36 TIMES, 1 & 2 December 1980.37 Tim Pat Coogan, THE IRA. Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 
1988, 618.
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conditions must be bad to drive women to do this, and how 
could the authorities allow the women to dieî^s
At this stage the prisoners heard that John Hume had 
received the support of all the parties in the Bail for 
an approach to the UK authorities on a face saving deal 
that was designed to try and resolve the issue without 
either side having to compromise their position too much. 
This was to be based on the European Commission of Human 
Rights' advice that the government should find an 
acceptable prison regime. The protesters' demands were to 
be met with regard to uniforms and association, this was 
essentially the lowest acceptable compromise to the 
republican movement. However, it was turned down by 
Humphrey Atkins, who on 4 December released a statement 
outlining the governments opposition to the "five 
demands", acceptance of which he felt would sacrifice 
control within the prison to the Provisionals, and also 
in some measure legitimate the terrorist organisations,39 
During both the 1980 and 1981 strikes there was 
never a lack of potential negotiators between the 
authorities and the prisoners. Aside from the Irish 
government, the Redemptorist priest Fr Reid had been 
important in getting John Hume's involvement. There had 
also been the involvement of journalists like Tim Pat 
Coogan, the editor of the Irish Press, who used his good 
contacts and standing to try to help negotiate a 
solution,40 But despite this there was no common ground
38 Kelley, (1988), 326.See also Chapter IV(d),39 Clarke, (1987), 125.40 Tim Pat Coogan, DISILLUSIONED DECADES, IRELAND 1966 87, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1987, 230,
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on which both sides could meet. Neither was prepared to 
change their position.
On 8 December, Thatcher and Haughey held a summit 
that concentrated on security and the discussion of 
"possible new institutional structures" for the Thirty- 
two Counties. This statement did not reflect Haughey's 
earlier declarations that the hunger strike was the most 
important political issue in I r e l a n d . D e s p i t e  the 
possibilities of the statement the hunger strike managed 
to become the principal factor in Anglo/Irish affairs at
this time.42
Then on 10 December, it seemed that the deadlock in 
negotiations might be broken. The leading civil servant 
responsible for the prisons in the North, John Belloch, 
visited the Maze Prison and spoke to the protesters. He 
outlined the various concessions, which the NIO had 
offered to the prisoners which they could take up as soon 
as they ended both the "dirty" protest and the fast. This 
was interpreted by the Provisionals as an authoritative 
statement of the British policy position. They also 
regarded the openings made by John Hume and the Roman 
Catholic Church as the manner in which they could relay
their answers.43
At this stage Sean McKenna's condition was 
deteriorating at an alarming rate. It became clear that 
despite over a year's contemplation of a fast, the 
prisoners were not psychologically prepared for the death
41 Kelley, (1988), 327.42 Clarke, (1987), 126.43 Ibid, 126-127.& Bishop & Mallie, (1989), 360-361.
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of one of the men. Additionally, the authorities showed 
that they were prepared to see the death through.
In an effort to heighten the pressure upon the 
authorities it was decided to announce a further increase 
in the number of hunger strikers in the Maze. On 15 
December, twenty-three men joined the fast followed by 
seven more on the next day. This meant that a total of 
forty prisoners were now on strike in the H-Blocks and 
A r m a g h . 44 McKenna had, after fifty-one days on strike, 
become blind, and was reaching the final stages of 
starvation before death. By Wednesday 17 December, he was 
incapable of keeping drinking water down.4 5
On the same day the NIO stated that a compromise 
solution might be possible, but that this could only be 
considered after the strike was called off. The strikers 
consulted the 00 of the Blocks (Bobby Sands) to see 
whether they could call the strike off in order to save 
McKenna's life on terms based on the British offer.46 
The following day Humphrey Atkins postponed a 
statement that he had been due to deliver to the House of 
Commons. A copy of his proposed statement was given to 
each of the seven original hunger strikers in the prison 
hospital along with a thirty-two page document which 
outlined the prison rules. The five hunger strikers who 
were still in a fit enough condition now faced the 
unenviable decision over whether or not to give up the 
strike on the basis of the proposed statement.4?
44 TIMES, 16 December 1980.45 Reed, (1984), 344.46 Kelley, (1988), 326-327.47 Reed, (1984), 344.& Bishop & Mallie, (1989), 360-362.
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McKenna's condition was extremely serious. He was 
only occasionally lucid and on the verge of a coma. When, 
in one of his few conscious moments, he asked how long he 
still had to live, he was informed that his death was 
expected within twenty-four hours. He then restated his 
wish to continue with the strike. The prisoners were 
presented with a situation where it seemed an acceptable 
solution was possible; but a civil servant who was to 
meet them and clarify the situation was held up by a day 
in London. The delay would have been fatal for McKenna 
and the prisoners chose to call off the s t r i k e . *8
As the victory fires burned in the Nationalist areas 
of the North, McKenna, suffering from potassium 
deficiency, was transferred to the Royal Victoria 
Hospital in Belfast and admitted into the intensive care 
unit in a still dangerous condition. In Armagh the three 
women chose to give up their fast as did a small loyalist 
imitation hunger strike which had been called in protest 
at the religious integration of Ulsters prison system.*9 
6d. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE FIRST HUNGER STRIKE
The panic caused by the condition of McKenna was to 
lead indirectly to a second strike in 1981. A fair amount 
of controversy has dogged the debate about what was 
agreed by the British authorities and the prisoners in 
December 1980. There has been much talk of "perfidious 
Albion", but little agreement on the correct 
interpretation of the wording which the civil servants,
48 Gerry Adams, THE POLITICS OF IRISH FREEDOM. Dingle, Co.Kerry: Brandon Books, 1987, 77-78.& Coogan, (1988), 620-625.49 Clarke, (1987), 128-129.
193CHAPTER VI
with bureaucratic vagueness, had put together. In this 
section the intention is to examine the compromise and 
see why it failed.
The Guardian Northern Ireland correspondent at this 
time, David Beresford, subsequently wrote an account of 
the 1981 hunger strike named Ten Men Dead. With a 
journalist's eye for drama, the book opens with the cloak 
and dagger way that the proposed solution was delivered 
to a representative of the PIRA Army Council at 
Aldergrove (now Belfast International) Airport. When the 
document arrived at the Belfast offices of PSF a member 
of the Council is reported to have stated that the 
document was full of holes but was nonetheless a good 
start in any possible negotiations. The deliberations are 
cut short though, by the announcement that the fast had 
been called off.so
It would be useful at this stage to restate the 
"five demands" that the republican prisoners were 
demanding. They were,
1. The right to wear their own clothes.
2. The right to abstain from penal labour.
3. The right to free association.
4. The right to educational and recreational
activities in conjunction with the prison
authorities.
5. The right to have remission restored.si
50 Beresford, (1987), 44-45.51 Coogan, (1980), 48.
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The government proposed that '^Republican Prisoners" 
coming off the protest would be placed in clean cells and 
that,
within a few days clothing provided by their 
families will be given to any prisoner giving up his 
protest so that they can wear it during association 
and visits.
During the working day in the prison they were to be 
issued with "civilian type clothing". Further, prisoners 
were to be permitted to associate within each wing in the 
evening and at the weekends when they could wear their 
own clothing. There would also be the arrival in the 
prison the following day of a senior civil servant to
discuss the p r o p o s a l s . ^ 2
This meant that of the "five demands" point one was 
partially addressed, giving prisoners the right to their 
own clothes when not working. Point two was not going to 
be possible and the prisoners would have to work, but the 
government offered to regard the definition of work 
liberally. Although point three was largely acceptable, 
the authorities were to remain in full control of the 
prison: there would be no return to the old prisoner-run 
huts of the special category period. Point four was 
already possible under existing regulations if they were 
sympathetically interpreted by the prison administration. 
While point five was not going to be given in total, 50% 
of the lost remission time would be restored. And while 
there was no recognition of political status the 
government seemed to be prepared to describe them as
52 Clarke, (1987), 128.& Bishop & Mallie, (1989), 360-362. & Coogan, (1988), 619.
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Republican Prisoners. This was a substantial improvement 
to previous British offers. For the first time at least 
some of the most important parts of the "five demands" of 
the "blanketmen" were addressed directly.
Initially, after the protest had been abandoned the 
situation did seem to be resolving itself. Bobby Sands 
had several meetings with the Governor of the Maze, 
Stanley Hilditch, and met with a senior civil servant.
The atmosphere changed though in a matter of days. The 
Provisionals claim the Governor said that there would be 
no movement until the prisoners on the "blanket" protest 
conformed. Then on 9 January 1981, Atkins announced that 
the prisoners would not receive their own clothing. 
Instead the prisoners would only have civilian type" 
clothing as issued by the authorities.
The prisoners decided to attempt to conform although 
there was resistance from some prisoners, especially from 
the INLA, to put on the old uniforms, even temporarily.
It was agreed that ninety-six men from H-5 and H-3 would 
slop out for a week to prove that they were conforming. 
They would then instantly qualify for 50% of their lost 
remission and one parcel a week. The following week they 
would wash, shave, and ask for their own clothing. The 
government asked for a week longer. On Friday 2 3 January 
1981, twenty of the ninety-six prisoners shaved and asked 
for their clothing, but emphasised that they would not do 
any prison work except clean their own cells and attend 
full-time education. But the authorities said that they
53 Reed, (1984), 345.& Bishop & Mallie, (1989), 360-362. & Beresford, (1987), 46-47.
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were first to pick up prison issue clothing and move to 
furnished cells. By 27 January, the ninety-six prisoners 
had rioted causing £13,000 worth of damage and had 
started to foul their cells again.s* The situation seemed 
to be deteriorating, with the government hoping that the 
numbers of protesting prisoners would be reduced to a 
small hard core.ss
Who broke their word? Predictably, both sides 
claimed that it was the other. The authorities seemed 
determined to ensure that the prisoners conformed first 
before there could be any resolution of the dispute. The 
prisoners were equally strong in their wish not to 
conform at all to the old system. It was certain that the 
deal that led to the end of the 1980 fast was not the one 
republicans wanted, and that they had hoped to be able to 
continue negotiations after the strike was over. However, 
the British authorities had not wanted to negotiate such 
a compromise in the first place and once the pressure of 
the fast had been lifted, decided that there was no 
longer a need to continue discussions. The acceptance by 
the hunger strikers of the deal was understandable as 
they did not want to see the unnecessary death of a 
comrade. This, combined with the problems suffered by the 
strikers after over fifty days without food, meant that 
they should not have made the decision to call off the 
fast themselves. It was for this the reason that in 1981 
the Provisionals chose to keep the prisoners under the 
normal prison command led by a non-hunger striker.
54 Clarke, (1987), 135.& Coogan, (1988), 625-626.55 Clarke, (1987), 135-136.
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Brendan McFarlane, Had the British been a bit more 
flexible after the end of 1980 it is likely that the 1981 
fast would not have been necessary and that the problems 
caused internationally, and within the Province, would 
never have happened.
It has been stated that the Provisionals might have 
found an excuse to restart the fast again, had the deal 
worked, in order to launch the use of the Armalite and 
Ballot Box strategy. This was unlikely as PSF was unsure 
whether it was possible to regain the momentum of the 
outside protest a g a i n . ^6 The outside leadership was also 
aware of the past history of Irish hunger strikes. This 
meant it was fully aware of how much this technique had 
proved to be a double edged sword in the past and that it 
was notoriously difficult to control once started. Given 
PSF's wish to be in command of events it would almost 
certainly have preferred to use a different issue with 
which to launch itself upon electoral politics.
56 Kelley, (1988), 333& Coogan, (1988), 515.
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7a. INTRODUCTION.
The confusion at the end of the 1980 hunger strike 
had resulted in a determination amongst the Provisionals 
that this time they would not make the same mistakes. The 
hopes for the successful resolution of the strike without 
any deaths this time must have been remote in the 
extreme. The experience of 1980 had shown that the 
authorities while prepared to try and resolve the strike 
they were also willing to allow a prisoner to die, as in 
the case of Sean McKenna. This would turn the moral j
pressure that the authorities were supposed to suffer |
from back upon the prisoners and republicanism.
This meant that the prisoners had to be psychologically 
prepared for a death. Rather than having a multiple |
hunger strike as in 1980, which was recognised as a 1tactical mistake, they chose to have a series of lone i
ifasts starting at two week periods, steadily building up 
the pressure upon the authorities.i This was to lead to a 
protracted period of tension in the Province through much 
of 1981.
It is not the intention of this chapter to deal with the 
two aspects of the strike that have already been dealt 
with in Chapters IV and V, so the external campaign will 
only be analysed when it had a direct input to the events 
during the fast and the moral and ethical aspects will
1 Kevin J. Kelley, THE LONGEST WAR, NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE IRA. London: Zed Books, 1990, 333-334.
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also only be touched upon. Section 7b is a summary of the 
principal events of the 1981 strike in chronological 
order. This will be followed in section 7c by an 
examination of the reaction to the strike amongst the 
parties in Northern Ireland.
7b. THE 1981 HUNGER STRIKE.
After the confusion following the end of the 1980 
hunger strike the Provisionals were determined to ensure 
that the mistakes made then would not be repeated again. 
This resulted in a series of communications between the 
Army Council and the Maze prisoners about the possibility 
of starting the hunger strike again. The Council was 
extremely anxious to avoid the confusion that had ended 
the 1980 fast. The PIRA also made it clear that there 
would be no run down of the level of violence as there 
had been in 1980 if there was a new hunger strike.%
It was decided that the men on the fast would come 
under the normal prison command structure, which 
effectively meant that they were under the command of 
Brendan "Bic" McFarlane, who was to take Bobby Sands 
place as PIRA prison O C . The prisoners were informed that 
the strike would probably lead to the death of at least 
some of the men taking part. This allowed the movement to 
come to terms with the idea of deaths and address the 
psychological barrier which the earlier hunger strikers 
could not cross and which had ended the first hunger 
strike. It was also decided that rather than a mass 
strike like 1980, which brought the problem to a crisis
2 Colm Keena, A BIOGRAPHY OF GERRY ADAMS. Cork & Dublin: Mercier Press, 1990, 89.
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point in relatively short period, this time the numbers 
would be in ones and twos, thus ensuring that the 
pressure could be maintained as each man approached death 
over a drawn out period, maximising the political mileage 
of every death.^
There was also the problem of morale within the 
prison amongst the "blanketmen". Between the end of the 
1980 strike on 18 December and 3 March 1981, eighty 
prisoners had dropped out of the protest.& If this rate 
of attrition was allowed to continue the whole protest 
would collapse, so the Provisionals faced the problem 
that if they did nothing there would no longer be a
ijprotest. j
The republican movement outside the prisons decided {
Ito carefully plan a campaign in support of the fast. PSF ]
was worried that the level of emotion at the end of the |
1980 strike might have drained possible support in the I
1community for the fast. On the 25 January 1981, the j]
National H-Block/Armagh Committee met in Dublin to I
prepare for the start of Sands' strike. It was decided i
that the committee should put across its view that the i
government had backed away from an honourable solution to |
the dispute after the pressure of the 1980 strike was I
lifted. A theme of Britain Reneges" was to be adopted 1
and fed to the public as much as possible.s This would i
deflect any criticism that they might receive alleging j
that the republican movement was responsible for any |
Iresulting deaths. They hoped this would safely put the ;
3 Kelley, (1990), 333-334.4 HANSARD, 3 March 1981, colls 131-134.5 Kelley, (1990 ) , 330.
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blame upon the British. Leaflets distributed in the 
Republic by the National Committee, emphasised the idea 
that the authorities had betrayed the agreement 
specifically on the issue of prison uniform. ^'Clothes 
brought to the gaols by relatives were refused by the 
authorities and parcels were not allowed"
In a similar way, propaganda that was distributed in 
the United Kingdom did not pull any punches in 
descriptions of the government's attitude to the 
prisoners. "The government has broken its agreement with 
Irish republican prisoners... The prisoners have been 
forced to hunger strike again,
The Committee also decided that the "dirty" protest 
would be called off on 2 March, the day after Sands was 
due to start his hunger strike. This was to concentrate 
further attention upon the fast, though the better 
conditions would also have helped general morale amongst 
protesting prisoners and help keep former conforming 
prisoners who had joined the protest in 1980 amongst the 
"blanketmen".®
The British authorities, though, were announcing to 
the world that they would not back down over their 
refusal to concede any form of political status. The 
hunger strike which Bobby Sands started on 1 March 1981, 
was not going to affect the issue, according to a speech 
which the Secretary of State, Humphrey Atkins, made to 
the Commons the day after the fast began.* In his
6 BRITISH RENEGE ON HUNGER STRIKE COMMITMENTS. National H-Block/Armagh Committee, 30 Mountjoy Sqr, Dublin, 1981.7 AD-HOC HUNGER STRIKE COMMITTEE. London NW5 4NH, 1981.8 DAILY TELEGRAPH, 3 March 1981.9 IRISH TIMES, 4 March 1981.
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statement Atkins was emphatic that the strike would not 
be successful.
The claim for political status has been 
rejected in clear terms by the European Commission 
of Human Rights, by successive governments, and by 
both sides of the house,
Speaking for the Opposition the Labour MP for 
Mansfield, J.Don Concannon, concurred with the Secretary 
of State. ”We agree that this is the only sensible course 
for the house to take". He went on to say to the Commons 
that he did not wish to make an issue of this situation 
and did not want any potential propaganda to be given to 
the Provisionals by the Labour Party."...we shall not be 
pressing him to make further statements, in fact quite 
the reverse"
This was not a great surprise to Sands (nor the 
republican movement) who wrote in his diary that. "It 
[the Atkins statement] does not annoy me, because my mind 
was prepared for such things and I know I can expect more
of such, right to the bitter end. %
Bobby Sands was a rather sad figure. His family had
been burnt out of their home during the early part of the
"troubles", and this had probably drawn him to the 
paramilitaries. He was separated from his wife, who with 
his son had moved to the mainland. After his second 
arrest in 1976, he had distinguished himself in prison as 
a writer and was close to Gerry Adams' wing of the 
Provisionals. In the late 1970's, he had acted as Brendan 
Hughes' deputy, and during the 1980 hunger strike was the
10 HANSARD, 3 March 1981, colls 131-134.11 Ibid12 Extracts from a leaflet released by Provisional Sinn Fein published in the GUARDIAN, 23 June 1981.
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OC of the PIRA prisoners (an elected position).is With 
his experience it is certain that he realised that he 
would probably die, which meant that he was a good choice 
to lead the strike from the front, fully aware of the 
consequences from the start.
Two weeks later, as planned, the second hunger 
striker Frances Hughes started his fast. Hughes, unlike 
Sands, had been an important figure in the PIRA. Before 
his capture he had been notorious in South Co.
Londonderry for his daring in fighting the security 
forces. He had been shot during his capture, was found 
guilty of the murder of a soldier and was estimated by 
some commentators to have been involved in over thirty 
killings.14 unlike Sands he was representative of the 
more conservative republican tradition which was still 
strong in the rural areas on the boarder with the 
Republic.is
Outside the prison as Sands went into the fourth 
week of his strike the National H-Block/Armagh Committee 
was drumming up support. On 22 March two more prisoners 
embarked upon a fast. They were Raymond McCreesh (PIRA) 
and Patsy O'Hara (INLA). This was intended to ensure that 
there would be continuous pressure on the authorities as 
each man approached death.is When a by-election was 
caused by the death of the sitting Independent
13 Liam Clarke, BROADENING THE BATTLEFIELD, SINN FEIN AND THE H-BLOCKS. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1987, 121-123.14 David Beresford, TEN MEN DEAD, London: Grafton, 1987, 152.& Kelley, (1990), 333-334.& IRISH TIMES, 13 May 1981.15 Beresford, (1987), 152.16 IRISH TIMES, 23 March 1981.
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Nationalist M P , Frank Maguire, in the constituency of 
Fermanagh and South Tyrone, an ideal propaganda tool was 
given to the committee. On the 9 April Sands won the seat 
and became a member of the House of Commons, as discussed 
in Chapter IV and in the next section. Many nationalists 
hoped that this would lead to some form of compromise 
from the government, but this was not the case.i? The 
British government had decided that the strike had become 
a trial of strength as well as principle, which could 
decide much of the future of British policy in the North 
and so they could not afford to show any weakness to the 
Provisionals.
By 20 April Sands was approaching death, as a result 
tension increased throughout the North. The security 
forces naturally became targets for crowds of youths in 
republican areas. During a riot in Belfast two Catholic 
youths were killed by an army landrover which had knocked 
them over at high s p e e d . is This reflected the general 
polarisation that was being created by the fast. The 
enclave mentality of the late 1960’s and early 1970's was 
returning to the province.i* There had been some 
criticism of the army and the RUC for their heavy 
presence in nationalist areas. It was argued that their 
presence incited the rioters and that if they were not in 
the ghettos there would be no riots. The security forces 
though were undoubtedly concerned to prevent a recreation 
of the no go areas that had existed at the start of the
17 TIMES, 11 April 1981.18 TIMES, 20 April 1981.& GUARDIAN, 20 April 1981.19 GUARDIAN, 2 May 1981.
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troubles and were unwilling to allow barricades to go up.
Further, the authorities could not allow any perception 
that they had lost control of even the most republican 
areas of the Six Counties, so a heavy police and army
presence in these districts was imperative from the j
iauthorities' point of view. ;
On 5 May, the NIG released a statement stating that |1Bobby Sands, "took his own life by refusing food for 66 *i
days".20 He had died at 1.17 in the morning in the Maze |
Prison hospital. One of the first reactions to the death |
Iwas released by Atkins who indicated that BRITISH policy |
would not change despite the death when he said. ”I ;
regret this needles and pointless death. Too many have |
died by violence in Northern Ireland. In this case it was :Iself inflicted. "21 I
The republican prisoners also released a similarly i
!uncompromising statement which illustrated how far from a |
■I
solution the problem had come. "There are many Bobby iI
Sands in these Blocks, and we will continue to die on \
hunger strike if needs be in order to safeguard those i
principles [Political S t a t u s ] . i 
However, it seems that internally the prisoners were i
Inot quite so blase' as the statement indicated. In one ,
communication from McFarlane (Bik) to Adams (Brownie) we '
Isee a better example of the atmosphere in the Blocks. ;
To Brownie 2.15 A.M *
Comrade mor, I just heard the news I'm shattered- j
just can't belive it. This is a terrible feeling I have. I
I don't even know what to say. Comrade, I'm sorry, but I |
just can't say anything else. May God in his infinite j
23 Prison Communications published in Beresford, (1987), 133 - 135.24 GUARDIAN, 6 May 1981.25 GUARDIAN, 6 May 1981.& INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 6 May 1981.
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mercy grant eternal rest to his soul. Jesus Christ 
protect and guide us all.
God Bless, 
xoxo Bik xoxo
The bitter determination came later in the day when in 
another communication to a PSF official, he said, "Let's 
stay together comrade and hammer the bastards into the 
ground. %
The other major parties in the North also issued 
statements about the death. The DUP leader Ian Paisley 
reflected the general view of the Unionist parties when 
he simply said that Sands had a choice not afforded the IPIRA's victims. This low key response fitted in with i
their opinion that the international media had been 
biased in the favour of the hunger strikers and that it 
was not concentrating on the victims of Provisional 
violence. John Hume the leader of the moderate 
nationalist party the SDLP complained that Sands' death 
could have been avoided if the government had been more 
flexible and sensitive.
Almost immediately after the death of Sands had been 
publicly announced, there was rioting in the republican 
areas of the Province as well as in parts of Dublin where
targets like British Home Stores were attacked and ■imarchers had to be beaten back from the British Embassy jIby the Garda. During the disorder in Ulster twenty-one i
people were injured, including a milkman and his son who
were stoned by youths on a morning milk r o u n d . 2 s j
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Subsequently, both died as a result of their injuries 
which had been sustained when the float c r a s h e d , 2 6
When Bobby Sands was buried on 7 May, the number of 
mourners was estimated by the Times as between 50,000 and 
70,000, while republican sympathisers claimed 100,000 
mourners.27 The polarisation between the two communities 
was illustrated when unionists held a form of counter 
ceremony at which the 2000 victims of the troubles were 
commemorated at the cenotaph in Belfast city centre.2 a 
On 9 May the treadmill of new hunger strikes 
continued when Joe McDonnell a thirty year old PIRA 
prisoner started to fast.29 As Francis Hughes' condition 
deteriorated after fifty-eight days of refusing food on 
11 May, rioting had begun to sporadically break out again 
in some parts of the North. On the same day the depth of 
tension was illustrated when the largest of the 
Protestant paramilitary organisations, the Ulster Defence 
Association (UDA), carried out what it described as a 
mobilisation exercise with 300 unarmed men dressed in 
paramilitary uniform in Londonderry.20 This was partly as 
a show of strength and intimidation but also echoed the 
original purpose of the UDA when it was formed in 1971 
which was as a defence organisation protecting Protestant 
areas from the IRA.si
26 DAILY TELEGRAPH, 14 May 1981.27 TIMES, 8 May 1981.& David Reed IRELAND THE KEY TO THE BRITISH REVOLUTION, London: Larkin Publications, 1984, 355-356.28 TIMES, 8 May 1981.29 OBSERVER, 10 May 1981.30 IRISH TIMES, 12 May 1981.31 Martin Dillon & Denis Lehane, POLITICAL MURDER IN NORTHERN IRELAND, London: Penguin,1973, 51-53.
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On 12 May Francis Hughes died at 5.43pm after a 
fifty-nine day fast. A PIRA statement described him as 
"one of the struggle's bravest soldiers", In the rioting 
following his death Protestant schools in Londonderry 
City were attacked, and a teenage girl from Andersonstown 
sustained fatal head injuries from a plastic bullet fired 
by the security forces.3% The rioters' attack upon 
Protestant targets was a rare example of blatant 
sectarianism by republicans. This was partly an example 
of the youths' anger but also showed the frustration of 
the crowds in not having targets upon which to vent their 
feelings. This was a further reason for the security 
forces' heavy presence in republican areas.
On 15 May 1981 Brendan McLaughlin was announced as 
Hughes' replacement on the hunger strike.33 On the same 
day a leader of the UDA, Andy Tyrie, called upon the 
government to settle the prison dispute as its effects 
"could lead to very, very serious conflict", Perhaps with 
some of his own men in prison also on his mind he said, 
"There are special courts and special legislation so why 
can't there be special p r i s o n e r s " This was also, 
however, an indication of the fear that was developing in 
Ulster, that the growing polarisation caused by the fast 
was increasing the danger of inter-community conflict.
As the health of the hunger strikers Raymond 
McCreesh and Patsy O'Hara deteriorated, the inevitable 
rioting resulted in a twelve year old girl from Belfast
32 GUARDIAN, 13 May 1981.& IRISH TIMES 14 May 1981.33 FINANCIAL TIMES, 15 May 1981.34 GUARDIAN, 15 May 1981.
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sustaining fatal plastic bullet wounds on 19 May, When 
both the strikers died within hours of one another on the 
21 May after a fast of sixty-one days, another person was 
killed by a plastic bullet during rioting. This time 
though it was a middle aged man who d i e d . ^ 5
The next development in the crisis came when Brendan 
McLaughlin decided to abandon his fast after doctors 
informed him that he had a stomach ulcer which would kill 
him before the fast did. The Provisional leadership 
deemed that this was an inappropriate way to die and that 
he should give up on 2 7 May. His place was taken two days 
later by Martin H u r s o n . s s  The republicans had realised 
that the negative publicity of an ill man dying on hunger 
strike would have countered any benefits that could be 
gained by the strike. For their purposes the PIRA/INLA 
needed to recruit men at the peak of health for the 
hunger strike. The conveyor-belt of strikers continued on 
8 June when another PIRA member Tom Mcllwee started to 
fast.37 On the 15 June they were joined by yet another 
prisoner, Patrick Quinn.3s
This alarmed the Catholic Church, and on 18 June the 
Irish Bishops Conference backed a compromise solution 
proposed by the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace. 
This would have given the prisoners their demands on 
clothing, association and work, but not what they craved 
most, political recognition. And at least briefly the
35 IRISH TIMES, 22 May 1981.& DAILY TELEGRAPH, 23 May 1981.236 TIMES, 28 May 1981.& IRISH TIMES, 29 May 1981.37 GUARDIAN, 8 June 1981.38 TIMES, 15 June 1981.
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Commission was confident enough to say that relations 
between the Provisionals and the British authorities did 
seem to be '^mellowing a little" With hindsight this 
statement seemed to be more an exercise in wishful 
thinking than fact, though the Commission might also been 
attempting to kick start a dialogue. However, when 
Michael Devine, a member of the INLA joined the strike on 
23 June he demonstrated that republican efforts to keep 
the pressure on the British authorities continued.*0
The next move came from the NIC when Atkins, in a 
five page document, told the hunger strikers that the 
fast was holding up possible improvements in the prison 
regime. He also said, "The hunger strikes are not of the 
UK government's making and it is not within our power to 
bring them to an end, j
This was rejected by the prisoners who described the 
statement as "arrogant and callous". However, in their 
response they did hint at a possible moderation of the 
demands for special treatment as they were now prepared 
to see all prisoners in the North benefiting from their 
"five demands". This was a change from the demands that 
were issued at the start of the 1981 strike which had 
been released on the 5 February, claiming the status of 
political prisoners.42
This progress, though, finished with the death of 
Joe McDonnell, who died after a fast of sixty-one days on 
8 J u l y . 4 3  On 13 July, the prisoners finally rejected the
39 IRISH TIMES, 18 June 1981 & 20 June 1981.40 GUARDIAN, 23 June 1981.41 DAILY TELEGRAPH, 1 July 1981.42 GUARDIAN, 2 July 1981.43 IRISH TIMES, 9 July 1981.
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mediation efforts by the Irish Commission for Justice and 
Peace. The prisoners claimed the Commission had been used 
by the British authorities against them and that the 
compromise it produced was an unacceptable dilution of 
the "five d e m a n d s " . *4 it seemed that at this stage after 
so many deaths they had committed themselves to a path 
where only a complete victory was possible.
Unfortunately, the British were equally committed for the 
same reason, and the authorities had the advantage as it 
was PIRA that was suffering from the deaths and the 
pressure which it had hoped that the British would suffer 
from.
On 14 July Martin Hurson died after forty-five days 
without food and was replaced by Matt Devlin on the day 
after. This continued the seemingly endless tragedy which 
the prisoners were forcing upon themselves.*5 On 15 July, 
the NIO released a statement from Atkins where he 
continued to show that the authorities would not submit 
to the prisoners demands.
The government deeply regrets that the hunger 
strikers are continuing and has naturally been 
considering further what steps it can properly take 
to persuade those concerned to end their action
The next organisation that was to try and find a
solution to the dispute was the International Red Cross,
which intervened in the hope of saving the lives of the
eight surviving hunger strikers on the fast.*? The
44 TIMES, 13 July 1981.45 GUARDIAN, 14 July 1981 & IRISH TIMES, 15 July 1981.46 Humphrey Atkins THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY 
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, RT HON 
HUMPHREY ATKINS', M.P, TODAY, Northern Ireland Information Service, Stormont Castle Belfast, 15 July 1981.47 TIMES, 16 July 1981.
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British government made it clear when they accepted the 
Red Cross invitation to visit the Maze, that this visit 
was on the basis of the statutes which permit the Red 
Cross to inspect the conditions of normal prisoners other 
than Prisoners of War. The intervention would not be 
conducted under the 1949 Geneva Convention but in the 
context of its humanitarian r o l e . 4 8
The Red Cross almost immediately ran into problems 
because the government refused to participate in face to 
face negotiations with PSF or PIRA.49 Though this may 
have seemed stubborn, one has to remember that the PIRA 
is an illegal subversive organisation that was actively 
killing representatives of the state. Further, the 
British authorities could not afford to give them any 
form of legitimacy or recognition in the eyes of the 
world, probably the principal reason for government 
policy during the strike.
The next important developments came when on 1 
August Kevin Lynch, a member of the INLA, died after a 
fast of seventy-one days. On the same day Paddy Quinn had 
his forty-seven day fast ended due to the intervention of 
his relatives, showing the first cracks in the previously 
united front between the relatives and the republican 
movement.so This had been brewing for some time, since 
Adams had already been asked by Fr Faul to intervene with 
the prisoners on the relatives behalf. The lack of 
success created bitterness as the futility of the fast 
was becoming clear to everybody apart from the prisoners
48 Atkins, (15 July 1981).49 SUNDAY TIMES, 19 July 1981.50 GUARDIAN, 1 August 1981.
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themselves. The refusal of the external leadership to 
order the breaking of the fast had placed each family 
with a dreadful dilemma, to allow their sons or husbands 
to die or to have them live in defiance of their own 
wishes.51 Then on 2 August, Kieran Doherty, the man who 
had become the elected TD for Monaghan, died after a 
seventy-three day fast.52
On 7 August it was revealed that the level of 
violence that had happened since the fast had started 
five months previously was horrific. In this time period 
fifty-one people had died and more than 1000 people had 
been injured in Ulster.53 Another illustration of the 
level of street disturbance is the fact that during this 
period, in the months of May and June of 1981, 17,000 
plastic bullet rounds were fired by the security 
forces.54 In all approximately half of all plastic 
bullets fired to date in Ulster were discharged during
1981.55
The prisoners had on 6 August offered a compromise 
to the government but this had been rejected. On 8 
August, Thomas McElwee, a convicted murderer died after 
sixty-two days fasting. He had become the ninth man to 
die on the hunger strike.56 The PIRA replacement for 
Doherty, Pat Sheehan, started his hunger strike on 10
51 Beresford, (1987), 345-358.52 GUARDIAN, 3 August 1981.53 DAILY TELEGRAPH, 7 August 1981.54 Troops Out Movement, WITHOUT CONSENT, BRITAIN'S ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRELAND, Troops Out Movement, London, 1990, pp 8 - 9.55 PACK UP THE TROUBLES, CRITICAL EYE, London: Exco Television for Channel 4, 24 Oct 1991.56 OBSERVER, 9 August 1981.
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August.57 On 9 August, another man was killed during a 
riot by a plastic bullet.5 8 On 17 August, Jackie McMullan 
was named as the replacement for McElwee.59
On 21 August the intervention of the Catholic Church 
with the relatives, through the chaplains at the Maze, 
was beginning to show. Patrick McGeowan's mother decided 
to intervene and save his life when he fell into a coma 
after forty-seven days.so On 20 August the INLA prisoner 
Michael Devine died after sixty days without food.^i
The campaign received a much needed propaganda and 
morale boost on 21 August when Owen Carron, Bobby Sands' 
election agent, won the by-election caused by Sands' 
death, gaining a greater number of votes than Sands. He 
had fought the election on an Anti-H Block Abstentionist 
ticket.62 On 23 August the Provisionals announced their 
next hunger striker was to be Bernard Fox.®^
In late August there seemed to be some moderation in 
the position of the British government on the prison 
dispute when it announced on 25 August that it was 
willing to grant prisoners the right to wear their own 
clothing at all times if the strike finished.64 On 28 
August, the Northern Ireland Minister responsible for the 
prisons, Michael Alison, met with Owen Carron the 
recently elected MP. Although the talks proved fruitless, 
as both sides were not prepared to change their stance.
57 IRISH TIMES, 10 August 1981.58 GUARDIAN, 10 August 1981.59 IRISH TIMES, 17 August 1981.60 GUARDIAN, 21 August 1981.61 IRISH TIMES, 21 August 1981,62 IRISH TIMES, 22 August 1981.63 DAILY TELEGRAPH, 24 August 1981.64 TIMES, 26 August 1981.
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it did show a liberalisation in the British position in 
agreeing to talk to a member of PSF (though, Carron met 
the Minister as an MP not a member of the Party).65 The 
Provisionals demonstrated that their determination 
continued when Hugh Carville was announced as the latest 
addition to the fast on 31 A u g u s t . 66
However the relatives were no longer as determined 
as the prisoners and on 4 September Mathew Devlins' 
mother and brother intervened to save his life on the 
fifty-second day of his fast.6? on 6 September Laurence 
McKeowan's relatives also intervened after seventy days 
of fasting. There was another blow to the Provisionals on 
the same day when the INLA, which was divided about 
whether it should continue the strike as it had very few 
members left in the Maze to put on the fast, announced 
that it was cutting down the frequency with which it was 
putting its men on the hunger strike. There were also 
rumours that the remaining INLA man on strike, Liam 
McCloskey, might come off it.68
On 14 September the Cabinet reshuffle by Margaret 
Thatcher saw a change in the team at Stormont with 
Humphry Atkins and Michael Alison leaving Belfast and 
being replaced respectively by James Prior and Lord 
Gowrie. In spite of this, PIRA members continued to join 
the fast, and on the same day Gerard Hodgins became the 
latest hunger striker.69 However, the flow of people 
coming off the strike continued when Bernard Fox, ended
65 GUARDIAN, 29 August 1981.66 INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 1 September 198167 DAILY TELEGRAPH, 5 September 1981.68 GUARDIAN, 7 September 1981.69 GUARDIAN, 14 September 1981.
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his fast after thirty-two days because of a kidney 
complaint.70 Then on 26 September 1981, the remaining 
INLA prisoner came off the fast after fifty-five d a y s . 7 i 
On 27 September an assistant chaplain at the Maze,
Fr Denis Faul, organised a meeting of the remaining 
hunger strikers' relatives. For some time Faul, who is a 
committed nationalist, had argued that the deaths in the 
prison were pointless. But he decided to do more to end 
the fast and his position amongst the prisoners gave him 
a pivotal role in achieving this. He decided that he 
should visit the relatives at home and persuade them to 
intervene. In the meeting which was attended by five out 
of the six families he persuaded them to intervene if 
their relatives on the fast passed o u t . 72 when the Ifamilies informed the prisoners of this Faul had j
effectively presented a fait accompli. The prisoners now 
faced the problem that they would not die and that the 
authorities knew this. Thus the fast was effectively 
emasculated.
It then only became a matter of time before the 
announcement of the end of the strike was made and 
eventually, on 3 October, the prisoners took food 216 
days and ten deaths after Bobby Sands first refused 
f o o d . 7 3  In a statement the PIKA was forthright in who it 
blamed for the failure of the strike.
We have been robbed of the hunger strike as an 
effective protest weapon principally because of the 
successful campaign waged against our distressed
70 GUARDIAN, 25 September 1981.71 IRISH TIMES, 28 September 1981.72 GUARDIAN, 5 October 1981.73 OBSERVER, 4 October 1981.
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relatives by the Catholic hierarchy, aided and
abetted by the Irish establishment. ?^
The government wisely chose to give a low key 
response to the end of the fast. It did however feel that 
the end of the strike had been a vindication of its 
policy of giving no concessions to terrorists. A few days 
after the end of the strike James Prior gave a press 
conference in Belfast. During the conference a series of 
reforms were announced that went a long way to improving 
the conditions in which the prisoners were held. The men 
at the Maze were to be allowed to wear their own clothing 
at all times (this was as long as the clothing was not 
paramilitary dress or resembled the warders uniform). 
There was an increased amount of association to be 
allowed within each block, and up to half of the 
remission lost by protesting prisoners was to be 
restored.?s
This was politically an extremely astute move. The 
reforms, together with the concessions given earlier on 
in the strike, meant that the government had in effect 
granted the points that the Provisionals had used to 
attract human rights supporters. At the same time it 
ensured that control of the prison, which had been Merlyn 
Rees's original motivation in abolishing the special 
category status, had been maintained. Further, the 
prisoners had not gained the much coveted status as 
political prisoners, while the government was able to be 
magnanimous in victory by announcing the concessions, and 
in not being publicly jubilant about the collapse of the
74 OBSERVER, 4 October 1981.75 TIMES, 7 October 1981.
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strike. In doing this James Prior, was hoping to help 
facilitate the healing of the divisions that had been 
opened up in the Province during the strike.
The wisdom of this policy was seen by the reaction 
of the leader of the SDLP, John Hume, who described the 
reforms as a "positive response"  ^ The Provisionals were 
also put into some confusion about how to respond to the 
reforms. They were not what PIRA wanted but were enough 
to satisfy a substantial number of people who had been 
sympathetic to the H-Block/Armagh campaign but not to the 
armed struggle. The prisoners chose to accept their 
clothing, thus coming "off the Blanket". They had already 
ended the "dirty" protest to concentrate attention on the 
fast earlier on in the strike, leaving the "no-work" 
protest as the only leftover of the dispute that had 
existed since 1976. This effectively left republicans 
with nothing to keep attention on the prisons. When the 
first Provisional prisoner was released after the end of 
the strike (John Connolly) he said to the press that the 
prisoners did not consider that there had been any 
settlement and that the campaign would continue.?? This 
already was more bluster than political reality and the 
prisoners had no choice but to negotiate with Lord 
Gowrie, the replacement for Michael Alison, as prisons 
Minister at the NIO.
Perhaps inevitably, James Prior's wish to heal the 
wounds opened during the hunger strike was not shared by 
the loyalist political parties. The Rev Dr Ian Paisley,
76 TIMES, 7 October 1981.77 IRISH TIMES, 14 October 1981.
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leader of the DUP, was forthright in his condemnation of 
the reforms. He claimed that this was evidence of the 
long feared sell out of the Protestant community by the 
British. He also said, "It is absolutely disastrous, You 
will see the IRA soon in military uniforms in the 
prisons. The extra remission is a terrible business"^ 
While James Molyneaux, leader of the larger Official 
Unionist Party, said that the reforms would mean that 
"the IRA would be able to claim victory".
With hindsight, this reaction should have been 
expected by the government, and might have been intended 
by the Tories as a signal that the unionist veto in 
Ulster was not total and that Mrs Thatcher was prepared 
to adopt policies that were dramatically different from 
theirs. This was ultimately to develop to the Anglo-Irish 
agreement which recognised that Dublin should have a 
limited role in the government of the North. Ironically, 
it was the rise of PSF on the back of the prisons dispute 
at the expense of the moderate nationalists in the SDLP 
that was to contribute to the agreement.
7c. LOCAL REACTION TO THE HUNGER STRIKE.
The reaction to the hunger strike in the North 
amongst the political groups not directly concerned with 
the prison dispute was an indication of the polarisation 
of views that occurred at this time. Which made some
observers fear that there would a resumption of the inter
sectarian strife at the level that was seen in the early 
1970’s.
78 TIMES, 7 October 1981.79 TIMES, 7 October 1981.
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Fionnula O'Connor, writing in the Irish Times, noted 
that the violence was not dramatically worse on the 
streets than was normally expected at the annual 
internment commemoration marches but that despite this 
there was an increased climate of fear in the North. She 
interpreted the reason for this as being the level of 
awareness and understanding of the issue in both 
communities and their separate opinions on the matter 
(which tended to reflect which side of the sectarian 
divide a person was on). She also noticed that there was 
a growing perception of Catholicism equalling 
republicanism amongst Protestants and that republicans 
like Bernadette Devlin began to refer in speeches to "our 
people" and the "nationalist people", forgetting the old 
republican aim of uniting Protestant, Catholic and 
Dissenter, which had originally been mooted by the 
Protestant Wolfe Tone who is revered as the founder of 
Irish r e p u b l i c a n i s m . 8 0  The role of the SDLP in the 
Fermanagh/South Tyrone by-election had also blurred the 
distinction in the minds of many unionists between it and 
PSF. By refusing to stand and thus divide the anti­
unionist vote the SDLP had alienated many Protestants who 
perceived this to be supporting the prison campaign.8i 
Further, the unionists perceived the votes in the by- 
elections and in the Irish Republic's general election, 
where H-Block candidates were voted in to seats, as pro- 
PIRA votes. An example of this was a speech by the
80 IRISH TIMES, 6 May 1981.81 Michael J. Cunningham, BRITISH GOVERNMENT POLICY IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1969 - 1989, ITS NATURE AND EXECUTION, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991, p 146.
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Official Unionist MP for Londonderry W.M. Ross after the 
two republican prisoners were elected to the Dail in June 
1981, when he said, "These two men, like Sands, were 
elected by people who believe in the gunman 's path to a 
United I r e l a n d . This led to the perception of all 
nationalists being looked on as closet if not open 
supporters of physical force republicanism, and harked 
back to the attitudes of the late 1960's and early 
1970's.
One further factor, in this polarisation, was the 
basic fear of attack that existed in both communities. 
While members of each community tended to genuinely 
support their own side (whether unionist or nationalist), 
this would not have dramatically changed the existing 
community relations which were not internationally known 
for their harmony! The paramilitaries encouraged this 
fear especially in the republican areas where the 
Provisionals chose to distribute leaflets explaining that 
Protestants would probably attack, and by organising food 
hoarding and vigilante patrols.ss This suited their aims 
as it both encouraged recruitment (the fear of attack 
gave the PIRA a legitimacy which it did not otherwise 
have) and allowed for increased pressure on the security 
forces, which indirectly would pressurise the government 
to concede on the prisons issue.
An aspect which the polarisation also had which 
suited extremists in both communities was the squeezing
82 SPEECH BY W. M. ROSS M.P AT THE UNFURLING OF A NEW 
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and marginalisation of the rather small middle ground 
politicians like the Alliance Party and the independent 
socialist Gerry Fitt. Evidence of this was seen in the 
May local government elections and the two Westminster 
by-elections in Fermanagh and South T y r o n e . T h e  
difficulty when assessing the situation is analysing 
whether the polarisation was a result of the tension or 
vice versa. In the writer’s view the polarisation was 
caused directly by the radically different perceptions of 
the conflict and this difference led directly to the 
retreat to sectarianism in the Province. The Guardian 
reported that tension in Protestant areas, such as the 
enclave of the Fountain on the largely Catholic city side 
of Londonderry, was described as very high, though this 
was caused more by fear rather than hostility. The view 
of one Protestant resident seemed to be generally 
representative when he said I think it is a. pity that he 
[Bobby Sands] is throwing away his life for nothing",
This supposition would be reflected in the UDA Supreme 
Commander Andy Tyrie’s call on the government to settle 
the dispute in May 1981,®® This statement must be 
interpreted in the context of the role that the 
Protestant paramilitaries were playing during the prison 
crisis.
When special category status was in operation the 
loyalist terrorists made use of the privileges that it
84 Arthur Aughey & Colin Mcllhey, THE ULSTER DEFENCE 
ASSOCIATION, PARAMILITARIES AND POLITICS, CONFLICT 
QUARTERLY, Frederiction, New Brunswick (Canada): Centre 
For Conflict Studies University Of New Brunswick, Fall 1981, 32.
85 GUARDIAN, 2 May 1981.
86 GUARDIAN, 15 May 1981.
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87 Patrick Bishop & Eamonn Mallie, THE PROVISIONAL IRA. London: Corgi, 1989, 343-344.88 Tim Pat Coogan, ON THE BLANKET, THE H-BLOCK STORY. Swords, Co.Dublin: Ward River Press, 1980, 182-183.89 There must also have been some tension within the UDA leadership as well at this time, the use of political targeting was rare for loyalists who preferred to kill Catholic civilians in an attempt to terrorise the whole community. Evidence would suggest that this change was under the influence of John McMichael, a Brigadier in the UDA/UFF (Ulster Freedom Fighters).Martin Dillon, THE DIRTY WAR, London: Arrow, 1990, 292.
gave to them. Once this was abolished some of the first 
protests came from Protestants, and the loyalists had 
gone on the "blanket" protest themselves for brief 
periods as well as going briefly on hunger strike during 
1980 in protest at prison conditions and the religious 
integration of prisoners.s? It is likely that the 
loyalist paramilitaries would have wanted to support the 
protest, but the hostility of the Protestant politicians 
and public to special status restricted their ;
activities.88 Despite this the loyalists had also *
assassinated leading H-Block activists as part of a 
concerted attack against the external prison campaign. i
However, this was probably because the activists in the j
National H-Block/Armagh Committee were the major profile 
advocates of physical force nationalism and therefore the 
easiest targets. So the loyalist paramilitaries had 
something to gain from a republican victory yet could not 
afford to be seen as too sympathetic and out of step with 
the loyalist community.89 The situation did lead to the 
calling of an emergency meeting of Protestant 
paramilitaries by the Ulster Army Council because of the 
fear of a PIRA/INLA offensive if Sands died. The meeting
was attended by representatives of the UVF (Ulster i
]
______
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Volunteer Force), the Red Hand Commandos and the Orange 
Volunteers. A spokesman for the Army Council, Samuel 
Doddy, was at pains to explain that this move was 
defensive. "There is absolutely no Intention of attacking 
any Catholic ghetto areas. Our concern is to ensure that 
our own areas and our people are safe.
The constitutional unionists largely underestimated 
the importance of the hunger strike. This was because of 
their obsession with each other and their perpetual fear 
that the British might abandon them. The loyalist 
political parties in the early 1970's were subjected to 
many schisms over the general problem of political 
reform. The various groups had eventually merged into two 
principal parties; the relatively moderate Ulster 
Unionist Party (the Official Unionists) and the more 
extreme Democratic Unionist Party. They were by the early 
1980’s locked in a competition as to which party was to 
be the premier unionist party.
An example of the ferocity with which this 
competition was being fought can be seen in the press 
releases of the time by the Official Unionists which 
regularly attacked Ian Paisley the DUP leader but hardly 
mentioned the prison dispute. In one speech the elder 
statesman of the Official Unionists, Enoch Powell, 
attacked Paisley for his antics while on the "Lundy 
t r a i l " This was a reference to his attempted
90 TIMES, 27 April 1981.91 The use of the word Lundy was an especially abusive reference to any unionist as Lundy was the Protestant traitor who wanted to surrender the garrison in Derry to the Catholic King James II in 1689.J.Enoch Powell, SPEECH BY J. ENOCH POWELL^ News Release, Ulster Unionist Party, Glengall St, Belfast, 15 May 1981.
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resurrection of the famous Carson trail against the 
Dublin summit. He went on to say,
I must grudgingly admit that it would be beyond 
the capacity of the IRA to be any where near so 
effective in calling the Union into question, 
antagonising Britain and playing Haughey’s game.^^
Aside from this power struggle their other principal
fear was the series of talks between Margaret Thatcher
and the Irish Taoiseach, Charles Haughey. There were the
inevitable fears that as long as the British were
prepared to talk to the Republic about the North, despite
the claim for the North's territory in the Republic's
constitution, that the British would one day abandon
them. Finally, they felt that there was too much media
attention on the fast and they did not want to add to it.
As early as 3 March 1981, James Kilfedder, the MP for
North Down asked Atkins.
Can the right hon gentleman or the government 
do something about certain sections of the news 
media that are bombarding the public with propaganda 
issued by the IRA, which, no doubt, will increase as 
the hunger strike goes on until, perhaps the man's [Sands] death, which may lead to further violence?^ ^
The unionist politicians when they did address the
prison problem were fairly forthright in their attitude;
they felt that the British policy was correct and that
the republican (and loyalist) prisoners were terrorists
and so should be treated as criminal prisoners and not be
given anything that might give them even a shred of
legitimacy. When they were asked to respond to the deaths
of the hunger strikers they gave a similar reaction
whatever party they belonged too. The Official Unionist
92 Ibid.93 HANSARD, 3 March 1981, colls 131-134.
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MF, Harold McCusker, when reacting to Sands' death warned 
that those who had borne the brunt of PIRA violence 
should be alert and vigilant in case of any reprisals as 
"they will be given no choice by those whose calling card 
is a bullet in the back".^^
Similarly Ian Paisley the leader of the DUP said 
Sands had a choice not afforded to PIRA v i c t i m s . I t  was 
the same when the hunger strike finally ended and both 
parties roundly condemned the British prison reforms, 
which were seen to have gone too far, and turned a defeat 
into a victory for the republican movement.ss
The perception of the liberal, largely middle class 
anti-sectarian Alliance Party was also hostile to the 
granting of concessions to the prisoners. In the local 
elections of May 1981, their manifesto roundly condemned 
what it saw as the hypocrisy and complicity of the H- 
Block campaigners in the death of Bobby Sands.
He was callously encouraged to go to his death 
because the Provisionals and their fellow travellers 
believed that the death of an MP on hunger strike 
would be an immense international propaganda weapon 
which they could exploit to the full. They had 
already decided that Bobby Sands was of more value 
dead, rather than alive,
Of all the constitutional parties the SDLP found 
itself in the most difficult position. Unlike the other 
parties it had to fight with PSF for the same vote and so 
was the most susceptible to the pressure which the 
National H-Block/Armagh Committee could exert. It has as 
its aim the peaceful reuniting of Ireland and is
94 GUARDIAN, 6 May 1981.95 GUARDIAN, 6 May 1981.96 TIMES, 7 October 1981.97 COUNCIL ELECTION MANIFESTO, "ALLIANCE, THE NEWSPAPER 
OF THE ALLIANCE PARTY OF NORTHERN IRELAND" , May 1981.
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fundamentally opposed to the use of violence for this 
purpose. In this sense it has to prove to the nationalist 
community that there is another way to address the 
grievances and interests of the Catholics in the North 
other than by the gun. In October 1980 during the first 
hunger strike the leader of the SDLP, John Hume, released 
a statement on the parties attitude to prison policy.
The SDLP has taken the consistent view that the 
only punishment to which a prisoner should be 
subjected is the deprivation of liberty. All other 
punishments are in danger of infringing basic 
humanitarian conditions in prison.
The Party made a desperate effort to be all things to all
men, in that it condemned violence and thus could not
object to the imprisonment of PIRA members who had been
convicted of criminal acts, but had also to address the
fact that its constituency wanted to see the H-Block
issue resolved. As early as February 1979 the SDLP
released a statement which argued.
We are convinced that it is within the 
government's power to take measures which would 
resolve the problem without any sacrifice of 
principles. 9*
Later on, once the dispute was fast heading to a 
dramatic conclusion, this factor continued to be shown. 
One example of this was an emergency motion put to the 
party conference which both attacked the government for 
its inflexibility and made a call on the prisoners to end 
the hunger strike, while at the same time also making a 
general call for the sectarian divisions not to be 
further encouraged by politicians and other commentators.
98 John Hume, STATEMENT BY MR JOHN HUME, Press Release, SDLP, 38 University St, Belfast, 30 October 1980.99 SDLP, BRITISH TACTICS CONTRIBUTING TO VIOLENCE, Press Release, SDLP, 38 University St, Belfast, February 1979.
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Conference deplores the ineptitude of the 
British governments handling of the H-Block issue, 
urges that the prisoners be allowed to wear their 
own clothing in line with progressive practice in 
other countries.., calls for immediate action to 
implement a new regime based on respect for 
individual dignity, appeals to the hunger strikers 
to allow the matter to be settled through further 
discussions, reminds all who publicly comment on the 
issue of its potential for deepening community 
divisions and calls on them to direct their efforts 
towards a peaceful resolution of the issue.
Executive Committee
The Party also faced an important ethical and 
practical problem after the death of Frank Maguire the MP 
for Fermanagh and South Tyrone. This was a constituency 
with a narrow Catholic majority that had been held by 
Maguire as an Independent Nationalist. While Maguire had 
been alive the various nationalist parties had been 
content not to stand thus allowing the vote not to be 
split. But in the by-election the National H-Block/Armagh 
Committee decided to put Bobby Sands up for election.
This placed the SDLP in a rather difficult position. 
It could not afford to be blamed for the death of any 
prisoners. It knew that the H-Block campaigners would 
almost certainly claim during campaigning that a vote for 
Sands would save his life as the government would not 
permit the death of an MP. If an SDLP candidate split the 
vote and allowed the Unionist candidate Harry West to 
win, or the SDLP won the seat it would be open to the 
accusation that by entering the contest they caused the 
death of Sands. If they entered the contest and lost to 
Sands an even worse possibility was opened up. That was 
that PSF could claim to be the premier nationalist party
100 SDLP, EMERGENCY MOTION- NUMBER 1, Press Release,SDLP, 38 University St, Belfast, undated (probably 1981).
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and so claim that the SDLP had become an irrelevance to 
most working class Catholics. So it found itself with the 
prospect of losing whether it won or lost the election.
Initially, the SDLP meeting in Irvinstown on 21 
March, was favourable to the prospect of contesting the 
by-election. However, members of the Fermanagh party 
persuaded the executive to back Frank Maguire's brother 
Noel as the nationalist candidate rather than split the 
vote, but Austin Currie, a local leader and former civil 
rights activist who was passionately opposed to political 
violence and terrorism, was determined that he would 
stand against Sands as an independent if Maguire 
withdrew. Two days before the closing date for the 
deadline for candidates in the by-election to be 
proposed, Maguire informed the SDLP that he would stand. 
Then thirteen minutes before the closure of the 
nominations Maguire withdrew his papers leaving Sands as 
the sole anti-unionist candidate. The SDLP was furious 
but powerless to do anything other than call on its 
supporters to abstain from the vote. It seems that 
Maguire was pressurised into withdrawing his papers by 
PSF. There were subsequent allegations that he had been 
physically threatened but he did subsequently call on his 
supporters to vote for Sands.loi After Sands died and a 
new by-election was called the SDLP chose not to propose 
any candidates for the seat though Currie opposed this 
and chose to stand as an Independent Nationalist.102 The 
SDLP would have been unwilling to risk a probable defeat
101 Clarke, (1987), 141-142, & Chris Ryder, THE RUC, A FORCE UNDER FIRE. London: Mandarin, 1989, 248-50.102 Clarke, (1987), 191.
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by Owen Carron after the bitterness which many of the 
voters had felt after Sands death and did not wish to be 
portrayed as too pro-British at this stage. Given that 
Austin Currie and the Alliance candidate were roundly 
beaten, and that Carron increased Sands share of the 
vote, the SDLP probably made the right decision. 
Subsequently, in the General Elections that have followed 
the Party has chosen to stand and split the vote allowing 
the moderate Official Unionist Ken Maginnis to become the 
MP for this area.
The general perception of the SDLP towards the 
prison dispute was that the government could and should 
have resolved it before it snowballed into the hunger 
strikes of 1980 and 1981. It viewed the pro-prisoner 
campaign with a good deal of suspicion as it marked the 
rise of PSF as an electoral force and so a direct rival 
for the nationalist vote. When the dispute finally 
finished in October 1981, the SDLP were extremely 
relieved. As the representative of the nationalist 
establishment in the North the party had been involved in 
several mediation attempts, especially that of the Irish 
Commission for Justice and Peace. The Commission's 
recommended solution had been approximately the SDLP's 
and so when the British announced that their would be a 
series of reforms now the hunger strike was over which 
were essentially the compromise proposed by the 
Commission welcoming this John Hume released a statement 
describing the reforms as a "positive r e s p o n s e " ^
103 TIMES, 7 October 1981
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Thus, the various parties in the Province tended to 
react to the hunger strike and the prison dispute in a 
fairly predictable manner. This reflected the views of 
their supporters who tend to vote on "tribal" as opposed 
to moral or ideological grounds (with the exception of 
the Alliance Party). The result of this was the growth of 
tension between the two communities. As sectarian tension 
tended to be generated by republicans in this specific 
situation, once the majority of Catholics felt that the 
prisoners had been treated fairly by the government's 
reforms of 6 October, tension dramatically reduced in the 
Province. At the same stage PSF found that its campaign 
had run out of steam and they have been subsequently 
unable to gain the high levels of support that they 
commanded in 1981, whether on prison conditions or the 
wider question of the whole conflict. Many of the other 
criminal justice policies which had led to conflict and 
controversy during the 1970's had been resolved. For 
example, the psychological interrogation techniques that 
had brought allegations of torture had been abandoned, 
and internment without trial was discontinued. The 
liberal regime which the government introduced in the 
Maze and other prisons in the North during the 1980's has 
also meant that the Provisionals have been unable to find 
a new single issue that could exert so much feeling in 
the nationalist community. There remain complaints, 
especially about the integration of Protestant and 
Catholic paramilitaries in the Crumlin Road Gaol, and the 
holding of PIRA members in mainland prisons for their 
roles in bombing campaigns in Britain, but when there
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have been hunger strikes subsequently, they have failed 
to catch the attention of anyone but diehard 
republicans.io *
The reactions of the civil population in the North 
generally reflected the views of their political 
leaderships. The Catholic community tended to look on the 
claim of the prisoners for political status as a 
recognition of the obvious. On the other hand the 
Protestants viewed the prisoners as criminals living in 
self-inflicted conditions. Both sides felt threatened by 
the rise in tension that the fast brought and which led 
to the retreat back to the siege mentality of the early 
1970's.
At the time there were a great many fears that the 
hunger strike might have led to a long term change in the 
situation in the Province. The issue of the British 
presence in the North was again questioned 
internationally. Meanwhile in Ulster PSF was now in a 
position to challenge the SDLP as the representative of 
Northern nationalists. These issues are examined in the 
next chapter, which will look at the longer term 
implications of the 1981 prison hunger strike.
104 Martina Anderson, IN DURHAMS H- WING, & Danny Morrison, CRUMLIN ROAD GAOL- THE SEGREGATION BATTLE 
CONTINUES, THE CAPTIVE VOICE/AN GLOR GAPA, Belfast; PSF- POW Dept, Summer 1990, 5 & 16-17.
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OMAF*TEFi VXXX 
THE AETEHMATH OE THE X98X 
HXJIsTGEH STHXEE
--------   j
8a. INTRODUCTION. 3j
Among the many factors which were to still to be |
assessed at the end of the hunger strike, the question of j
to what extent the political scenery of Northern Ireland 
had been changed was imperative? Did the international 
attention attracted mean that pressure might grow against !
the maintenance of the Union? What had been the effect of |
the fast upon the Provinces electorate? Was there to be a I
further polarisation of the vote in both communities as IJ
there had during the fast or would the status quo return? îI
Specifically, what was the effect of the fast upon the j
nationalist community and would one see the rise of PSF JI
as the party of the nationalists in the North? !
Section 8b, will deal with the Irish Republic’s ;
reaction and the international repercussions to the I
strike, while section 8c will examine the long term :
effect of the strike on the Northern Irish situation ten ’
years on from its end and concentrating on the effect of î
the fast upon PSF and the British Government,
8b. THE INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS OF THE HUNGER STRIKE.
I
Northern Ireland first gained the attention of the ;
world in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s when civil =
rights marchers was brutally attacked by the police, B- |
iSpecials, and Protestant extremists. This was followed by
the violence in which the Provisionals were born, and ‘Î
troops were sent in to the Province initially to protect i
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Catholic areas, but subsequently to fight the various 
factions of the IRA and loyalist paramilitaries. However, 
as is generally the case, over time the violence became a 
regular feature and the world's media transferred their 
attention to other wars, such as the one being lost by 
the US in South East Asia. Northern Ireland became 
relegated to the inside pages of newspapers and was of 
only marginal interest to editors. But the hunger strikes 
and the violence associated with them made Ireland 
newsworthy again. Interestingly the attention given to 
the prisoners was far greater than that of the eighteen 
prison officers murdered by republicans during the prison 
dispute.
This attention came from all over the world. Within 
many of the UK's allies, such as the US and Australia, 
groups of republican sympathisers had found an issue 
which they could use to paint Britain in the worst 
possible light, and by extension question the 
continuation of Northern Ireland as part of the United 
Kingdom.
This point was well illustrated in a letter that was 
smuggled out of the prison from Tom McKerney, an inmate 
of H-5 who wrote to Amnesty International requesting 
their involvement. In the letter he summarised the 
reasons for the "blanket" protest and used the argument 
that because the motives of the prisoners were political 
they should be classed as political prisoners.
There is virtually no argument whatsoever 
against the fact that three facets of British 
malpractice are responsible for the blanket protest: 
1. The British occupation of Ireland, 2. State
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authorised torture and) 3. repressive and draconian
laws,1
This attempt failed as Amnesty International is 
concerned with non-violent prisoners of conscience and 
the republican prisoners had undeniably been involved in 
violence, whatever their motives. The letter did show 
that the intention of the protest was to concentrate on 
the issue as one of human rights rather than of who 
controlled the prison, which was the Government’s 
interpretation of the dispute. The hope was that by 
portraying the British presence in Ireland as a draconian 
neo-dictatorship the Provisionals could be portrayed as 
freedom fighters with right on their side. So the 
international campaign had as a definite agenda the aim 
of discrediting the British argument that the majority 
should be allowed to decide what country they wished to 
be part of, as the Protestants were in the majority they 
had the right to stay in the Union. Interestingly the 
pro-republican, 68 Committee, an annual civil rights 
commemoration organisation in Londonderry also put this 
point across with the slogan ''There Can Be No Civil 
Rights Without National R i g h t s " The national rights 
that are referred to hear are those of the Irish 
nationalists rather than those of the community who class 
themselves as British.
The protest was also sufficient to promote the aims 
of the Provisionals in various EEC countries which had 
not had a great interest in Ireland before. This created
1 Letter from Tom McKerney (H-5) to Amnesty 
International, London. Undated pre October 1980 original 
in the political collection Linen Hall Library Belfast.
2 Fergus O ’Hare, COMMON MEMORIES, CONTRASTING OPINIONS, 
FORTNIGHT, October 1988.
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problems for Britain in its international policy, but the 
most important reaction by an outside power was that of 
the Irish Republic, which will be dealt with first.
The constitution of the Irish Republic makes a claim 
for the territory of the Six Counties of the North. This 
together with the history of the origins of modern 
Ireland, gives the Republic an importance and interest in 
Northern affairs which was officially acknowledged in the 
Anglo-Irish agreement of 1985. The troubles are also of 
great importance to the stability of the Republic, and 
its importance in Ulsters affairs means that it has a 
role in the domestic politics of the North that is far 
greater than one would normally expect from a 
neighbouring country.
In 1977, the Irish Government gave what was 
effectively political status to the republican prisoners 
in Portlaiose Prison after a hunger strike had been 
started. This was regarded by the Irish Government as an 
acceptable prison regime and meant that it felt that the 
British were showing too much inflexibility to the Maze 
prisoners in not permitting similar changes.  ^ The Irish 
Government was also afraid of the effect that the dispute 
in the North might have in the Republic and within Fianna 
Fail (FF) as a party. In November 1980 internal party 
pressure was already being exerted when some of Haughey’s 
more republican minded backbenchers were receiving 
appeals directly from the H-Blocks. For instance the TD, 
Sile de Valera, received a letter from a ”blanketman" in
3 Tim Pat Coogan, THE IRA, Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 
1988, 618-619.
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H-3, Colm Scullion, who explained to her the reasons for 
embarking upon the hunger strike were that.
The English showed all signs of remaining 
static, refusing to move in the slightest to end 
this protest and only willingness to continue this 
inhumanity indefinitely affected our decision.^
It was probably hoped that this pressure directly upon
his own backbenchers might persuade Haughey to lend his
weight to the prisoners' demands. The FF government under
Haughey was frightened that its position in power was
threatened by the possible defection of voters from FF to
PSF. Haughey, had originally hoped to delay the Irish
general election until after the hunger strike had been
resolved. But he eventually decided that the issue would
continue and that he should go to the country before
opinion was further inflamed over the issue. This made FF
choose, after the decision to go to the country in June
1981, to highlight the prisons in order to persuade its
more republican supporters to stay loyal rather than vote
for one of the prison candidates. The FF manifesto led
with its Northern policy, saying about the prisons
dispute that "The government has urged the adoption of a
humanitarian approach to the problem of the prisons in
the North,
However this was not enough to persuade the voters 
of Monaghan/Cavan and Louth, and as a result Haughey 
found that these two seats were to cost him power and 
give victory to a Fine Gael(FG)/Labour Coalition. Because
4 Unpublished letter to Sile de Valera from Colm Scullion (H-3), dated 24 Nov 1980, original in the Political Collection, Linen Hall Library, Belfast.5 Fianna Fail SUMMARY OF OUR PROGRAM FOR THE 80'S,Dublin: 1981, 1.
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of this, after the election but before the new government 
had taken over, Haughey chose to launch a new initiative 
over the H-Blocks.® In the Republic there was a definite 
cross-party agreement that the prisons dispute should be 
resolved. The leader of FG, Dr Garret FitzGerald was more 
understanding of the position that the British had taken 
but felt that the dispute could be and should be solved. 
With his own close personal links to the North he was 
disturbed by the violence that the crisis was causing and 
was alarmed by the spill over of this into the Republic, 
especially to Dublin which had not previously had a 
strong reputation for militant republicanism. He had 
personally met with relatives of the hunger strikers and 
was inclined to look at them from a humanitarian view as 
he did the whole dispute.? He, like Haughey, backed the 
attempted mediation of first the European Commission for 
Human Rights, and subsequently the intervention by the 
Church based Irish Commission for Justice and Peace, in 
the hope that through these neutral intermediaries a 
possible compromise might be reached. It was not until 
the Irish Commission made a compromise proposal which was 
rejected by the prisoners that he realised that the 
dispute had become an all or nothing struggle between the 
"blanketmen" and the government. This meant that the 
moderate reforms which would have allowed the government 
to retain control but give the prisoners privileges like 
the wearing of their own clothing were not acceptable to 
the Provisionals.
6 DAILY TELEGRAPH, 25 June 1981.7 Raymond Smith, GARRET, THE ENIGMA, DR GARRET FITZGERALD, Dublin: Aherlow publishers, 1985, 406 - 408.
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It was from outside of the British isles, though, 
that the most worrying reactions came as far as the 
British government was concerned. Countries not noted for
pro-British feeling were inevitably critical. The !!
spectacle of criticism from the Eastern Block or the
Afrikaner community in South Africa could be easily !I
dismissed when one compared the human rights violations |
of these countries to Northern Ireland.& It was not so I
easy to dismiss the criticism that came from countries I
iwhich generally were sympathetic to Britain. This was the j■ Icase within the EEC, NATO, and the Commonwealth. The |!
Provisionals had chosen to portray their campaign in !
it
Europe using a left of centre anti-imperialist argument. |
This led to an emphasis upon British intransigence j1leading to bad conditions within the cells and the hunger 
strikers deaths.^ |
Within Europe the strongest criticism came from J
!France where a group had been formed in 1980 to support jI
the claims of the prisoners. This was the Comite de IIDefense des Prisonniers Politiques Irlanda.il, It f
organised marches of sympathisers and organised a ’
petition of 12,000 signatures in support of the demand ;
for political status.lo The campaign which was dominated 1
iby the Communist Party and their affiliated trade unions |
had organised a stepping up of activity in May as Sands i
8 Adrian Guelke, DESPERATION IN PRETORIA, FORTNIGHT, June 
1989 .
9 Kieth Bryett and Joanne Wright, PROPAGANDA AND JUSTICE 
ADMINISTRATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND, TERRORISM AND 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE, London: Frank Cass, Summmer 1991, 31- 
34 .
10 leaflet issued by the Comite de Defense des 
Prisonniers Politiques Irlandail, 14 rue de Nantevil 
75015 Paris, Undated 1981.
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approached death. The Paris office of British Airways 
was occupied on 2 May by protesters claiming that 
Thatcher was an assassin and accusing the President, 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, of being her a c c o m p l i c e . O n  6 
May protesters demonstrated against the British 
Ambassador about the death of Sands. This was all in the 
context of the French Presidential election so it was not 
as successful in gaining as many headlines as the 
protesters might have wished and failed to become an 
issue.12 Predictably even Sands' death was overshadowed 
by domestic politics, this was to mean that in the long 
term pro-republican activity did not change French 
policy.
In Scandinavia, an area with very strong links with 
the UK and a residual pro-British sentiment dating from 
the Second World War along with a general ignorance of 
Northern Ireland, the issue was useful to republican 
sympathisers. One example for instance was in the 
formation of an Irish committee in Denmark with regional 
groups who released leaflets to the help put the PIRA 
case to the Danish population. One example of this was a 
leaflet by Bjarne Mortensen, for the Irlandskomiteen i 
Odense entitled Irsk Parlamentsmedlem Kieran Doherty Er 
Dod Af Sultestrejke - Som Frihedskaemper, ("IRISH MP 
KIERAN DOHERTY IS DEAD FROM A HUNGER STRIKE - AS A 
FREEDOM FIGHTER"). It shows well how the H-Block issue 
was used to give the republican interpretation of Irish 
history.
11 LE MONDE, 3 May 1981.12 LE MONDE, 7 May 1981.
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The imprisoned prisoners of war in the H- 
blockSf Long Kesh in Northern Ireland are freedom 
fighters in a war that is centuries old. In our 
century it started with the war of independence 1919 
- 1921f in which the British troops were driven to 
the northern part of Ireland. It last flared up in 
1969f when British paratroopers re-ocupied Northern 
Ireland, the Irish population and The Irish 
Republican Army are fighting for a United Ireland. A 
fight for Independence and social justice.
(De faengslede krigsfanger i H-Blok, Long Kesh 
i Nordlrland er friheds Kaempere i en Krig. Der er 
Arhundred Gammel. I vort Arhundred startede det med 
uafhaengighedskrigen 1919-21. Hvor de Britiske 
tropper blev fordrevet til det Nordlige Irland.
Sidst Blussede det op i 1969, da Britiske 
faIdskaermstropper genbesatte Nordlrland. Den Irske 
Befolkning og den Irske Republikanske Haer kaemper 
for et Foren et Irland. En kamp for selvstaendighed 
og social retfaerdighed)
This rather naive, one-sided, and in parts factually 
incorrect version of modern Irish history was able to 
gain an audience for the hunger strikers as well as place 
the British firmly in the role of aggressor. The leaflet 
went on to explain that the troubles were nothing to do 
with terrorism and that Kieran Doherty was not a 
terrorist as he was an elected member of the Dail. It 
went on to explain that.
Only the violent protest of the Irish people 
and world opinion can make the British give in. (Kun 
det irske folk og verdensopinionens kraftige protest 
kan fa briterne til at give after.
This demand for support for the aims of the Provisionals
was based largely upon the newly-claimed legitimacy that
the H-Block Armagh Committee had gained in the by-
elections in Fermanagh and South Tyrone and in the
general election in the Republic. For the first time in
recent history, that republicans had been able to receive
13 Bjarne Mortensen, IRSK PARLAMENTSMEDLEM KIERAN DOHERTY 
ER DOD AF SULTESTREJKE - SOM FRIHEDSKAEMPERE, 
Irlandskomiteen i Odense, Smedevaenget lo 523, Odense (Denmark), 1981.14 Ibid.
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sufficient support to win seats and this opportunity was 
not going to be wasted.
In the international campaign the existence of the 
SDL? as the principal representative nationalists north 
of the Irish border was conveniently forgotten and the 
uninformed reader could be forgiven for thinking that PSF 
were the only representatives of Catholics in Northern 
Ireland. Similarly the existence of the Protestant 
majority in the North was also not mentioned. These were 
ignored probably because the foreign writers were 
sometimes genuinely ignorant about the issues in Ulster 
and simply believed what the republicans said to them. 
This was certainly the case with at least one foreign 
journalist in Ireland who covered the death of Sands and 
the rioting which followed. The New York Daily News, a 
paper with a large Irish American readership, sent a 
reporter, Michael Daly, to cover events in Ulster. He 
chose to stay in the hard-line republican area of 
Andersonstown in Belfast rather than with the rest of the 
press who used the large hotels in the centre of town. In 
his reports he made many mistakes that were easy to 
detect, as he simply reported what the Provisionals told 
him. These inaccuracies were soon detected by British 
journalists in the US who published stories back in the 
UK about this, and forced his rather humiliating recall 
by the paper.is This showed that the Provisionals were 
quite happy to twist the truth if it suited them. If they 
were prepared to allow a sympathetic journalist to 
discredit himself, it is little wonder that they felt
15 SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, 10 MAY 1981.
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happy to feed misinformation to supporters world wide, 
who generally do not have the wish to study Ireland in 
any great depth.
Similarly, in Australia there was a growth of 
activity organised by a mix of human rights activists and 
republican sympathisers. In Sydney the most effective 
publicity was organised by a local man of Irish 
extraction, Eamon O'Connor, who decided to mount a hunger 
strike of his own in August 1981 to gain local attention 
to the dispute. He explained his view on the origins of 
the dispute in a leaflet.
The British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, 
then decided that all Irish people 'lifted', 
tortured and 'tried' by her conveyor belt system, 
after May 1976, would be subject to criminalisation. 
The republican prisoners true to republican 
tradition, ref used.
Again, in this literature we see historical 
inaccuracy in that the leaflet seems to claim that it was 
Margaret Thatcher who introduced the abandonment of 
special status when in reality, she was still three years 
from winning power in 197 6. This was probably ignorance, 
but by August 1981 Thatcher was such a hate figure in 
republican demonology that it is entirely possible that 
they just chose her as the embodiment of all recent 
British policy in Ireland. In the leaflet there was also 
a call for letters of protest at the lack of political 
status to be sent to, Malcolm Fraser (Australia's Federal 
PM), Thatcher, and local politicians, as well as a 
request to phone television and radio stations in support 
of the prisoners. The hunger strike by O'Connor did
16 SYDNEY HUNGER STRIKER EAMON O'CONNOR, Sydney (Australia): Sydney H-Block Committee Box k703, 1981.
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succeed in gaining the attention of some opposition 
Labour M P 's who under the banner of the Geneva Rights For 
H-Block Committee of Australia, requested that he end his 
fast and put forward a motion to the Australian 
parliament that called "upon the government of Great 
Britain to grant the five demands of the Irish republican 
prisoners.  ^ In Australia though, the right were still 
in power and so relations with the UK were held to be of 
greater importance than the concerns of opposition M P 's . 
Further, it is unlikely that many Australians outside of 
Sydney would have been greatly concerned with events in 
Ireland.
The country that probably worried the British 
government most though was the United States. The Irish 
in America have a long history of support for militant 
republicanism. In the nineteenth century there was even 
an attempt by expatriate Fenians under the name of the 
IRA to invade Canada from US territory. More recently the 
Provisionals had started to raise finance from the Irish- 
American population. The front organisation that was used 
the most was Noraid (Irish Northern Aid). This 
organisation was used largely in a fund raising capacity, 
normally for the relatives of republican prisoners but 
allegedly also for arms. It had a secondary role, which 
was that of a propaganda organisation taking speakers to 
America for speech tours.is They organised pickets of 
notable British targets like the luxury liner Queen 
Elizabeth II, and visits by members of the British
17 GENEVA RIGHTS FOR H-BLOCK COMMITTEE OF AUSTRALIA, 198118 Patrick Bishop & Eamonn Mallie, THE PROVISIONAL IRA. London: Corgi, 1989, 297.
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government and the royal f a m i l y . I t  has also been 
claimed by Tim Pat Coogan that the hunger strike served 
to re-ignite interest and awareness of the North amongst 
a large section of the Irish American community and led 
to hostility in the Congress to British government policy 
up to and including the reforms of the extradition act 
with the UK in 1986.2 0 As with many attempts to use 
hindsight as an explanation for later actions, this is 
open to some debate. It is true though, that the 1980's 
were marked by the involvement of many American 
legislators in introducing the MacBride principles into 
State legislatures. These introduced quotas for fair 
employment if American firms wished to invest in the 
Province. The British argued that this was dissinvestment 
by the back door and accused campaigners of being pro- 
Provisonal.
However, in the US other groups and individuals were 
supporting the prisoners protest. In one example a former 
US Attorney General, Ramsey Clark, and, Fr Daniel 
Berrigan, went to Northern Ireland during the hunger 
strike and sought to enter the Maze but were barred by 
the a u t h o r i t i e s .21 This decision, given the nature of the 
visitors, was almost certainly taken at ministerial 
level. It is probable that the decision to do this was to 
signal that an initiative that would almost certainly 
have favoured the prisoners was not welcome. The
19 ABC NIGHTLINE, New York(US), 4-9 May 1981, & CBS EVENING NEWS, New York, 5 & 9 May 1981.20 Coogan, (1988), 630.21 Liam Clarke, BROADENING THE BATTLEFIELD, THE H-BLOCKS AND THE RISE OF SINN FEIN, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1987, 148.
I
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authorities would also have been aware that the prospect 
of a senior legal figure from the US condemning the 
conditions in the prison was a worse prospect than simply 
an angry former US Attorney General not getting his own 
way.
Of greater import than the Irish American fringe 
which though vocal was not very influential, were the 
more mainstream groups led by the Democratic Party 
establishment. On 6 May the four leading Irish American 
politicians, collectively known as the four horsemen 
(Senators Edward Kennedy and Daniel Moynihan, Speaker Tip 
O'Neill and Governor Hugh Carey of New York) wrote a 
letter to Margaret Thatcher, condemning violence in 
Ulster but also questioning a British "posture of 
inflexibility", This prompted a reply from Thatcher on 14 
May. In this letter she refuted the allegations stating 
that the British government had acted with "great 
flexibility", She then outlined British attempts to 
negotiate on prison conditions but stated that the 
impasse in resolving the dispute was over political 
status not conditions, which the prisoners demanded and 
the British could never c o n c e d e . 22 This form of. 
legitimisation and recognition could not be given.
The four horsemen had practically dictated the 
Carter Administrations Northern Irish Policy, and tended 
to take their cue from John Hume and the SDLP.23 But by
22 Margaret Thatcher, TEXT OF THE RELY BY THE PRIME 
MINISTER, MRS THATCHER, TO A MESSAGE OF MAY 6 FROM US 
SENATORS KENNEDY AND MOYNIHAN, SPEAKER T.P. O ’NEILL AND 
GOVERNOR CAREY OF NEW YORK, Belfast: Northern Ireland Information Service, 14 May 1981.23 Bishop & Mallie, (1989), 299-300.
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1981 the US Republican Party had regained the Presidency 
with Ronald Reagan, a man who was both ideologically and 
personally close to Margaret Thatcher. This meant that he 
was unwilling to strain the relationship he had with her 
and chose not to follow their advice, while not making 
them unduly hostile by repealing the previous 
administration’s ban on arms sales to the RUG, thus 
preserving the status quo. Another prominent Irish- 
American William V, Shannon, the US Ambassador to Dublin 
from 1977 to 1981 described the hunger strike in 1986 as 
"the greatest political and propaganda coup for the IRA 
in the last decade.
Between the end of July and early August the new 
regime in Dublin led by Garret FitzGerald was frustrated 
by the stalemate in the North and decided to try to 
pressurise the British through the A m e r i c a n s . T h e  Irish 
Ambassador to Washington, Sean Donlon, approached the 
President in order to gain some US involvement, but 
Reagan refused to get involved in the ” tragic 
s i t u a t i o n " This approach had been prompted by 
desperation in Dublin, but the President was realistic 
enough to know that Thatcher would regard this as 
unwanted interference in the internal affairs of the UK. 
To get embroiled in a situation which one could not solve 
and which would put unnecessary strain on a relationship 
with a close political and ideological ally would have
& Kevin J. Kelley, THE LONGEST WAR, NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE IRA, London: Zed Books, 1988, 277-280.24 William V. Shannon, THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Council on Foreign Relations Inc, New York, vol 64 no 4, Spring 1986, 856.25 Kelley, (1988), 343.26 Ibid, 343.
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been foolish in the extreme. The large part of the Irish 
American population (like Reagan himself) would also not 
have been greatly concerned with the hunger strike or the 
North, generally preferring to concentrate on financial 
schemes and aid packages to help the Irish Republic 
through the recession and the appalling economic 
situation it had found itself in. The WASP (White Anglo- 
Saxon Protestant) faction of the American establishment 
which tends to act as the pro-British ethnic group in US 
politics, would also have been hostile to undue strain in 
Anglo-American relations.
In conclusion, the 1981 hunger strike was effective 
in one undisputed area and that was in the attention that 
it received in the US media. When Sands was nominated for 
the Fermanagh and South Tyrone by-election the story was 
carried in one paragraph of the New York News. By the 
time he died the story was leading the front page and the 
US news networks each had sent several news crews to 
Ulster. The coverage was sympathetic to the view that the 
British should withdraw from the Six Counties and that 
the issues were essentially those of human rights 
violations by the UK. This had inevitably rekindled some 
greater support among the proportion of Americans who 
supported republicanism or were actively interested in 
Irish affairs.27
This effect to a lesser extent was true world wide, 
with the growth of activity in support of Irish 
republicanism expanding out of the minority communities
27 Tim Pat Coogan, DISILLUSIONED DECADES, IRELAND 1966 87. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1987, 171.
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of Irish descent to include the non-Irish. It was to take
several years for the effect of the hunger strike to
erode. But, in the longer term the more brutal face of 
the PIRA began to dominate the world's screens again, 
with the indiscriminate bombings at Harrods in 1983 and 
Enniskillen in 1987 eroding much non-republican support.
This face was to reduce much of the international |
sympathy that the hunger strike had gained, just as the 1IDon Tidey kidnapping in the Republic (where a Garda ?
officer and an Irish Army soldier were killed), did I
It
similar damage to the hopes of PSF gaining mass support.
This came ironically at the time when the party had IIdecided to abandon abstentionism in the Republic and take |
any seats that were won. However, the PSF have as yet I
been unable to subsequently win any seats south of the I
boarder. j
8c. THE LONG TERM EFFECT OF THE PRISON DISPUTE. IiWhen one takes a longer term view of the prison |
!dispute it is surprising how little effect it had despite j
the gloom laden prophesies that commentators were in the '
habit of making at the time. The most important result of 
the strike was within the republican movement itself. As
1has been said earlier, the dispute was an important 
coming of age for the Provisionals as it marked their i
first successful attempt at constitutional politics in j
the North since PSF had been legalised in the 1970's. PSF j
also gained credibility as an electoral force within the :
nationalist community, which was to lead to a dramatic ■
change in Northern Irish politics. !
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The other principal by-product was the attitude of 
the British government to the Provisionals and the threat 
which they presented. The dispute proved that there was 
an intelligent and politically sophisticated northern 
leadership in place which had replaced the older 
conservative Southern based Army Council. The new 
leadership was still committed to the "armed struggle" 
but recognised the role of political action within the 
movement. This was coupled with the evaluation by the 
government that there could not be a military victory to 
the conflict, but only a political solution.
In 1982 the Provisionals had been able to reflect 
upon and assess the 1981 fast and its effect. They had 
received press exposure both nationally and 
internationally at a level that they hadn’t previously 
experienced and had arguably won a moral victory in their 
own eyes. But in the prisons, though the British 
authorities had given some improvements in conditions, 
they did not have anything resembling "political status". 
There was no return to the days of the cages. The 
authorities remained firmly in control of the blocks. 
While the prisoners no longer had to wear uniform and 50% 
of their lost remission was restored, warders still 
patrolled the blocks. There were liberal rules on 
association between prisoners inside each half block and 
they were held separate from the Protestant paramilitary 
prisoners in the Maze. This was not universal across the 
Northern Ireland Prison System, an issue that was to
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cause friction threw out the 1980's and early 1990's. 
There was not a return to the total freedom within each 
compound that existed in the pre-1976 regime. Also there 
were not the unsupervised meetings of Block OC's or the 
military style uniforms and training of the 1970's. The 
most important factor, though, was that much of the 
Prison regime was not government policy but a liberal 
interpretation of the rules by prison governors. This was 
not even a de facto recognition of political status as 
has been a r g u e d . 2 9
This has been reinterpreted over the years by the 
Provisionals who now portray the end of the dispute as a 
victory. This ignores that the solution was a fait 
accompli, presented by James Prior, which took much of 
the remaining wind out of the prisoners' sails 
immediately after they had been forced to abandon the 
fast. In 1982, on the first commemoration of the hunger 
strike, the Maze prisoners chose to highlight the fasts 
in England and the issue of the return of PIRA prisoners 
to the North from the British mainland and remembered the 
fasts of 1974 and 1976.3° There was no reference to the 
complaints that the prisoners still had about the Maze or 
the no work protest which was to continue until 2 
November 1982. The optimistic interpretation of events 
was also evident in the last sentence of the
28 Danny Morrison, CRUMLIN ROAD GAOL- THE SEGREGATION 
BATTLE CONTINUES, THE CAPTIVE VOICE/AN GLOR GAFA. Belfast: PSF- POW Dept, Summer 1990, 16-17.29 Coogan, (1988), 631-632.30 Unpublished, unsigned prison communication smuggled out of HMP Maze to address the 1982 commemoration of the 1981 hunger strike. May 1982, original in the Political Collection, Linen Hall Library, Belfast.
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communication, ”1981 was a sad though historic year in 
the war for freedom. In a letter, for a commemoration 
later in the decade, the Maze prison 00 argued that the 
victory was not in terms of the prison regime but in the 
boost that PSF had received.
The victories of the hunger strike are not to 
be measured in terms of prison life. The real 
victories can be seen in the resurgence of the 
nationalist people, the increase in republican 
membership the pledge of Armaiite politics in the 
days ahead supported by 35% of the nationalists
In this assessment the prison 00 deliberately
concentrated on the success of the external campaign and
the effect that this had upon PSF as a political
movement.
The leaders of the northern wing of PSF had been 
thinking about going into the constitutional political 
arena for some time. Gerry Adams has stated that at the 
time prior to the hunger strike they had planned a slow 
build up of the electoral strategy. But the stunning 
success of the H-Block candidates was to have an 
accelerating effect upon the hopes of PSF.33 The 
Fermanagh and South Tyrone by-elections had made Adams a 
national figure and had ensured that PSF became a 
credible political force.
The campaign for first Sands, and then subsequently 
for Carron, had acted as an education for the party in 
electoral politics. Several years later Adams told the
31 Ibid.32 Unpublished, prison communication smuggled out of HMP Maze for commemoration of the hunger strike signed by the OC P, dated May 8 (post 1985), original in the Political Collection, Linen Hall Library, Belfast.33 Gerry Adams. THE POLITICS OF IRISH FREEDOM, Dingle,Co.Kerry: Brandon Books, 1987, 86.
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journalist Tim Pat Coogan. "It was educational for us. We 
learned about presiding officers, personation officers, 
how to campaign. It was exhilarating”.^^ Hands-on 
experience like this did a lot to help compensate for the 
experienced manpower shortage that the republicans had 
generally suffered from at the start of the prisons 
dispute. The invaluable training gained by activists in 
both the by-elections in the North and the general 
election in the Republic, equipped PSF with the people 
that were needed to make "Armalite politics" a viable 
proposition. There was a second highly useful by-product 
of the dispute which both PIRA as well as PSF gained 
from. This was the return to the movement of old 
activists who had dropped out from republicanism after 
spells in gaol. These people gave both sections of the 
movement an injection of skills and maturity which they 
needed. They had become militant again because of the 
dedication of the hunger strikers to the movement which 
at least in the eyes of Adams' had shamed them back 
again.3s
This was to launch the new phase of the Northern 
conflict with the fighting being carried out upon the 
political battle field. If one looks at the level of 
violence in the North (see appendix II) the British 
military and the RUG had succeeded in the 1970's in 
reducing the level of violence and numbers of deaths, and 
with the exception of 1981 when the hunger strike had 
inflamed passions this downward trend continued until
34 Coogan, (1987) , 233.35 Adams, (1987) , 86.
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1986. Further, the British policy of "Ulsterisation" had 
dramatically reduced the numbers of British troops on the 
streets. This was reflected in the increase of Irish 
rather than British deaths as the RUG and the UDR 
increasingly took the place of the British regiments.
This took an important weapon away from the PIRA as they 
hoped that pressure for withdrawal of the troops could 
come if too many British deaths were caused. This led to 
the Provisionals choosing to launch themselves onto the 
political arena, and the hunger strike proved to be the 
ideal issue with which to base there campaign. The 
northerners also used their new stature, gained from the 
hunger strike, to firmly establish themselves in control 
of PSF just as they had during the 1970's within PIRA.36 
This was first shown by their domination of the 1981 ard 
fheis in Dublin where Danny Morrison gave his famous 
"Ballot box paper and Armalite" speech. In 1982 the ard 
fheis voted to end the federalist Eire Nua policy, 
following the northerners wish to gives no "sops to 
loyalists" In 1983, this take over was completed when 
the President and Vice-President, Ruairi O'Bradaigh and 
Daithi O'Connell, stood down just as they had been forced 
to step down from the PIRA Army Council. Adams and his 
allies now controlled both the principle wings of the 
republican movement.3a
The first test of the expected hunger strikes' 
effect electorally was in the Northern Ireland Assembly
36 For more details of the northerners control of PIRA see Chapter II.37 Coogan, (1988), 633.38 Ibid.
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elections of October 1982. The 1981 election victories 
were partly caused by a lack of competition for the 
nationalist vote and the strength of feeling amongst the 
community that the government should grant the "five 
demands" of the prisoners, but this was single issue 
politics and PSF was faced with the rather daunting task 
of copying this success in multi-party, multi-issue |
politics. The task was to try to take seats from the |
constitutionalist non-violent SDLP. They carefully I1
targeted twelve seats and won five at the SDLP's |
iexpense.39 îÎThe next big electoral test was the 1985 general j
election when PSF gained 11.8% to the SDLP's 17.8%. This I
was important to PSF as this was approximately 35% of the |
nationalist v o t e . ^ o  The greatest victory, though, was the |
psychological one of Gerry Adams' gaining of Gerry Fitts' IjWest-Belfast seat. Not only did he have the satisfaction Ï
of beating Fitt, who stood for anti-sectarian values and !
constitutionalism, but also he ended the House of !
Common's career of the nationalist who had been most ;
vocal against the hunger strikers and the Provisionals. ?
However, they have been unable to improve on this i
figure since that period. In the 1987 election the PSF ^
vote marginally declined to 11.4% while the SDLP improved ;
its vote to 21.1% and the Alliance Party increased from 
7.1% to 10%, Interestingly the PSF was also threatened I
from the OIRA who as the Workers Party increased their i
39 David Reed, IRELAND, THE KEY TO THE BRITISH REVOLUTION, London: Larkin Publications, 1984, 367-368.40 Cynthia Irvin and Eddie Moxon-Brown, NOT MANY FLOATING 
VOTERS HERE, FORTNIGHT, May 1989,
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vote from 1.6% to 2.7%. In 1992 the Workers Party, all 
but disappeared. Since 1987 the PSF vote has continued to 
decline scoring 10% in the General Election of 1992 and 
losing Adams’ West Belfast seat to the SDLP.**
In the Republic PSF did not repeat its H-Block 
success in the election of February 1982 losing the two 
seats which the prisoners had won. By the Bail elections 
of February 1987 it won 1.9% of the vote and no s e a t s . 42 
PSF has been unable to build up a valid constituency 
south of the border and its increasingly northern 
identity has led to it failing to have any real relevance 
to the vast bulk of the Republic’s electorate.
The prospects do not look good for the "Armalite and 
Ballot Box Paper” succeeding. A negative aspect of the 
hunger strike to PSF was that it heightened expectation 
amongst supporters to an unreasonable level, it was not 
long though before this naivety was ended as Adams has 
said.
The stunning initial success with the election 
of Sands, and Carron and the two in the Republic, 
gave many the impression that elections were all 
about winning, It was not until our second 
intervention in the 26 counties... that our members 
began to gain some kind of perspective
The profile of the PSF’s electorate means that it
should not be too complacent. The support tends to be
from young people (approximately 50% of PSF voters are
aged between eighteen and thirty-four) from semi-skilled
or unskilled manual workers (approximately 45% of support
comes from social groups D and E). 33.3% of Provisional
41 See Appendix II.
42 Andy Poliak, DUBLIN: SIX INTO 26 ISN’T GOING, 
FORTNIGHT, November 1987.
4 3 Adams, (1987), 86.
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voters are unemployed compared to only 13% of SDLP voters 
(below the Northern Irish average). Further, 20% of PSF 
voters favour an end to the armed struggle which is a 
large enough proportion to worry any Provisional 
strategist.^ *
This imbalance makes the PSF vote extremely 
vulnerable and the drop to only 10% in the recent 
election, to the benefit of the SDLP, make the future of 
the two pronged campaign extremely doubtful. This will 
lead to a re-emergance of the militarist wing of the 
Provisionals. Thus, the cycle of violence will continue 
with little hope of ever being completely resolved. If 
Sands and his nine colleagues proved anything it was the 
truth of Terence MacSwiney's statement, ”Jt is not those 
who can inflict the mostf but those that can suffer the 
most who will conquer'"^^ . At the present those who suffer 
the most are the Protestant community who see the killing 
of each RUG and UDR man as a direct attack upon their 
whole community, and more generally the vast majority of 
innocent civilians who have seen normal society 
sacrificed on the sacred altar of Nationalism (whether 
Irish or British). One lesson which PIRA could have 
learnt from Sands, which they have ignored, was that he 
achieved far more in his death than he ever did in his 
career as a terrorist.
44 Data compiled by the Ulster Marketing Survey in February 1989 and quoted in Cynthia Irvin and Eddie Moxon-Brown, NOT MANY FLOATING VOTERS HERE, FORTNIGHT,May 1989.45 J. Bowyer Bell, THE SECRET ARMY, A HISTORY OF THE IRA, 1916-1970, Sphere, London, 1972, 2.
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Unsurprisingly the PIRA's first instinct after Sands 
died was revenge. In An Phoblact/Republican News on 5 
September 1981 there were calls for military action to 
avenge the ten dead hunger strikers. The answer to this 
request was that this should go without saying. One of 
PIRA's Dublin bomb makers, Desmond Ellis, constructed a 
series of devices that he thought were for use in the 
North. However, they were taken by an ASU that was 
operating on the M a i n l a n d . *6 This unit was then ordered 
to embark on a campaign in the home counties to avenge 
the dead men. The unit which included Paul Kavanagh,
Tommy Quigley and Eibhlin Glenholmes (according to 
police), then set out to attack a series of soft targets 
that would grab the world's attention. These included the 
Irish Guards who were based in Chelsea Barracks. This 
attack in October 1981 instead killed two civilians who 
were standing near to the bus in which the troops were 
travelling.47 Shortly afterwards, Lt Gen Steuart Pringle 
was severely injured in the booby trap bombing of his 
car. Other attacks by this unit included two bombings in 
central London. One was an attack on a bandstand which 
resulted in the deaths of seven men of the Royal 
Greenjackets, and in the other four members of the 
Household Cavalry died on 20 July 1982.4a Subsequently,
46 When Ellis stood trial in the UK in 1991 he was found not guilty by the jury of taking part in the Mainland campaign. His defence did not contest that he had made the devices but said he had been ignorant of their destination and that he had already been convicted and punished by eight years imprisonment in the Republic for this crime where the offence was perpetrated and so faced a "double jeopardy" if convicted.TIMES 31 October 1991.47 Clarke, (1987 ) , 205.48 Coogan, (1988), 646.
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the unit also bombed Harrods just before Christmas 1983, 
resulting in the deaths of six civilians. Quigley, 
Kavanagh and the quartermaster from Dublin Natalino 
Vella, were eventually found guilty at the Old Bailey of 
causing four explosions in London. This campaign of 
revenge culminated in an attack upon the Cabinet and the 
Prime Minister herself at the Grand Hotel, Brighton in 
October 1984, when a bomb planted by Pat Magee killed 
five people who were attending the Conservative Party 
conference, and came within inches of killing Margaret 
Thatcher.^  ^
The PIRA campaign in the North was relatively 
untouched by the hunger strike, though the Official 
Unionist MP, Rev Robert Bradford, was killed because of 
comments made during the fast. The level of violence, as 
stated earlier, has continued to take a downward trend 
and the number of casualties inflicted on the security 
forces has stabilised to between thirty and forty deaths 
a year.50 Thus, while the security forces are not able to 
defeat the paramilitaries they have been able to contain 
the violence and enforce governmental control of the 
Province. While the PIRA has at best managed to maintain 
a stalemate the security forces are at best maintaining 
an upper hand in the hope of a political solution sooner 
or later. This is despite the fact that since the large 
shipments of arms to Ireland from Libya the PIRA has been 
better armed than ever before. In 1988, a senior 
Provisional said that.
49 Bishop & Mallie, (1989), 423-426.50 See Appendix II, Table One.
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This is the final phase. The next eighteen 
months to two years will be critical because the IRA 
has the resources and will know then if it has the 
capacity to end it.^^
This has patently failed, at the time of writing over 
three years has passed since the statement was made. The 
PIRA has not been able to force the British out.
There are several possible reasons for the failure 
of PIRA to increase the heat of the war. One reason is 
the brain drain of talent from the military wing of 
republicanism because of arrests and the use of "Armalite 
politics". The success of PSF in the 1980's has meant 
that there is an option available for many of the 
brightest people attracted to the movement to enter 
politics rather than the risky life of the gunman. This 
attrition was combined with people leaving the prisons 
who having served their time for the movement now wish to 
settle down. Because of the security force's monitoring 
of PSF activists this means that they cannot join up with 
the PIRA again. Additionally, since the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement the RUC has gained an increased level of 
support from the minority, leading to people like Bishop 
Cathal Daly (at the time Bishop of Down and Connor) 
supporting Catholics who wanted to join the RUC.sz 
Finally, since the Anglo-Irish agreement cross-border co­
operation has increased between the security forces in 
the North and in the Republic. This has constrained the 
freedom of movement for terrorists. Thus, the PIRA has 
been unable to hit too many British targets while the UDR
51 Eamonn Mallie, THE PROVOS' RESURGENCE: THERE'S MORE TO 
COME, FORTNIGHT, September 1988.52 Robert Bell, Robert Johnstone & Robin Wilson, TROUBLED TIMES- FORTNIGHT MAGAZINE AND THE TROUBLES 1970-91.Belfast: Black Staff Press, 1991, 215.
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and RUG have, due to their increased presence on the 
streets, curtailed much of the Provisional's ability to 
fight.5 3 Yet despite this the PIRA will continue to 
operate and the statement given by a spokesman for the 
Army Council is probably correct.
IVe can't be beaten; there is no question of us 
winning in the sense of driving the British Army 
into the sea. But we always maintain the capacity to 
bring the situation to a crisis at some stage.^^
The British, after the end of the hunger strike,
were keen to try and stabilise the situation again and
then try and find some form of political solution. It was
recognised as early as 1978 in a British army
intelligence report that the Provisionals campaign would
probably last as long as Ulster stays part of the
Union.55 This has prompted a military policy of
containing and limiting the PIRA rather than to try to
fight it full on. This has involved an increased use of
covert operations, informers, and restricting the
availability of easy targets which, combined with
"Ulsterisation", has meant that the politicians have been
given space in which to try and find a solution to the
Irish problem.
Once the crisis of 1981 was resolved by the defeat
of the hunger strike, it was followed immediately by an
enlightened liberalisation of the prison regime. The
53 Sean O ’Neill, HITTING THE TARGET, FORTNIGHT, September
1988.54 Coogan, (1988), 650.55 Document by Brigadier Jim Glover, titled NORTHERN 
IRELAND: FUTURE TERRORIST TRENDS, dated 2 November 1978, captured by PIRA.Published as an appendix to Sean Cronin, IRISH NATIONALISM-A HISTORY OF ITS ROOTS AND IDEOLOGY, Dublin: Academy Press, 1980, 339-357.
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hunger strike could not be said to have had any long-term 
direct effect on British policy. It did however confirm 
in the minds of British politicians that it was time to 
look at the problem again. The strike had illustrated to 
politicians that the new leadership was well led, and 
that the enemy were in their own way men to respect. In 
1991, Lord Gowrie the Minister responsible for the 
prisons during James Prior's period as Secretary of State 
said: "J respect the integrity of the hunger strikers. 
This personal view probably reflected the seriousness 
with which the government took the rise of PSF. This led 
to the recognition of the need to counter its rise as an 
electoral force. It also led to a re-assessment by the 
government of the extent of the loyalist veto on 
constitutional change, resulting in increased cooperation 
with the SDLP and the Irish government. These changes 
have led to a series of initiatives and reforms which 
have tried to address the grievances of the nationalist 
community.
The reform process ultimately led to the signing of 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement of November 1985 by FitzGerald 
and Thatcher. This addressed many of the grievances of 
the nationalist community by giving the Irish government 
a consultative role in Northern Irish affairs. It has led 
to the consolidation of the SDLP vote and the decline in 
electoral success for PSF.s? Ultimately this led to the 
defeat of Gerry Adams in West Belfast and PSF's lowest
56 PACK UP THE TROUBLES, CRITICAL EYE, Exco Television for Channel 4, broadcast 24 October 1991.57 Coogan, (1988), 235-237.
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ever Province wide vote (10%) in 1992 since it embraced 
electoral politics in 1982.
However, it must be remembered that despite the 
decline in fortunes of PSF it could always re-emerge, 
especially if it can find, some issue with which it could 
tap into mainstream nationalist opinion again. It is 
vital that the government remains aware of this danger 
and if possible heads off any controversies before they 
become major issues over which a new generation of Irish 
republican martyrs could be created.
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This thesis has examined events in modern Irish 
history which, though based around the republican 
prisoners in the Maze, were to have repercussions out 
with the Prison. It was the importance of this which was 
one of the initial attractions of the subject and as a 
theme- the effect which the hunger strikers were to have 
on Ulster generally- it has underlined the thesis. The 
study also sought to examine the motivations behind the 
self-inflicted suffering which the prisoners embarked on, 
first in the "dirty" protest and then in the hunger 
strikes of 1980 and 1981.
The leadership of the PIRA changed during the 1970‘s 
when the young Northerners under the leadership of the 
late Seamus Towmey displaced the more (small c) 
conservative largely Southern leadership. This was 
another theme that ran through the whole period.
The Northerners had the intention of dramatically 
changing the whole nature of the conflict in the 
Province. It has been noted that this included securing 
the structure of the PIRA brigades, and the creation of 
the Active Service Units (ASU) which were based on a 
closely knit cell structure. These units included the use 
of specialists and often operated outside their own 
regions. This increased the security within the movement 
and greatly reduced the influence of the Southerners.
They then retreated into PSF, but the Northerners wanted 
to change the party's strategy as well. The prisons
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crisis proved to be the ideal vehicle with which to do 
this. The use of the dispute as a single issue was to 
prove as important as the anti-internment campaigns of 
the early 1970‘s in attracting popular sympathy from the 
nationalist community. Further, the stature of the 
Northerners was greatly increased within the movement by 
the success that the external campaign had in winning 
this sympathy.
The success of Northerners, now under the leadership 
of Gerry Adams and his allies Danny Morison and Martin 
McGuinness, was proved at the PSF ard fheis of 1981 when 
the federalist Eire Nua (New Ireland) plan was dropped 
from party policy. In 1982, this was further demonstrated 
when all aspects of federalism were dropped from the 
constitution of the party. This resulted in the 
resignation of Ruarai O'Bradaigh and Daithi O'Connell 
from the leadership and the election of Adams to become 
President of PSF. Eventually, these moves prompted a 
split in 1986 over the issue of abstentionism within 
Ireland. The split was prompted by O'Bradaigh and 
O'Connell who were suspicious of this overtly political 
move that possibly threatened the "armed struggle". They 
formed a small party which became known as Republican 
Sinn Fein. This split would not have happened without the 
boost in electoral fortunes which the hunger strike 
brought to PSF.
The rise of PSF was to contribute indirectly to the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Government recognised that the 
constitutionalist SDLP was threatened by the rise of the 
Provisionals. The prospect of PSF becoming the voice of
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Northern nationalists was not one that the Government 
would have relished. Any form of legitimacy for the armed 
struggle within the nationalist community would have been 
a disaster on the international stage as well as leading 
to the increased questioning of the British presence in 
Ulster that this could produce within the UK itself.
This wish to stabilise the position of the SDLP, as 
well as the need to try and find some form of resolution 
of the conflict, was to lead to an attempt to resolve 
nationalist grievances within the framework of the UK.
This was to become the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985.
While the effect of the hunger strike has been over 
estimated with regard to the signing of the agreement, it 
is unlikely that the chain of events that led to the 
accord would have occurred without the hunger strike 
giving PSF a position that had to be addressed. Thus, one 
can argue that the agreement was indirectly caused by the 
fast.
The hunger strike itself was only the last event in 
the prison dispute which began in 1976. As a subject of 
study the dispute proves a very interesting microcosm of 
the whole Northern Irish conflict. The confrontation in 
the prisons illustrated the different ways the conflict 
was perceived by republicans, nationalists, unionists and 
the government.
Essentially, the British government perceive the 
Northern problem as one of an ethnic conflict where they 
stand neutral between the two communities. This is 
reflected in the way mainland politicians refer to the 
Irish Problem, while republicans view the conflict as one
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of national liberation and will pointedly talk of 
Ireland's British problem. The unionists look on the 
conflict as a defence of the right of self determination 
for the majority of the population in the Province and an
attempt to preserve the right to a British identity and
their existence in Northern Ireland. The nationalists of 
the SDLP along with moderate pro-union Alliance Party try 
to find a middle ground between the extremes. In one way 
or another all sides in the conflict make a claim for the 
moral high ground and passionately believe in the 
righteousness of their cause.
In the prisons the republican prisoners were
prepared to live in the appalling self-inflicted
conditions to bring about what they regarded as their 
rightful demand to be treated as political prisoners of 
war. In doing this they chose to walk in the footsteps of 
previous Fenian and IRA prisoners who had refused to 
accept that they were criminal prisoners. It was no 
surprise that the prisoners would react so violently when 
one remembers that republicans have a great sense of 
history which is thought to them from early childhood.
They see themselves as the latest successors of a history 
of Celtic resistance to Anglo-Saxon domination. This line 
stretches back eight hundred years to the first Norman 
invasion led by Strongbow in 1170. Much of this 
republican mythology involves the struggles inside the 
prisons dating back to Fenians like Jeremiah O'Donovan 
Rossa who in the nineteenth century claimed the right to 
be Prisoners of War.
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Thus, when Merlyn Rees announced the end of special 
category status he was laying down a direct challenge to 
the prisoners. The men who were to go on the "blanket" 
would have felt that they were betraying their 
predecessors if they did not fight to regain the 
privileges, which had been won in 1972, by a hunger 
strike. Given that it was won by a hunger strike it is no 
surprise that by 1980 the prisoners had decided that they 
had to try the weapon of last resort- the fast. The 
conditions of the "dirty" and "blanket" protest meant 
that there was a steady erosion of men this lead the 
protest, leading to the feeling that the protest should 
be finished quickly by bringing it to a peak. The outside 
assassination campaign against prison officers had been 
as unable to move the government as the protests within 
the prison. Further, the new party in power in London had 
a past history of giving in to the hunger strike weapon.
Indeed, the threatened hunger strike by the President of 
Plaid Cymru, had helped to ensure that the new commercial 
fourth channel in Wales would be largely in the Welsh 
language.i
However, the prisoners made a mistake in assuming 
that the British would give in to such tactics when used 
by convicted criminals. The Conservative Party had 
dramatically changed since the Heath government of the
1 In May 1980 Gwynfor Evans, threatened a fast when the ÎGovernment refused to honour a manifesto promise to have Channel Four in Wales as a Welsh language station (S4C). 1His fast was to start on the 6 October 1980, but on the ‘17 September it was announced that the pledge would be jhonoured. iDavid Beresford, TEN MEN DEAD, London: Grafton, 1987, 34- |35. i
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1970's. The new leadership was aggressively opposed to 
the PIRA and the premier, Margaret Thatcher, was being 
advised by William Whitelaw who had, as Northern Ireland 
Secretary, granted special category status. This was 
granted in the context of many of the prisoners being 
interned without trial and a cease fire with the 
Provisionals. Nether of these factors was in play in 
1980/81. The Northern Ireland Secretary at this time,
Humphrey Atkins, has subsequently said that one of the 
problems with the fast was that the prisoners did not 
believe the government when it said that it would not 
give in to the hunger strike. As history proved, this was 
a grave misjudgement by the Provisionals.
By February 1981 the prison leadership faced a moral 
dilemma. The first hunger strike had ended 
inconclusively. The prisoners and authorities had 
different interpretations of the proposed reforms that 
had been agreed in December 1980. The prisoners felt that 
they had been cheated by the government and faced the 
choice of either accepting the limited reforms of the 
authorities or embarking upon a second hunger strike.
This fast, the prisoners realized, would result in the 
death of at least one hunger striker. Aside from the 
practical problems: PSP faced restarting the external 
campaign while the PIRA faced the armed struggle being 
placed into the background as the world looked on the 
Maze Prison, there also remained an important moral 
question to be answered.
Most of the Provisional prisoners were practising 
Roman Catholics, yet the Church is fundamentally opposed
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to suicide as an act of violence against oneself. Suicide 
is by extension an act of violence against God in whose 
image mankind is believed to have been made. This was a 
question which Bobby Sands discussed with the prison 
chaplains, who felt that the fast was acceptable if it 
was a technique for winning reforms, but if the intention 
was death in itself then it was wrong and a sin. This 
interpretation was open to argument. The British Catholic 
Church was opposed from day one, while the Irish Church 
was divided. Bishop Cahal Daly, of Derry, was opposed to 
the hunger strike in principle, while Cardinal Tomas 
O ’Fiaich was more sympathetic to the arguments of the 
prisoners, stating that no body went on hunger strike 
with the intention of killing themselves. However, after 
the first few deaths it became apparent that the British 
would still not give in even if every prisoner in the 
Maze were to die on a fast. The British were taking a 
principled stance that this tactic was a form of moral 
blackmail which it would not give in to. This reduced the 
strike to a mere body count with the Provisional 
leadership on the outside trying to make as much mileage 
of this as they could in the political campaign. Once the 
aim of the strike had undeniably become death in itself, 
rather than a form of protest, the Catholic Church turned 
against it. Such a position was not going to have much 
effect on the prisoners who, despite their own faith, 
were used to being condemned by the Church. But the 
relatives were a different matter; many were not 
necessarily PSF supporters and were generally far more 
ready to listen to the Church. After the failure of the
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intervention by the Irish Commission for Justice and 
Peace, because of Provisional intransigence, the Church 
and specifically Fr Denis Paul, an assistant Chaplain at
Ithe Maze, decided to campaign against the strike. As the |
prisoners remained unresponsive he went to the relatives, ]
who had the right to ask for medical intervention after i
!the prisoner was no longer conscious. He asked the j
relatives of the surviving strikers to make their j
Îintention to intervene known and thus present a fait \
accompli to the prisoners. The prisoners were furious, |
Ibut could do nothing, and thus they announced that on 3 ;
IOctober 1981, that the fast was over. i
The question that is asked about the hunger strike, !
in regard to the policy of the United Kingdom government, |
was whether it should have been possible to reach a jI
compromise on prison conditions before the crisis reached j
the point of no return with the hunger strikes. j
The view of the SDLP is that the government could |
and should have resolved the problem, probably in 1979 j
and certainly in 1980 both before and after the hunger I
strike of that year. On the other hand one must remember -j
1the reasons why special category status was abandoned in I
the first place. When the government Committee under Lord i
Gardiner reported on the prisons in Northern Ireland it Îi
stated that special category status had been a ^'serious j
mistake" T h e  whole committee had been appalled by the ]
Îsituation inside the prisons, most importantly it felt ]
2 Lord Gardiner (chair), REPORT OF A COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER, IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, MEASURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND, London: HMSO, 1975, 33.
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that the authorities had no control over the inmates and 
that the prisons were not succeeding in their aim of 
reforming the convicted terrorists. Further, the 
continuation of special category status had convinced the 
prisoners that there would be an amnesty which the 
committee felt should be refuted by abolishing the 
special category prisoners, thus signalling that the 
British would not withdraw and that there would be no 
amnesty, reinforcing the deterrent value of gaol. The 
government agreed, and had not changed their Irish policy 
since 1976 (the date of abolition) and were not prepared 
to give any form of legitimisation to the PIRA or create 
any false illusions that might encourage young people 
into the paramilitaries. If anything, the success of the 
international H-Block support movement in attracting 
attention meant that the government were even more 
determined not to be seen to lose the dispute.
It was probably in the summer of 1980 that the 
British could have reached an acceptable compromise with 
the prisoners. It has been argued that the Provisionals 
were desperate for an issue with which to launch their 
campaign within constitutionalist politics, and that they 
would not have accepted anything other than a return to 
special category status because of the prisons role as a 
propaganda tool. While the campaign was useful in this 
role, it would have been unlikely that PSF could have 
anticipated the dramatic electoral gains that it won 
through the spin off from the strike. Had this been the 
case PSF would have contested the 1980 local elections.
Further, whatever the result of the fast it would have
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been long since over by the next election which would 
have been the general election predicted for 1983. They 
would not have expected the by-election which was caused 
by the death of its M P . By chance this was one of only 
four or five seats in which a republican could have stood 
and reasonably expected to win. No strategist would have 
even dreamed of the possibility of standing a candidate 
until the MP, Frank Maguire, had died and even so it was 
touch and go whether Sands would stand. Apart from these 
factors, historically prison hunger strikes were 
notoriously unpredictable and were a protest which the 
Provisionals would have preferred not to use other than 
as a weapon of last resort. They looked on the prison 
dispute as an important matter, but it distracted from 
the armed struggle and the ultimate aim of re-uniting 
Ireland. At this time the prisoners were at the end of 
their tether with very low morale amongst the 
"blanketmen", and large numbers were leaving the protest 
and conforming in order to keep the very generous 
remission of sentence (50%) which the NIO gave to the 
prisoners. They would almost certainly have accepted a 
face-saving measure like the conditions introduced by Jim 
Prior in October 1981. However, the British were 
unwilling to accept any form of defeat, especially inside 
the prisons. This meant that it took the first hunger 
strike to get them to address the issue. The 1980 fast 
ended in confusion because the prisoners were not 
prepared to see a man die at the point when it looked as 
if the protest was resolved. Again at this stage the 
British, with a bit of bargaining, could probably have
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resolved the dispute, but the authorities' inflexibility 
was returned with interest by the republicans. Had the 
five points been negotiable rather than carved in stone 
they probably could have reached a deal on prison 
conditions that was acceptable to the authorities.
However, there was a complete failure by ether side to 
understand the other's position.
The strike completely failed to end the three-party 
consensus in Westminster on Irish policy or even on penal 
policy. There had been some activity by traditional 
republican sympathisers in organisations like Troops Out, 
who formed Charter 80 to campaign for the fast; but the 
majority of the British population remained apathetic 
about Ireland. Internationally, while the dispute was a 
useful propaganda issue the pressure failed in persuading 
the governments who could pressurise the British to do 
so. Once the immediacy of the fast was over the pro­
republican international propaganda returned to the 
normal noise level.
The 1981 hunger strike ended after the death of ten 
men inside the prison. Outside the prison system, the 
protest directly and indirectly cost the North over 
thirty other lives in the violence surrounding the 
campaign from 1976 to 1981. This was the cost of the new 
regime introduced by James Prior and his successors. By 
giving a series of extremely generous concessions, while 
the republicans were reeling from the shock of defeat, 
the government had ensured that the prisoners eventually 
had to accept defeat, though it took until November 1982
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before the no work protest was finally dropped by the 
prisoners.
The hunger strike and the violence that surrounded 
it had ensured that the British public and media had to 
take notice of the Irish problem again. While the fast 
continued the republicans gained an attention not seen 
since the early 1970's. The media interest probably 
prolonged the fast because of this factor. Subsequently, 
other fasts by prisoners have received little or no 
attention from the media in an attempt to deprive them of 
the "oxygen of publicity".3 This is self-imposed and 
almost certainly designed to prevent a repeat of the 1981 
situation.
The Churches in Ireland, like the press, reacted to 
the fast largely as could be expected. The Protestant 
Churches followed the line that the hunger strike was 
self inflicted suicide and so broke divine law. They felt 
that the government could not respond to the moral 
blackmail of the fast. The Roman Catholic Church though 
took a far more ambivalent stance. The men were given 
Christian burial on the principle that even if they were 
suicides they should be given the benefit of the doubt 
and buried according to normal church practice. On the 
point of definition the Irish Catholics were more divided 
some like Bishop Daly, arguing from the start that the 
men were suicides. Others, such as Cardinal O'Fiaich and 
Fr Faul felt that the initial fasts were not suicide but
3 The best example of this was the hunger strike by Desmond Ellis, a former PIRA bomb maker, who fagted to try and prevent his extradition from the Republic to the UK in October/November 1990, which received practically no attention from the British media until his acquittal.
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legitimate protest. However, after the death of the 
second hunger striker Francis Hughes this became 
increasingly unsustainable as the British were obviously 
not moved. The fast then started to resemble a death 
strike- a fast with the intention of dying- which was 
without doubt suicide. This was wrong and so the Church 
then set out to end the hunger strike eventually leading 
to Fr Faul persuading the relatives of hunger strikers to 
threaten to intervene, thus emasculating the fast.
Republicans have gradually revised their public 
interpretation of the resolution of the fast, from being 
wholly unacceptable to a great victory. The reality is 
different as the Provisionals, although they definitely 
won the propaganda battle, were unable to win in the 
prison. Subsequently, by indiscriminate attacks killing 
civilians, they lost much of the support gained outside 
the Province.
As one can see in Appendix II (Table Two), the 
support of the Provisionals within the North would seem 
to have remained at a fairly stable (though gradually 
declining) level, polling between 10% and 12%.'* But in 
the Republic the percentage of the vote has dropped from 
4.9% in 1984 to 1.85% in 1987. This is despite the fact 
that during 1986, in an attempt to have a relevance in 
the Republic, for the first time in its history, the 
republican movement dropped abstentionism. It seemed that 
once the single issue of the prisons was solved then
4 After the PSF high-point in the 1983 general election of 13.4% the vote dropped to 11.8% (1985) then to 11.3% (1989) and finally 10% (1992). See Appendix II, Table Two.
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republican-minded voters drifted back to Fianna Fail.
With the exception of the physical force republican 
minority in the Catholic community of the North, it 
seemed that the Provisionals and the ten hunger strikers 
proved to be more successful when their violence was 
directed against themselves, rather than against anyone 
else. As a terrorist Sands was not very successful, yet 
as a martyr he achieved some of the highest levels of 
support any militant republican has had since Partition.
He had also succeeded in getting Irish, British and 
international attention directed at Northern Ireland in a 
way the PIRA had failed to do since the early 1970's or 
since the 1981 fast.
However, the politicians within the Provisionals are 
unlikely to ever get the chance to escape their stagnant 
position. The PSF are a minority party within a minority 
group, and as such if their influence was only in 
relation to their vote they would be relegated to a 
minority role approximately the same as the Alliance 
Party. Yet, at the present they are a vital factor in any 
assessment of the situation. The reason for this is the 
link to the gunmen in PIRA- not the level of public 
support for PSF.
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The following Irish words have been used in the Thesis with a translation in the text where necessary.
Ard Fheis: Party Conference.
An seachtain dona: The bad week, the name given by prisoners to a week of alleged ill-treatment by warders.
An Uachtaran: President
Cealachan: To achieve justice by starvation as recognised in the Senchus Mor.
Cumann na mBan: The female wing of the IRA, after thereorganisation of the PIRA in the late 1970*s itoperationally merged with the male wing, it now only exists in a ceremonial manner.
Cumann na nGaedheal: The first government of the FreeState, see Fine Gael.
Bail Eireann: House of Representatives, the Irish Parliaments lower house.
Eire Nua: New Ireland, the federalist policy proposed by PSF in the 1970's dropped in 1982 from the party constitution.
Fianna Fail: Solders of Destiny, the party that was formed by Eamon de Valera in 1926 after the anti-treaty IRA/Sinn Fein split, famed for its parochial right wing Irish nationalism.
Fine Gael: Clan of the Gales, the party that traces itself from Cunian na Gaedheal the faction of the IRA and Sinn Fein that supported partition and formed the Irish Free State, became Fine Gael after a merger with the small Centre party in 1933,
Garda Siochana: Civic Guards, the police force formed by the Free State as a replacement for the old imperial Royal Irish Constabulary.
Oglaigh na hEireann: The IRA.
Oireachtas: The Irish Parliament.
Poblacht na hEireann: The Republic of Ireland.
Radio Telefis Eireann: (RTF) Radio Television of Ireland, the Irish State broadcasting organisation.
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Sceal: News, the name used for gossip and news among the prisoners in the H-Blocks.
Seanad Eireann: The Senate, the upper house of the Irish Parliament.
Senchus Mori The Medieval Irish civil code.
Sinn Fein: Ourselves Alone/We Ourselves, Political party formed in 1905 became aligned to the IRA and is the political wing of Republicanism this century though frequently suffering from splits, up to the split between the Provisionals and Officials in 1969 and the creation of Republican Sinn Fein in 1987.
Taoiseach: Prime Minister.
Teachta Dala: (TD) Member of the Dail.
Trosscad: To fast on or against a person, as recognised in the Senchus Mor.
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S T A T I S T I C S  O E  T M E  I s T O E T M E E l S T
I R I S H C O I s T E L  I  G T 1 9  6  9 —  1 9  9  0
TABLE ONE:- VIOLENT DEATHS 1969 - 1990
Year RUC RUCR Army UDR Civil Total
1969 1 12 13
1970 2 - - - 23 25
1971 11 - 43 5 115 174
1972 14 3 103 26 321 467
1973 10 3 58 8 171 250
1974 12 3 28 7 166 216
1975 7 4 14 6 216 247
1976 13 10 14 15 245 297
1977 8 6 15 14 69 112
1978 4 6 14 7 50 81
1979 9 5 38 10 51 113
1980 3 6 8 9 50 76
1981 13 8 10 13 57 101
1982 8 4 21 7 57 97
1983 9 9 5 10 44 77
1984 7 2 9 10 36 64
1985 14 9 2 4 25 5 4
1986 10 2 4 8 37 61
1987 9 7 3 8 66 93
1988 4 2 21 12 54 93
1989 7 2 12 2 39 62
1990 7 5 7 8 49 76
Total 182 96 429 189 1956 2849
Source
1991.
: RUG, STATISTICAL INFORMATION, 1969
Belfast : 1991,
- FEBRUARY
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TABLE TWO:- PARTY SHARE OF VOTES
Partv 1979a 1982b 1983c 1985d 1987e 1989f 1992g
OUP 36.6 29.7 34.0 29.5 37.8 31.4 34.5DUP 10.2 23.0 20.0 24.3 11.7 17.8 13.1Other Union + 5.7 + 3.1 2.5 4.8 +APNI 11.9 9.3 8.0 7.1 10.0 6.8 8.7WP + 2.7 + 1.6 2.7 2.1 +SDLP 19.7 18.8 17.9 17.8 21.1 21.2 23.5PSF * 10 .1 13.4 11.8 11.4 11.3 10Others 21.6 0.7 6.7 4.8 0 .0 4.6 4.5Conservative * * * * * * 5.7All figures are shown as percentages+ listed in the "Others" line.* Did not stand for election.
a General Election, Source; 
HOUSE OF COMMONS JUNE 1983. b Assembly Election, Source 
SINCE 1979. London : Longman c General Election, Source; 
HOUSE OF COMMONS JUNE 1983. d Local Election (1st pref% 1989.e General Election, Source; f Local Election (1st pref%1989.g General Election, Source;
THE TIMES GUIDE TO THE London: Times Books, 1983.; F, Magee, NORTHERN IRELAND , 1984.
THE TIMES GUIDE TO THE London: Times Books, 1983.), Source; FORTNIGHT. May
FORTNIGHT, May 1989.), Source; FORTNIGHT, June
FORTNIGHT. June 1992.
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A  O H r t O N O L O O Y  O F  T H E  F H I S O I s T J SHISFUTE 1e 7 G TO 1981 -
30 January 1975,
The report of a committee chaired by Lord Gardiner called 
for an end to special status for scheduled offenders and 
the introduction of conventional cellular prison 
accommodation in Northern Ireland.
Source; Lord Gardiner. REPORT OF A COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER 
IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 
MEASURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND. Cmnd 
Paper 5847, London: HMSO, 1975, 33.
16 February 1976,
The Northern Ireland (Treatment of Offenders) Act was 
moved before the House of Commons by the secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees. The principal 
component of this act was the incorporation of the 
Gardiner Report’s recommendations that special category 
status should be removed from paramilitary prisoners in 
Ulster.
Source; HANSARD, HOUSE OF COMMONS OFFICIAL REPORT 1975- 
76, COMPRISING THE PERIOD 9 TO 20 FEBRUARY,1976, coll 
1077-1080.
1 March 1976,
The cut off day after which people who committed 
scheduled offences ceased to qualify for special category 
status and the HMP Maze Cellular Compound was opened for 
new prisoners on the site of the Long Kesh Prison, this 
was subsequently become infamous as the H-Blocks.
Source; Robert Bell, Robert Johnstone & Robin Wilson. 
TROUBLED TIMES, FORTNIGHT MAGAZINE AND THE TROUBLES IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND 1970-91. Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 
1991, 176.
8 April 1976,
Patrick Dillon was shot near his home in Omagh, the first 
prison officer murdered, in PIRA’s prisons campaign.
Source; APRIL CALENDAR, FORTNIGHT, 7 May 1976.
19 April 1976,
Prison officer John Cummings was shot dead.
Source; APRIL CALENDAR, FORTNIGHT, 7 May 1976.
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15 September 1976,
Kieran Nugent became the first Republican prisoner to refuse to where prison uniform and so became the first prisoner to go "on the blanket",
Source; Tim Pat Coogan, ON THE BLANKET- THE H-BLOCK STORY, Swords, Co Dublin: Ward River Press, 1980, 7 9-82.
8 October 1976,
Prison officer R.J. Hamilton was killed in a gun attack outside his home in Londonderry.
Source; DATELINES, FORTNIGHT, 5 November 1976.
22 June 1977,
A prison officer Weseley Millaken of the Crumlin area of Belfast was murdered.
Source; JUNE DIARY, FORTNIGHT, July 1977.
7 December 1977,
Desmond Irvine, chair of the Northern Ireland Prison Officers Association was murdered by two gunmen as he left a union meeting.
Source; TIMES, 8 December 1977.
26 November 1978,
Albert Miles, the deputy governor of the Maze Prison, Long Kesh was shot dead at his home in Belfast. The attack was conducted by PIRA as part of the prisons campaign.
Source; TIMES, 27 November 1978.
11 December 1978,
Two prison officers were shot and wounded in a machine- gun attack on their way home from work at Crumlin Road Prison, Belfast.
Source; GUARDIAN, 12 December 1978.
12 December 1978,
Three Prison Officers wives were hurt by letter bombs sent by PIRA.
Source; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 13 December 1978.
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14 December 1978,
A prison clerk J.M.McTier was killed by republicans.
Source; Coogan, (1980), 153.
4 February 1979,
A retired Catholic prison officer Patrick Mackin and his wife Violet were murdered by the Provisionals in their North Belfast home.
Source; FINANCIAL TIMES, 5 February 197 9.& DAILY TELEGRAPH, 6 February 1979.See also Martin Dillon. THE DIRTY WAR, London: Arrow, 1991, 394-396.
16 April 1979,
A prison officer M.C.Cassidy was shot dead by the PIRA at his sisters wedding in Co Tyrone.
Source; Bell, Johnstone, & Wilson, (1991), 186.& Coogan, (1980), 153.
19 April 1979,
A female prison officer A.J.Wallace was murdered.
Source; DIARY 1978/79, FORTNIGHT, November 1978 to August 1979.
14 September 1979,
Two prison officers were shot in a social club near where they worked at the Crumlin Road Prison, Belfast, G.Foster was killed while the other was seriously wounded. This fell on the third anniversary of the first conviction of a PIRA member who was not classed as special category.
Source; GUARDIAN, 15 September 1979.
19 September 1979,
A deputy governor of the Crumlin Road Prison, was shot dead a few yards from the prison Edward Jones had stopped at traffic lights in the area which was known for its Republican sympathies.
Source; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 20 September 1979.
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21 October 1979,
At a conference at the Green Briar Hotel in Andersonstown organised by the Relatives Action Committee a pro- prisoner/anti-Unionist coalition was formed including PSF, IRSP, Peoples Democracy and other groups forming the National H-Block/Armagh Committee.
Source; Gerry Adams, THE POLITICS OF IRISH FREEDOM,Dingle Co.Kerry: Brandon Books, 1987, 76-77.
5 November 1979,
A prison officer T.Gilhooley was killed by the PIRA in Belfast.
Source; Coogan, (1980), 153. And Bell, Johnstone, & Wilson, (1991), 187.
7 November 1979,
A prison wages clerk Mr D.W.Teeny was killed by the INLA.
Source; Coogan, (1980), 153. And Bell, Johnstone, & Wilson, (1991), 187.
23 November 1979,
A prison officer G.F.Mulville was murdered.
Source; Coogan, (1980), 153.
3 December 1979,
A fifty-eight year old senior prison officer, William Wright, was shot dead by PIRA as he walked from his car to the front door, at his home in West Belfast.
Source; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 4 December 1979.
17 December 1979,
Senior prison officer Mr W.Wilson was killed.
Source; TIMES, 18 December 197 9.
18 December 1979,
A conference held in Dublin created a Southern sub­committee of the National H-Block/Armagh committee to co­ordinate anti-H-Block activity in the Republic.
Source; David Reed, IRELAND THE KEY TO THE BRITISH REVOLUTION. London: Larkin Press, 1984, 319.
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18th January 1980,
A prison officer G.F.Fox was murdered.
Source; Tim Pat Coogan, (1980), 153.
4 June 1980,
John Turnly a Protestant and the leader of the Independent Irish Party and H-Block activist was murdered by loyalists while returning from an H-Block meeting.
Source; TIMES, 6 June 1980.
19 June 1980,
The European Commission on Human Rights released its report on the case of five blanketmen who demanded political status. This was refused by the commission which found in favour of the UK government.
Source; GUARDIAN, 20 June 1980.
26 June 1980,
Miriam Daly a lecturer at Queens University was shot dead at home by loyalists, she was a former chair of IRSP and a member of the National H-Block/Armagh Committee.
Source; TIMES, 28 June 1980.
15 October 1980,
A leading Protestant member of the INLA and the IRSP Ronnie Bunting, and Noel Lyttle were killed by loyalist terrorists while Buntings wife was injured at their home in the nationalist Andersonstown area. This was part of an on going campaign to kill H-Block activists by the UDA/UFF.
Source; TIMES, 16 October 1980.
27 October 1980,
The names of the seven hunger strikers who started their fast on this date were publicly released, they were Thomas McFeely, Thomas McKearny, Brendan Hughes, Leo Green, Raymond McCartney, Sean McKenna, and John Nixon.
Source; TIMES, 28 October 1980.
1 December 1980,
Three female prisoners at Armagh Prison embarked upon a hunger strike demanding political status. They were Mairead Farrell, Mary Doyle, and Mairead Nugent. The male hunger strikers were moved to the prison hospital.
Source; TIMES, 1 December & 2 December 1980.
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12 December 1980,
Six Protestant UDA members in the Maze Prison, Robert Adams, Norman Earle, William Mullan, Thomas Andrews, Samuel Courtney, and Samuel McClean went on hunger strike to demand the segregation of paramilitary prisoners.
Source; TIMES, 12 December 1980.
15 December 1980,
In order to increase pressure upon the authorities twenty-three more Republican prisoners refused food and started a fast. In a statement the condition of the original hunger strikers was given as the reason for this escalation.
Source; TIMES, 16 December 1980.
18 December 1980,
The five still lucid hunger strikers in the Maze chose to call off the fast after the Northern Ireland Office indicated that it would be possible to compromise on the issue, and that Sean McKenna was close to death if he was not treated.
Source; Adams, (1987 )., 77-78.& Patrick Bishop & Eamonn Mallie, THE PROVISONAL IRA. London: Corgi, 1989, 360-361.
5 January 1981,
The National H-Block/Armagh Committee ruled out a new hunger strike for the time being. Bernadette McAliskey (nee Devlin) on behalf of the committee alleged that the British government had reneged on private assurances made at the end of the 1980 fast.
Source; Bell, Johnstone & Wilson, (1991), 189.
16 January 1981,
Loyalists attempted to assassinate the former MP and National H-Block/Armagh Committee member, Bernadette McAliskey.
Source; IRISH TIMES, 17 January 1981.
21 January 1981,
The former Speaker of the Northern Irish parliament Sir James Strong and his son Norman were murdered by PIRA in retaliation for loyalist attacks upon H-Block activists.
Source; TIMES, 22 January 1981.
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28 January 1981
In the Maze prison, ninety-six prisoners smashed furniture and had to be returned to empty cells after an attempt to place them in furnished cells.
Source; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 22 January 1981.
9 February 1981
It was announced by the PSP office in Belfast that a new solo hunger strike by Bobby Sands would begin on the 1 March 1981, Sands would be followed two weeks later by other hunger strikers.
Source; IRISH TIMES, 10 February 1981.
1 March 1981,
Bobby Sands refused his breakfast and started his hunger strike.
Source; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 3 March 1981.
2 March 1981,
The dirty protest was called off to concentrate attention upon Sands' hunger strike.
Source; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 3 March 1981.
14 March 1981,
Frances Hughes became the second PIRA hunger striker. 
Source; TIMES, 13 March 1981.
22 March 1981,
Two new hunger strikers started their fast they were Patsy O'Hara (INLA) and Raymond McCreesh (PIRA).
Source; IRISH TIMES, 23 March 1981.
24 March 1981,
A British business executive was shot three times in the leg by a man shouting pro-hunger strike slogans during a conference in Trinity College, Dublin. The H-Block/Armagh Committee and the PIRA denied any involvement.
Source; MARCH DIARY, FORTNIGHT, May-June 1981.
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9 April 1981,
Bobby Sands won the by-election in Fermanagh and South Tyrone caused by the death of the sitting member Frank Maguire on a Smash the H-Blocks" ticket. Sands, won 51% of the vote to the Official Unionist Harold West's 48.8%.
Source; TIMES, 11 April 1981.
19 April 1981,
In Londonderry two Catholic youths were killed by an army landrover during rioting caused by tension over the condition of Sands. One was named as James Brown aged 17. A PSF statement threatened that if the dispute was not solved the previous violence would seem like a 
Buckingham Palace tea party”
Source; TIMES, 20 April 1981.& GUARDIAN, 20 April 1981.& APRIL/MAY DIARY, FORTNIGHT, July 1981.
24 April 1981,
A four man delegation from the European Commission for Human Rights arrived in Belfast in an attempt to resolve the dispute.
Source; GUARDIAN, 5 October 1981.
29 April 1981,
The Popes personal emissary, Fr John Magee, arrived in Belfast in an attempt to save Sands' life.
Source; GUARDIAN, 5 October 1981.
5 May 1981,
Bobby Sands died as result of his sixty-six day fast at 1.17 am.
Source; GUARDIAN, 5 May 1981.
6 May 1981,
In the rioting after Sands' death twenty-one people were injured, resulting in the deaths of a milk man Eric Guiney and his fourteen year old son Desmond Guiney, after their milk float was attacked by rioters.
Source; INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 6 May 1981.& IRISH TIMES, 9 May 1981.& DAILY TELEGRAPH, 14 May 1981.
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7 May 1981,
Between 50,000 and 100,000 people attended Bobby Sands funeral.
Source; TIMES, 8 May 1981.
9 May 1981,
A replacement hunger striker for Sands was announced as Joe McDonnell (PIRA).
Source; OBSERVER, 10 May 1981.
10 May 1981,
The increased tension caused by the fast led to a UDA show of strength where 300 men in paramilitary uniform took part in ^^mobilisation exercises” in Londonderry.
Source; IRISH TIMES, 12 May 1981.
12 May 1981,
A second hunger striker died as a result of his fast.Francis Hughes died after a fifty-nine day strike.
Source; GUARDIAN, 13 May 1981.
13 May 1981,
Cardinal O'Fiaich, sent a telegram to Mrs Thatcher, saying "In Gods name don't allow another death".
Source; GUARDIAN, 5 October 1981.
14 May 1981,
A teenage girl from Andersonstown died as a result of head wounds. Julie Livingstone aged fourteen was hit by a plastic bullet fired by solders during a riot on the 12 May 1981. i
Source; IRISH TIMES, 14 May 1981. |
14 May 1981, |
Hughes was replaced by a new hunger striker Brendan jMcLaughlin. |
Source; FINANCIAL TIMES, 15 May 1981.
21 May 1981, |
Two hunger strikers Raymond McCreesh (PIRA) and Patsy |O'Hara (INLA) died after a sixty-one day fast. :
Source; IRISH TIMES, 22 May 1981. j
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22 May 1981,
Two people died as a result of wounds from plastic bullets, one, Carol Kelly aged twelve, was hit on the 19 May while the other, Hugh Dully aged forty-four, was hit on the 22 May during pro-prisoner riots.
Source; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 23 May 1981.
23 May 1981,
The local elections in the Province result in the victories of two IRSP and two Peoples Democracy candidates who in the process managed to defeat Gerry Fitt in his former seat in Belfast City Council. Due to an abstentionist policy PSF did not stand.
Source; Adams, (1987), 83.
27 May 1981,
Brendan McLaughlin abandoned his fast after fourteen days because of complications from an ulcer, this was not felt by the Provisionals to be an appropriate way to die.
Source; TIMES, 28 May 1981.
29 May 1981,
The PIRA prisoner who took McLaughlins place was named as Martin Hurson.
Source; IRISH TIMES, 29 May 1981.
8 June 1981,
A new PIRA hunger striker Tom Mcllwee embarked on his fast.
Source; GUARDIAN, 8 June 1981.
11 June 1981,
In the Republic's general election, two prisoners from ithe Maze were elected to the Dail. They were Paddy Agnew Iand Kieran Doherty, in the nine seats contested by prisoners they win a total of 40,000 votes.
Source; GUARDIAN, 5 October 1981.
14 June 1981, {
A bomb found outside Queen's University turned out to ihave fallen off the car used by Lord Gardiner, the Judge Iwho recommended the abolition of special status. He had Ibeen attending a seminar at the Law Faculty of the |University. j
Source; TIMES, 15 June 1981. j
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15 June 1981,
Patrick Quinn, a member of the PIRA, was the latest prisoner to embark upon a hunger strike.
Source; TIMES, 15 June 1981.
22 June 1981,
Michael Devine, an INLA prisoner, embarked upon a hunger strike.
Source; GUARDIAN, 23 June 1981.
8 July 1981,
The PIRA prisoner Joe McDonnell died as a result of his sixty-one day fast.
Source; IRISH TIMES, 9 July 1981.
13 July 1981,
Martin Hurson a 27 year old PIRA prisoner died after a fast of forty-five days.
Source; GUARDIAN, 14 July 1981.
15 July 1981,
The PIRA prisoner Matt Devlin started a hunger strike as the replacement for Hurson.
Source; IRISH TIMES, 15 July 1981.
1 August 1981,
An INLA prisoner Kevin Lynch died after a seventy-one day hunger strike, and the PIRA prisoner Paddy Quinn ended a forty-seven day fast after his relatives intervened and sought medical intervention.
Source; GUARDIAN, 1 August 1981.
2 August 1981,
The TD for Cavan/Monaghan, PIRA prisoner Kieran Dohertydied after a seventy-three day fast.
Source; GUARDIAN, 3 August 1981.
8 August 1981,
Thomas McElwee a PIRA prisoner became the ninth prisonerto die on hunger strike.
Source; OBSERVER, 9 August 1981.
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9 August 1981,
A man killed by a plastic bullet during rioting was named as Peter McGuiness aged forty.
Source; GUARDIAN, 10 August 1981.
10 August 1981,
The replacement for Kieran Doherty, Pat Sheehan a member of the PIRA, started a new fast.
Source; IRISH TIMES, 10 August 1981.
17 August 1981,
The replacement for Thomas McElwee was named as Jackie McMullan a PIRA member.
Source; IRISH TIMES, 17 August 1981.
20 August 1981,
Patrick McGeowan was moved to hospital after his mother intervened ending his forty-seven day fast.
Source; GUARDIAN, 21 August 1981.
20 August 1981,
Michael Devine a member of the INLA died after a sixty day fast he was the tenth and final hunger striker to die.
Source; GUARDIAN, 21 August 1981.
21 August 1981,
Owen Carron, Bobby Sands' former election agent won the Fermanagh/South Tyrone seat in the by-election that Sands death had caused winning 31,278 votes on an abstentionist anti-H Block ticket. To the Official Unionist Ken Maginnis' 29,048.
Source; IRISH TIMES, 22 August 1981.
23 August 1981,
A PIRA member, Bernard Fox, was named as the next prisoner to start a hunger strike.
Source; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 24 August 1981.
31 August 1981,
A PIRA member, Hugh Carville, joined the hunger strike. 
Source; INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 1 September 1981.
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4 September 1981,
The mother and brother of Mathew John Devlin intervened to end his fast after fifty-two days.
Source; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 5 September 1981.
6 September 1981,
The relatives of Laurence McKeown intervened to save his life after a seventy day fast. The INLA also announced it would not put members up for a fast as frequently as it had before.
Source; GUARDIAN, 7 September 1981.
14 September 1981,
In a Cabinet reshuffle James Prior became the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, while Lord Gowrie took over responsibility for the prisons from Michael Alison.
Source; GUARDIAN, 5 October 1981.
14 September 1981,
The PIRA announced that Gerard Hodgins (27) would become the latest addition to the hunger strike.
Source; GUARDIAN, 14 September 1981.
24 September 1981,
Bernard Fox came off his thirty-two day fast because of a kidney complaint.
Source; GUARDIAN, 2 5 September 1981.
26 September 1981,
Liam McCloskey the remaining INLA hunger striker came off his fifty-five day fast.
Source; IRISH TIMES, 28 September 1981.
27 September 1981,
At a meeting held by an assistant prison chaplain, Fr Denis Faul, the families of five of the remaining hunger strikers agreed not to allow them to die.
Source; GUARDIAN, 5 October 1981.
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3 October 1981,
The hunger strike was formally called off, after ten deaths and 216 days. This decision was reluctantly taken by the prisoners after the families of the five of the six men on the fast indicated that they would intervene to save the men's lives.
iSource; OBSERVER, 4 October 1981. |
6 October 1981, j
The new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, James Prior, announced at a press conference in Belfast a new |package of prison reforms. The prisoners were permitted ito wear their own clothes (but not paramilitary .juniforms), up to half of lost remission was restored, and jassociation was partially increased. î
iSource; TIMES, 7 October 1981.
2 November 1982,
The last remaining relic of the prison dispute was abandoned by 145 republican prisoners, when the no-work protest was finally discontinued.
Source; Reed, (1984), 368. And Bell, Johnstone & Wilson,(1991), 195.
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